


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THE SECRETS OF ESPIONAGE

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TALES OF THE SECRET SERVICE

BY

WINFRIED LÜDECKE



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BEHIND THE SCENES OF ESPIONAGE

Chapter 1

WILES AND TRICKS OF SPIES

MILITARY history proves that in every age, and among all the nations of the earth, there have been spies. Apart from methods of destruction, the killing and wounding of the enemy, there are many means, depending upon the use of intrigue and craft, which contribute quite as much to the attainment of the main object of war—that is, final victory. Of such means the most successful and the most dangerous to the opposing side is, beyond question, espionage. And the extraordinary peril arising from the spy's insidious mode of action justifies infliction of the severest penalties, should he be captured. He may be placed against the nearest wall and shot, after trial by court-martial or without that formality. In Italy, once war has broken out, he receives a bullet in the back. In most countries he is simply hanged. Such punishments, on the other hand, which are designed by their mere severity to act as deterrents, serve to stimulate the cunning of the spy, who must have recourse to all manner of ingenious devices if he is to reach

the desired goal without sacrificing his own life or liberty in the process.

In time of peace, spies are generally not called by this, the simplest of their designations. More frequently they are referred to under the harmless title of 'agents' (*agents secrets*), which means the same thing; and many a case before the courts, in one part of Europe or another, keeps the general public alive to the fact that spies are ever with us. Even in peace-time they run the risk of being sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and if they are not to be caught in the act, they are obliged, in the course of their work, to make use of tricks and dodges that might have been invented by Sherlock Holmes and would do him no discredit. It is these wiles and stratagems that provide much of the matter for the following pages, which make no pretension to being a history of espionage, but merely present typical examples from various times and countries.

The first business of a spy must be to deceive his fellow men as to his real personality and purpose. To this end he will assume a disguise, which he will try to make as inoffensive and as inconspicuous as possible; the more commonplace it is, the less likely will it be to suggest any thought of deception. That is one reason why

clerical garb has, from of old, been so popular among spies. It has, of course, other advantages to recommend it.

In 1809 the French general Grimoard wrote, "The best spies are often women and priests, who usually excite less suspicion than other people. Priests, especially in Catholic countries, can discover a lot of things, that can be learned only by their agency." In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 many spies disguised as priests came from Paris during the siege, and found their way into the German lines, especially where they happened to know that regiments from Catholic districts were stationed. These troops, naturally, did not shoot at the uniform that, for them, was sacred. The occurrence became so frequent that orders were issued to fire, without consideration of persons, upon all who approached the German positions anywhere except at points specially selected.

At the outbreak of the War in 1914, the Belgian authorities found, among the hordes of foreign spies infesting their country, many who, to the uninitiated, were priests, or monks, or even nuns. Similar cases were reported in Germany at the same period. In Munich several men in women's dress, a sham Capuchin monk, and one man who had got himself up as a nun

were arrested. In Eggenburg two supposed nuns turned out to be men from Serbia, who were carrying bombs on their person, while, in Berlin, two deaconesses were unmasked in prison as Russians of the male sex.

Another convenient cloak for spies of both sexes is the *rôle* of nurse or hospital attendant. Illustrations of this can be quoted from the history of the War of 1870-71, as well as of the last War. The Red Cross of the Geneva Convention has frequently been abused for purposes of espionage.

A very popular device, adopted especially in time of war, is simply to don the uniform of the enemy, and thus to enjoy the maximum of security by wearing the mask of friendship. Examples of the use of this, the most obvious and probably the oldest of all disguises, might be taken from almost any period of history. The French-speaking Russian, Colonel Figner, some of whose exploits in 1812-13 are noted in Chapter V, was a brilliantly successful officer who worked on this method. During the South-African War an English-speaking Boer, dressed in the uniform of a fallen British major, coolly rode past the British outposts, returning their salute, and made his way unmolested into Johannesburg, where he visited the clubs and

other meeting-places of British officers, hearing from their own lips the things he wished to learn. In the evening this bold field-spy mounted his horse again and rode back to his commando. He repeated this stratagem several times.

Much ingenuity in the choice of appropriate disguise is expended, even in peace-time, by professional military officers on reconnoitring-duty—this is one of the polite phrases current, that obviate the disagreeable terms for which they stand. Officers of all nations have been found at their appointed business of spying, endeavouring to pass unnoticed as tourists, labourers, employees of every kind. The seasonal influx of farm-hands and other hired workmen in certain parts of Europe provides splendid opportunities for surreptitious study and photographing of topographical subjects of interest to a possible invader. This applies, for instance, to the Franco-Italian frontier and to the eastern frontier of Germany. When the Russians arrived in the neighbourhood of Königsberg, in 1914, one of their staff-officers presented himself to a certain Prussian landed proprietor, and said, “I don’t suppose you recognize me?” “No.” “Have you never seen me before?” “No.” “Why, two years ago I was one of your hired men, and I had a good look round, while I was here.” In a public

lecture, Superintendent-General Schöttler—in the German Protestant Church a ‘Superintendent’ is something like a bishop without the finery—stated that the Russians certainly “followed roads that only natives would have thought of.”

In September 1904 two Japanese clerks employed in St Petersburg business houses were arrested. One of them, in order to facilitate his marriage with a Russian woman, had already joined the Orthodox church. When their rooms were searched, papers were found to prove that these supposed commercial men were both naval officers serving as spies. From recent military papers the following simple tale is taken to illustrate the well-known superiority of the Japanese in the art of espionage. “An American cruiser and some Japanese battleships happened to be visiting a Chinese harbour at the same time. As is the custom in such circumstances, the officers of the two navies exchanged friendly visits. One of the Japanese caused the American commander no little amazement and consternation by retailing to him sundry matters of the most confidential nature, which the American had believed could not possibly be known to any outside a very small circle of his own colleagues. He was racking his brains in the vain attempt to

imagine how the little yellow man before him could have found out this and that, when the latter picked up a table-napkin, threw it over his arm, and assumed the attitude of a waiter in the act of serving at table. The Japanese had been in the service of his American friend as officer's steward, when the former had been in charge of another ship, and he appeared quite proud to remind his quondam employer of the fact."

This story serves also to show that the spy requires not merely an appropriate disguise, but the skill to play the part he undertakes. He must be a good actor, and especially a first-rate quick-change artist, capable of meeting with boldness and presence of mind even the most perilous situations.

One of the best military spies of modern times is certainly Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell. In his book, *My Adventures as a Spy*, he devotes a whole chapter to the technique of disguise, emphasizing the psychological bases of the various modes of procedure. In his view, which is, of course, supported by very thorough personal experience, it is not the costume that matters so much as the skill shown in giving an entirely new stamp to the whole appearance. He lays special stress on the value of being able to change one's voice, and so to alter one's gait and

carriage as to be unrecognizable when seen from behind. Qualities of supreme importance are quickness of decision and capacity to deal with unexpected difficulties. One device he warmly recommends is the cultivation of a nasal pronunciation for use in emergencies. Spare neck-tie and headgear, he says, should be carried, quite different in colour and form from those usually worn, for experience teaches that, at a passing glance or in a brief meeting, it is the colour of the tie and the kind of hat or cap that are generally most firmly impressed on the mind.

Equal ingenuity is demanded in devising means of understanding and of inter-communication among the spies themselves, and in the transmission to the principals concerned of information acquired. These things must be done most warily, arrangements being made, where possible, for quickly getting rid of, or destroying, the material evidence. Lack of forethought in the matter of the disposal of documents has led to many a failure. In the smuggling of news through the enemy's lines, the South African native runners proved themselves as fertile of invention as European spies: the Hottentots and Zulus working for the British were as clever in cheating the Boers as Belgian men and women showed themselves to be in crossing the Dutch

frontier during the German occupation. And the Belgians were extraordinarily successful, in spite of the strong German guard and the rigorous search which they had to undergo. Letters were carried in boot-soles, sewn into cloak-linings and bands of neckties, or merely slipped into the leather band round the inside of a hat. They were found under the shells of oysters being imported from Zeeland. Prohibited newspapers were discovered in the double-bottoms of milk-cans. Belgian women used every part of their clothing and bodies as hiding-places. A strip of dress-lining covered with typescript would be sewn into the corsage, skirt, coat, or muff. For some time the German frontier guards were amazed at the number of women who were enceinte crossing the Dutch border into Belgium. Closer investigation revealed the fact that the curious phenomenon was due to the number of French and British newspapers that were being carried in an unusual manner. When most of these ruses ceased to be useful they hit upon the cunning idea of shooting the letters across the frontier with long-distance cross-bows, which was easily and successfully carried out during the hours of darkness.

Similar means had been employed by the spies and emissaries who enabled Bazaine, in the

B

beleaguered city of Metz, in 1870, to establish, and maintain for some time, communication with the French Government in Tours and in Bordeaux.

During the Balkan War of 1913 a woman in Sofia, suspected of espionage, was being kept under observation. The Bulgarian officer appointed for this service found her one day engaged in conversation with a Turk. They happened to be standing at a street-corner, near which was a jeweller's shop. Watching the two figures reflected in the mirror of the shop-window, he saw the woman remove from her braided hair a cigarette, which she handed to her companion, whereupon they separated and went off in different directions. Both were arrested. The suspicious cigarette was still in the Turk's case. It was filled at both ends with tobacco, but the middle portion was occupied by a tiny roll of paper, which was found to contain important details concerning the movements of the Bulgarian army. The woman was a Russian who had been expelled from her own country.

But the most cunning methods of all were in vogue among the Japanese spies, during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Most of these spies were drawn from the Chinese population and were often ostensibly earning their livelihood as pedlars, porters, and waiters. Even in very sus-

picious cases it was impossible for the Russians to convict these people of treachery by discovering upon them any material evidence of their carrying reports. The pedlar would carry in his basket goods of various colours—they might be black, blue, red, or white, corresponding to the uniforms of regiments. At the same time, each definite class of goods represented a different kind of weapon. For example, if tobacco and cigarettes were being offered for sale, the packet of tobacco stood for one military engine, the cigarettes for another. To complicate the matter for outsiders, and to make their message all the clearer to those for whom it was intended, they would show cigarette-holders of various kinds. Now and then inconspicuous notes in Chinese characters would be written on the articles. Separately, these notes meant nothing at all; arranged in a certain order they conveyed complete, and often very detailed, reports.

The transmission of information may be accomplished by signals of all sorts and by means of codes and cipher. The former are used by primitive peoples, as well as by spies belonging to the lower classes of the population everywhere. For the successful employment of the second method a little more intelligence is requisite. A war-correspondent, writing in the days of the

battle of Lemberg, in September 1914, stated "that the Austro-Hungarian troops suffered great losses owing to the espionage and treachery (!) of the natives, who indicated the positions occupied by artillery and infantry, employing, by day, columns of white and grey smoke, or small mirrors as heliographs, and by night, light-signals." A simple method of communication is provided by the use of appearing and disappearing lights in house-windows, by the burning of turf, and by the chalking up of signs upon buildings. During the Boer War, British spies—chiefly natives—would mark out a track by peeling the bark of trees, and show a change of direction by breaking over and bending a tree-top, or by laying a bundle of grass where the path turned.

On the western front, during the last War, the positions of German batteries were often betrayed by shepherds driving their flocks into the neighbourhood of the concealed guns. These movements would be observed by some French airman, who would pass on his observations by whatever signal had been agreed upon. A favourite dodge in French villages was to use the clocks in church steeples for the purpose of sending information; the hands of a clock can be distinguished from a fair distance, and they were

easily arranged so as to indicate the direction of German positions. Windmills and their sails lent themselves readily to similar manipulation; they could be put into positions that hardly aroused suspicion and yet conveyed precious information to their own side. A particularly sly trick was played by a Russian spy during the World War. Just in front of the Russian lines there was a mill, which happened to belong to his brother-in-law. The latter was very ill at the time. The spy tried to induce the miller and his wife, with a bribe of fifty roubles, to make the most of their favourable situation by turning the arms of the windmill as a signal to the Russians, if the Germans should arrive. They refused to accept his proposal. He determined to have his own way at all costs. He stripped three of the sails, bound the woman hand and foot, and fastened the helpless miller to the remaining arm, which he then turned upward. If the Germans came, they would be almost certain to bring the miller down to earth again, but, in order to do so, they would have to move one of the bared arms upward, and that would serve as an unmistakable sign that they were there. His supposition proved to be quite justified. The very next morning the windmill sails began to turn, and the Russians poured in shell-fire to make the place untenable.

A system of secret writing employed in the time of Napoleon, which was not very complicated but would appear to-day rather cumbrous, is described in a letter of the 27th of September, 1806, written by Marshal Soult to General Merle.

The instructions of to-day's date, that I am sending you along with this letter, are to inform you of His Majesty's will that I am to agree with you upon some sort of secret cipher, which you are to use in future correspondence with the General Staff.

In compliance with this order, the best thing to do, in my opinion, is to make use of the brochure entitled, *The Battle of Austerlitz, by a soldier present on the day of the 2nd December, 1805, ascribed to Major-General Sutterheim, Paris edition, published by Fain.*

The first number will indicate the page; the second number will indicate the line counting from the top, including the running title; the third number will indicate the position of the required word or letter in the line. If this number stands for a whole word, underline it. Between the numbers commas must be placed. Etc.

While a letter in cipher makes it perfectly obvious to any reader that some mystery is being concealed, all cryptic writing aims at covering up its real significance; the apparently harmless words and sentences convey one meaning to the casual reader, but a very different meaning to the initiated. In the War of Liberation of 1813

familiar expressions were employed in the correspondence between Germany and Austria, with a special military sense. For instance, "Have had a good journey, the weather is fine, the sky is blue" meant that "Austria had declared war on France." "Your cousin is in good spirits and feeling very fit" meant "The Austrian army is mobilized and ready to march."

Very instructive in this connexion is a letter from a spy to the headquarters of a Royal and Imperial Austrian corps, found among the Austrian documents referring to the same campaign of 1813. It takes the form of an ordinary business letter, but conveys a number of very important pieces of military intelligence.

DEAR SIR,

Trieste, July 31, 1813.

I sincerely hope that you are already in receipt of my last letter. I arrived at five o'clock this morning in this city of Trieste, which I find very interesting in every way. After an hour's rest I went out at once to have a look round and to see whether I could do anything about those goods that you are particularly anxious to obtain here.

I have secured the following:

- 1 hundredweight of cinnamon of average quality [*a fortress*].
- 2 cases of lemons of average size [*guns*].
- 60 ditto of smaller size.

These are being stored meantime not far from the shore.

Within the next few days you may expect to receive the following:

4 cases of bitter oranges [*earthworks*].

2 casks of eels [*magazines*].

400 sacks of rice [*hundredweights of powder*].

450 sacks of almonds [*chasseurs à cheval, light cavalry*].

1 small cask of figs [*brigadier*].

300 pounds of chestnuts [*skirmishers, light infantry*].

1 small cask of pure oil [*lieutenant-general*].

For all these articles I have paid a deposit of 1700 lire [*infantry*], debiting the amount to your account. A detailed statement of account I shall make a point of sending you by the next post.

Trusting that what I have managed to do for you may meet with your entire satisfaction and may prove extremely profitable to you,

I remain, Dear Sir, with all good wishes,

Yours faithfully,

R.

In the South-African war the British found in the office of a Dutch stationmaster, who was acting as a Boer spy, a signal-book, in which military terms were represented by technical expressions for materials used in railway and building construction. For example, sleepers=*brigades*, ribs=*batteries*, blocks=*guns*, framing-pieces=*battalions*, cross-beams=*squadrons*, boards=*companies*. Telegrams dispatched in that jargon must have looked quite unsuspecting.

Some of the codes used by German spies during the World War were rather curious. In July 1915 a German named Joseph Marks, carrying a Dutch passport, was arrested in Tilbury Docks. His method of transmitting information about the British fleet and mercantile marine was to utilize his collection of postage stamps. For example, if he sent to a certain address in Switzerland ten Nicaraguan stamps, the German Admiralty knew that ten British warships had left the port at which he had posted his envelope. Another spy, captured in the same month, was a Peruvian named Hurwitz von Zender. He was in the habit of sending news from Newcastle to an address in Christiania (Oslo), in the form of business orders for large quantities of tinned sardines. Unfortunately for him, he had not taken the trouble to find out that, at that season of the year, the wholesale sardine trade is usually very quiet, so that his telegrams very naturally excited the suspicion of the censor and led to his arrest. He was shot in the Tower.

A similar technical mistake was perpetrated by the two Dutchmen, Janssen and Roos. They were making observations in the naval ports of Chatham, Dover, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and ordering from the firm of Dierks and Co., in

The Hague, enormous supplies of cigars! They sent telegrams, for instance, asking for 10,000 Cabanas, 4000 Rothschilds, 3000 Coronas, which really signified that ten light cruisers, four destroyers, and three battleships had put to sea. If such orders had been dispatched from London, it is just conceivable that they might have passed without remark, but coming from dockyard towns they were too improbable. Two facts had escaped the notice of those agents. The population in British seaports, and British seamen in general, smoke pipes or cigarettes but hardly ever cigars; and the British counter-espionage was already fully aware that the house of Dierks and Co. was simply a screen for the Germans, and was indeed the headquarters of their espionage service in Holland. Janssen and Roos also paid the extreme penalty.

Attempts were made to send information from Hull to Holland by some system of marking fruit such as apples and pears.

Another method of communicating secret information, both simple and ingenious, was the insertion of advertisements in the columns of the daily papers. It was by this means that the German military authorities received prompt and exact news of the results attained by German bombing planes, when they visited Paris. The

points of the city that were struck, the extent of the damage, and the moral effect produced could be quite clearly indicated. One such advertisement ran: "19-22. Bien arrivé avec nos trois amis, mère malade. 3,160." This meant "Nineteenth arrondissement, square no. 22 on the military map, bomb hit, three victims, tremendous effect on the population. Sent by agent number 3,160." In this way the German intelligence service in Switzerland, where the French newspapers circulated freely, got to know exactly the results of the bombardment, and that within twenty-four hours of the event. When the French at last became alive to what was going on, a police permit had to be obtained before an advertisement was allowed to appear.

The surest way to collect information, although the slowest and not always the best adapted to every case, is that of direct personal observation, without the use of post or other means of communicating at a distance. The agent travels through the country he is ordered to reconnoitre, most frequently as a business man, sees and hears, makes a mental note of his observations, and, on his return, gives his report by word of mouth to his superiors. This method was the one generally and successfully followed by British spies, who visited Germany disguised as

neutral journalists and studied conditions on the spot. And yet even spies of this category were discovered and shot, nearly always because they aroused suspicion by some act not inevitable or necessary to the performance of their task. They might, for example, be found to have received money from persons known to the counter-espionage service as being in the pay of the enemy.

There are many other devices employed with more or less skill to conceal the transmission of information, but space will not allow us to mention them all here. It would require a special chapter to discuss the use of invisible inks and the innumerable codes and ciphers that have been invented.

Chapter 2

FRANCE

THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

IN France, as elsewhere, there have always been spies. During the sixteenth century military spies were under the immediate orders of the High Constable and actually enjoyed a certain degree of esteem. This is illustrated by a story told of the Duke d'Epernon, Marshal of France. One day there was brought before him a man accused of suspicious conduct. The Duke had him searched and in the end reached the conclusion that he was a spy. "Devil if I did not think that you were only a thief. I should have had you whipped till you were spinning like a top," the Duke said to him. "But I see that you are really an honest spy. Here are two gold pieces for you. Be off and tell those that sent you that, when we meet them, we'll see that their work is cut out for them."

Among the numerous secret agents in the service of Richelieu and his successor, Mazarin, the best were generally Englishmen, whose task it was to unravel the dark intrigues of foreign courts and cabinets, especially those of Spain, and to undo the secret foe by bribery and

treachery, ensnaring him in a net of conspiracy within and without the limits of France. At that period, when such political or diplomatic espionage flourished exceedingly, regular patents were issued to spies. Here is such a document found in the archives of the War Office in Paris.

ORDER OF THE KING TO FATHER BERTHOD

Trusting in the good conduct of Father Berthod, monk of the order of St Francis, chaplain and almoner to His Majesty, and in consideration of the proofs he has given of virtue, understanding, fidelity, and devotion to the Royal service, His Majesty hereby grants to the said Father Berthod permission, in case of need, to wear a disguise, without such act being deemed a contravention of the rule of his Order or of the King's Commands.

Paris, November 15, 1652.

This monk enjoyed the confidence of the Queen Regent and of Cardinal Mazarin. On the strength of that permit, which relieved his conscience from all moral and religious obligations, he was sent in November 1652 to Guyenne, where a rebellion that had broken out had been already partially suppressed by the royal troops, under the command of the Count d'Harcourt.

The town of Bordeaux, however, was still in revolt and remained the centre of the disturbance. Berthod managed to make his way into this town and to get into touch with the King's

followers. He was discovered and cast into prison, from which he escaped by means of a real spy's trick. He wrote a letter to the vicar of Blaye, in which he passed himself off as his uncle and referred in quite harmless terms to some benefit received, without even alluding to his plight for the time being. But in the margin he added, "I am sending you a lotion for your eyes. Rub them with it, and you will find your sight much improved." This letter, along with a phial of lotion, was handed to a peasant who was to deliver both to the Duke de Saint-Simon. In case of capture, he was to say that they were intended for the vicar of Blaye. By circuitous ways the peasant succeeded in reaching his goal, and it did not take the Duke long to understand the sly marginal note. He treated the letter with the accompanying lotion, and five or six lines, as black as if they had been written with the best ink, became visible. This was the message: "I am a prisoner of Prince Conti and his army. Send me the same shipmaster that brought me from Blaye to Bordeaux, and instruct him to bring some seaman's clothing in his boat. Make haste, or both I and the King's cause will be lost."

Berthod made his escape disguised as a sailor, and found his way back, safe and sound, to the royal army. He actually had the courage to

return to Bordeaux shortly after and managed, with the help of three women and two young girls, to procure fresh information which he brought to his employers.

Clerical garments, as appears from the numerous reports of René d'Argenson, Lieutenant-General of police, were at that time a particularly favourite cloak for spies, who moved in the make-up of Benedictine or Franciscan monks from monastery to monastery and from one country to another, thus finding an easy means of conveying news and documents of political or military importance.

Louvois, the War Minister of Louis XIV, kept spies in all the cities of the kingdom and with all bodies of troops, "Monsieur Louvois," writes the Duchess of Orleans in her *Memoirs*, "was the only one to be well served by his spies. In dealing with them he was liberal with money. Every Frenchman who went to Germany and Holland as an instructor in dancing, fencing, or riding, was in his pay and kept him informed of all that happened at those courts." And Guignard reports, "There was not an officer of any consequence in France, whose virtues and vices he did not know to the last detail. Not long ago, among the belongings of a maid who had died in the service of the largest hotel in Metz, were

found several letters from this minister which make it quite clear that she was commissioned to inform him of all that passed in that hostelry. For her services he made her a regular allowance."

In the reign of Louis XV military, as well as political and diplomatic, espionage was already extensively practised. Maurice of Saxony, a marshal in the service of France, penned certain observations which shed much light on the methods then in vogue among military spies. In Chapter X of his work, *Les Réveries ou Mémoires sur l'Art de la Guerre*, which appeared at The Hague in 1756, the famous general says:

"You cannot give too much attention to spies and guides. Monsieur de Montecuculli says, they are as useful as the eyes in your head, and, to a general, are quite as indispensable. He is right. You cannot spend too much money in order to obtain good ones. They must be obtained from the country in which war is being waged. Intelligent and skilful people must be employed. They must be distributed everywhere: among officers of the headquarters' staff, among sutlers, and especially among contractors for food-supplies; for the victualling depots and bread-bakeries afford an excellent means of judging the enemy's intentions.

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“These spies must not be known to each other and should be entrusted with various commissions. Some—those who are suited for the purpose—will smuggle themselves into the ranks; others, again, will accompany the army as buyers and sellers. Each member of the second group must know one of the first, so that he may acquire from him the information to be reported to the general who pays him. This particular task should be entrusted to a man who is intelligent and reliable. His trustworthiness must be checked daily, and you must make sure that he is not being bribed by the other side.”

A still more detailed picture of the military espionage of the period, about which only a short time ago practically nothing was known, is given in papers discovered in the historical section of the archives of the War Office in Paris, and published by Routier. These consist of the correspondence of, and documents drawn up by, Marshal de Belle-Isle, Marshal d'Angervilliers, Marquis d'Argenson, and other officers of the years 1728–48, including the period of the War of the Austrian Succession.

Here is a typical memorandum.

M. de Reen promises to carry on under various names a trustworthy correspondence describing interesting events in Vienna, Austria, Hungary,

and neighbouring countries. His informants are certain people attached to the persons of Foreign ministers resident in Vienna; and two of them undertake to remain in that city, even if it is besieged by the victorious arms of the King and his allies.

As compensation, he demands a monthly payment of two hundred florins for his own maintenance and that of a man-servant, a clerk to help him in the copying of his translations. Further, he will require two hundred ducats, for the duration of the present campaign, to distribute among the purveyors of news, bearers of instructions, and others who will, at risk to no one, send him information at this time, when the court of Vienna is taking barbarous measures against those who buy or sell even the most trifling bit of news.

He will instruct a confidant of his to proceed from Ratisbon to Vienna, who is to serve, in a sense, as a mouthpiece for the person appointed to manage this affair. He himself will remain in Ratisbon until the Elector has joined his army, and thither he will follow Monsieur de Chavigny or another minister of the King in the suite of the Elector, in order to be in a position without delay to deliver or to send latest information to whomsoever or whithersoever he may be commanded. About the *mouthpiece* he will express himself more fully.

Such documents reveal the details of an espionage system arranged according to requirements of time and circumstance, and one which possibly fulfilled its purpose not inadequately. But, of course, there is no question yet of a

comprehensive or permanent organization conducted with any unity of purpose. To bring a model system of this kind into being was reserved for the genius of Napoleon.

His mighty organization, whose centre was himself, stretched in peace as in war all over Europe, like some monstrous octopus. In every scene of war, in every land, in friendly and in hostile states, his reconnoitring generals and adjutants, his agents and spies were to be found probing into everything and overhearing everything. He knew, if ever an army leader knew, what value and what unique importance to attach to timely and reliable military information. And he knew the value of the famous utterance of Frederick the Great, "If you always know beforehand the plans of the enemy, you will beat him every time even with an inferior force."

THE MASTER SPY

Charles Louis Schulmeister is therefore of special interest, because he is the most distinguished representative of Napoleon's system; and a nearer acquaintance with his activities will afford an instructive glimpse behind the scenes of the organization of espionage under the first Empire. As it happens, we can read his reports,

and learn from his own lips, as it were, how he obtained his information.

His extraordinary career merits a brief notice. The "Great Spy" was the son of a clergyman. He was born in Alsace in 1770, and became a smuggler on the Rhine. In 1805 he was at the head of the French police in Vienna. In 1806 we find him as captain and adjutant to General Savary, capturing, at the head of thirteen hussars, the town of Wismar. In 1807 he was chief of police in Königsberg and in Erfurt. In the campaign of 1809 against Austria, he was commandant of the *gendarmérie* and of all the military police, with the title of Commissary-General. At the capture of Landshut, it was he, at the head of a stout-hearted little band, who stormed a bridge over the Isar and prevented the enemy from setting it on fire. The campaign over, he lived as a millionaire and landed proprietor on his estate in Meinau, or in the neighbourhood of Paris, where he was frequently visited by the Empress Josephine.

After the fall of Napoleon he was arrested by the Prussian police; but, for some reason never revealed, nothing was done to him, and the man who so often, as a spy, had just missed hanging, once more escaped scot-free. He died at Strasbourg at the age of eighty-three, in very modest

circumstances and surrounded by beautiful Angora cats, the passion of his old age.

Probably the most convincing account of his personality is that given by a contemporary, Napoleon's apothecary, Cadet de Gassicourt, who made his acquaintance in Vienna in 1809.

"This morning I met the French commissary of police in Vienna, a man of rare intrepidity, of imperturbable presence of mind, and amazing penetration. I was curious to see this man, of whom I had heard a thousand marvellous tales. He inspires the Viennese with as much terror as an army corps. His physique is in keeping with his reputation. He has a bright eye, a piercing glance, his countenance is stern and resolute, his gestures are abrupt, and his voice is sonorous and strong. He is of middle height but very sturdy, and of a choleric, full-blooded temperament. He has a perfect knowledge of Austrian affairs, and his portraits of its leading personalities are masterly. On his brow there are deep scars, which prove that he has not run away from dangerous situations. He is generous too: he is bringing up two orphans whom he has adopted. I talked to him about *The Recluses* (by Iffland), and thanked him for allowing us to enjoy this play."

Legend has woven round his name a garland

of anecdotes that bring into strong relief his daring, his presence of mind, and his extraordinary talent as a quick-change artist.

It is said that he presented himself for the first time to Napoleon in 1805, in the great hall of the palace of Strasbourg. When the Emperor asked him for his references, he said he had no recommendations but his own, and was naturally refused employment. The Emperor withdrew behind a screen for an instant. Schulmeister made some little change in his dress and puckered up his face. The Emperor, thinking that Schulmeister had gone, reappeared, and noticed what he took to be a fresh intruder. "Who are you? What are you doing here?" he exclaimed. Once he understood what had happened he was so amazed at the man's address that he immediately took him into his service.

It was by similar means that he once deceived the Austrian police, who had surrounded his place of abode and cut off all retreat. He passed right through their midst, bowing politely, and they let him pass, because he had not the least resemblance to the Schulmeister they knew. On another occasion, assuming the character of a German prince, he reviewed a whole army corps of the enemy, and, thanks to this ruse, supplied most important news to the French head-

quarters' staff. More remarkable still, disguised as a general of the Austrian army service corps he took part in a council of war presided over by Francis II. To the officer whose name and place he took, he had paid a million francs.

He avoided capture at the battle of Wagram by dashing into a house. When the Austrian soldiers followed shortly after, they saw a barber quietly stepping downstairs, with soap and all the usual equipment in his hands. That was Schulmeister. "Where is the spy? He must be in hiding here!" "Go up to the flat above: he is lying seriously wounded on the bed." And he was off.

One of his first commissions was to convey a dispatch from a French minister to an influential person in the Austrian army. Disguised as a German jewel-merchant, laden with diamonds and precious stones and possessed of the necessary passports, he betook himself to the enemy's lines. He was betrayed, arrested, and searched. The letter was discovered and read aloud in his presence. He was condemned to be shot; but as it was already dark the execution was deferred till the following morning. Among the soldiers in charge of him he recognized a French deserter, to whom he promised a handsome reward, if he would bring wine for him and the men. This was

done and the whole guard was doped with opium, which Schulmeister had managed to keep concealed and had put into the wine. He donned the uniform of one of the Austrians and, along with his accomplice, went straight to the person for whom the letter had been intended, delivered the contents of it from memory, and, without further molestation, left the camp. This story, we are assured by Cadet de Gassicourt, was in circulation among the senior officers and passed for gospel truth.

Schulmeister's activities were, however, by no means merely legendary. Indeed it must be admitted that his principal achievement during the third war waged by the Coalition was of great historical importance. It is certain that, in the shameful surrender of Ulm, on the 20th of October, 1805, by the incompetent Austrian general Mack, Schulmeister acted quite a prominent part. The immediate and disastrous consequence of this capitulation was the destruction of the Austrian army in South Germany, and thereafter the battle of Austerlitz.

From the documents in the military archives at Vienna relating to the inquiry held into this act of Field-Marshal Mack; from the terms of the verdict pronounced by the court-martial; and from the memorial written by Mack during

his confinement and addressed to the Emperor, it is not difficult to reconstruct the *rôle* played at that time by the spy. From Schulmeister's own reports to General Savary, to be found among the correspondence of the French army in the archives at Paris, the facts stand forth even more clearly.

At various times he called himself Charles, de Charles, Charles Frederic, Monsieur de Meinau, etc. He had been recommended to the Austrian leaders by Captain Wendt, the officer in charge of their intelligence service, and had soon won the confidence of Mack, of the Archduke Francis, and of the other generals. So it was quite readily believed that he had, at French headquarters, a friend who belonged to the commissariat, and that he had free access to the Staff. They therefore did not hesitate to facilitate his passage through the outposts by supplying him with passes, when he was going to, or coming back from, the other side. The Austrians thought he was acting as a spy for them, while he was really working against them.

Passing thus freely between the two armies he had the best possible opportunity of conveying to General Savary information as to the hopeless conditions prevailing in Ulm: the fatuous and chaotic measures taken by Mack, who would

issue on one and the same day two utterly contradictory sets of instructions; the shortage of artillery, munitions, and food; the absence of adequate fortifications; and so forth.

At one moment Austrian suspicion was aroused by an imprudent inquiry of Schulmeister's; but he re-established his credit with them by passing on a piece of news that could easily have been checked, and by offering to guarantee the truth of it by his own person. He knew at the moment that the enemy could not escape Napoleon's ring of steel; and in any case Mack, in his infatuation, did not attempt to act upon the information. He preferred to believe an idle report that suited better his own wishes. This story was to the effect that the English had landed at Boulogne, that somewhere a revolution against Napoleon had been carried through, and that the French army was consequently in retreat. There is reason to believe that Schulmeister was responsible for this invention, his object being to maintain Mack's state of irresolution, and to conceal as far as possible the actual movements of Napoleon.

In all this episode it is practically certain that Wendt, the ostensible head of the Austrian espionage bureau, was nothing else than a tool in the hands of Schulmeister. This is made evident

by the latter's reports to Savary, and by the facts that Schulmeister, though he does not say directly that he had Wendt in his pocket, does acknowledge his indebtedness to this man's traitorous information about the state of the Austrian armies, and that, after the capitulation, he recommended him warmly to General Savary for employment on the staff of the army in Tyrol.

In two letters, written immediately after the surrender of Ulm and addressed to Savary, Schulmeister described in detail his comings and goings, with the exact dates on which he was present with the Austrian army and that on which he communicated his reports to Murat. In the second one, he asked for some more interesting job than that of keeping an eye on the remnants of a beaten host, and suggested that he be allowed to make for the Russian army and then Vienna, mentioning accomplices he had in high places. Savary willingly acceded to his request.

Accompanied by Rulzki, an Austrian officer of hussars, whom he had bought with hard cash, and himself disguised as an officer of the Austrian army, he moved freely among the Russian Staff, observing the morale of the higher ranks and acquiring exact data concerning Kutusov's plans

and the forces at his disposal, all of which must have been of inestimable value to Napoleon.

After the capture of Vienna by Murat, Schulmeister became a very efficient chief of police, keeping General Savary continually informed of all that went on, and of his own measures. But he soon had a substitute appointed, and went to Brünn, where he became the director of espionage for an army corps, managing a bureau, with numerous agents and emissaries at his disposal. His special task at the moment was to watch the armies of Princes Charles and John, and, thanks to the skill and courage of his subordinates, no less than to his own masterly arrangements, his reports were astonishing in the exactness of their detail.

From Austrian official documents it is evident that, in the spring of 1806, he was, along with an accomplice named Rippmann, under lock and key, accused of correspondence with the enemy. But, as he was in possession of passes signed by Mack and Merveldt, it must have been difficult to convict him of playing a double game. At all events, he certainly escaped with his life.

He was, as has been indicated, no less remarkable in his capacity of policeman and soldier than in that of spy, but those other activities have less interest for us here. He was physically

courageous and was repeatedly wounded in battle. At Friedland he was seriously injured by a shrapnel bullet. But Napoleon, richly as he rewarded him, refused to grant him the one recognition he craved, the cross of the Legion of Honour, saying that that was reserved for his "braves." Schulmeister was merely the "Master Spy."

IN PRUSSIA BEFORE 1870

In the years 1855-56 there was great excitement in Germany over the Techen affair, which was also discussed at length in the French and British press. The judicial inquiry proved that the prime instigator of the business was Moustier, the French ambassador at the court of Berlin, who had taken advantage of his position to carry on quite an extensive scheme of espionage.

On the 24th of July, 1855, there appeared in the *Vossische Zeitung* an advertisement which ran: "Yes, on the 24th of July, at 4 p.m. in Z."

This was an intimation from Rothan, a secretary to the French embassy, that he agreed to meet in Zehlendorf the ex-Lieutenant Techen, then an old man of seventy. As a matter of fact, Rothan did not keep the appointment. In his stead he sent a man named Hassenkrug, who

had once been a Prussian police official, and was then an agent in the French secret service. Techen refused to trust this person and insisted on a personal interview with Rothan, which took place in the Tiergarten.

Techen handed to the French diplomatist reports that had been sent in by the Prussian military attaché at St Petersburg, Count von Münster-Meinhövel. These contained useful information concerning the Russian army and the state of things in Sebastopol, then besieged by the Allies. Further, he communicated extracts from the journal of General von Gerlach, in which that officer made almost daily notes of the views prevailing at the Prussian court on the political situation. Such information was obviously of great interest to the French Government, and Techen was handsomely rewarded. He entered the regular espionage service of the French embassy. Many subsequent meetings with Rothan took place. But, a little later, these were given up in favour of correspondence by letter, with a certain merchant, Mr Hauptner, and his wife as intermediaries, who also paid over the money received by Techen.

The latter had in his employment servants of Privy-Councillor Niebuhr and General von Gerlach, the two leaders of what was known as

the *Kreuzzeitung* party. For ten talers per month these unfaithful servants undertook to purloin letters, or to make copies or abstracts from letters and journals, which they passed over to Techen.

In January 1856 Techen was arrested, and toward the end of the year, having made a comprehensive confession before the High Court, he was convicted of treason.

Bismarck's reference to this affair is worthy of note. In a letter of the 16th of November, 1855, to von Gerlach, he writes, "They are saying that Berlin postal officials are suspected of being in French pay. This is rather interesting to me, because on a certain occasion Moustier spoke to Manteuffel of a thing that happened here, and of which he can hardly have heard except through a letter of mine, that had reached Manteuffel only half an hour before. The words he used were almost the identical and somewhat unusual terms that I had myself employed. The incident has always been something of a mystery to me."

On the 28th of November von Gerlach wrote this observation, "In the depositions they forgot to note that Manteuffel told me, that Moustier had questioned him about the contents of the letters in such terms as proved that he must have been already acquainted with them."

On the 26th of December of the same year, von Gerlach notes in his Journal, "This affair of the theft of letters in the post is taking a more and more sinister turn. The post office seems to have been opening letters, and delaying the delivery of documents." At a later date he writes, "The French ambassador is having the dispatches stolen."

During the period preceding the Franco-German War another notable French spy was a man named Gérard, who was in the personal suite of the Empress Augusta, his particular duty being to read aloud to her. This person was undoubtedly a tool in the hands of the ambassador Gontant-Biron, who probably recommended him. In his *Thoughts and Recollections* Bismarck writes, "For French policy, and for the French ambassador in Berlin, it was naturally an inestimable advantage to have so clever a man as Gérard in the royal household. He carried on a frequent correspondence with Gambetta, which, after the latter's death, came into the possession of Madame Adam, and furnished the principal material for the book *La Société de Berlin*. After his return to Paris Gérard became, for a time, a leader of the semi-official press, then secretary to the embassy in Madrid, *chargé d'affaires* in Rome, and ambassador to Montenegro."

D

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

During the war of 1870-71 the most cunning devices were employed by the French for the purpose of concealing correspondence from the enemy. In a communication from Moltke to Major-General von Stiehle, of the 9th of October, 1870, we read, "In the bottom of a snuff-box found on the person of an emissary of the French government, there was discovered the original of an edict signed by Favre and Gambetta, deferring the elections once more."

Dispatches were sewn into waistcoat linings, hidden in sticks, in boot-soles, cap-peaks, in a cigarette, in an artificial tooth, in a knife-handle, even in a ten-centime piece that had been cut through, hollowed out, and put together again, the joint being rendered invisible by the use of vinegar.

They were often concealed in rubber-coated pellets that were simply swallowed when danger threatened. There were emissaries who had had to swallow the same pellet several times. The Germans would search French prisoners suspected of carrying messages, strip them, give them a strong purge, and keep them under constant observation. If no suspicious signs had been observed in the course of a week the patient

was generally released with a warning not to be caught again in similar circumstances. The guilty were shot off-hand.

On the 4th of October, 1870, from his headquarters at Ferrières, Moltke issued this order:

"We have proof that communication is still being maintained between Paris and Tours by runners. We know here that one of them reached the capital on the 4th inst.

"To men whose alertness leads to the capture of couriers carrying government dispatches, a reward of one hundred talers is to be paid for each separate case."

These secret communications between Paris and the provinces were, for some time, a source of much annoyance to the Germans. General Prince Hohenlohe, whose headquarters were at Versailles, wrote, "Till the 21st of December, we had clear evidence that this correspondence was being maintained. The telegraph cable which was laid along the bed of the Seine was fished up and cut. But we knew that spies were passing to and fro. One night, after the completion of the trench connecting Stains and Pierrefitte, a peasant with his son, following a cross-country path from Paris, fell into the trench, and so into the hands of our outposts. When interrogated he became confused and gave contradictory

answers. He was therefore brought before a court-martial, but was acquitted and allowed to go. After the war Monsieur de Varu, Adjutant to Trochu, told me that that man was their last and best spy.... From that date, the Parisians received news from the outside only by carrier-pigeons, which were sent out from Paris by balloon."

The men who maintained so persistently the secret postal service were for the most part countrymen, merchants, carters, foresters, and customs or excise officers, who, by reason of their calling, had exact knowledge of the country. But police, soldiers, and sailors were also found in their number. Very often these people pretended to be Belgian subjects, and carried false passports supplied by the French authorities.

Of important dispatches several copies were always sent, and these were entrusted to various persons. One dispatch of MacMahon's was conveyed by twenty different people. The contents were often known to the bearer, so that, if the document happened to be lost, while he himself got through, he might be able to give the message orally.

Women were frequently employed as spies but they seldom reached their goal, and were generally not so successful as men. One woman, a certain Louise Imbert, however, disguised as a

man, rode from Metz to Thionville, carrying dispatches which she had concealed in her hair.

During this campaign the French authorities made a great mistake in connexion with these extremely dangerous missions, either by promising more than they usually paid, or else by promising too little. After all, in this spy business, the money question is as a rule the vital one. The reward for carrying dispatches through the enemy's line was from fifty to two hundred francs. Often not more than from five to twenty francs were paid. The peasants, especially, were badly paid, as is revealed by the data quoted from the accounts of the secret service fund at the Bazaine trial, *e.g.*:

Sept. 24. To a peasant belonging to Donchéry who returned from Saarbrücken, 5 francs.

Sept. 25. To a peasant from Donchéry, 50 francs.

But under the date October 22, we read:

To Valcour, Interpreter, Special Mission, 300 francs.

To Courtial, Sergeant in the 24th Regiment, 300 francs.

To Prieskewitsch, Interpreter, Special Mission, 300 francs.

To Vernet, Interpreter, Special Mission, 300 francs.

On the 20th of August Policeman Flauhaut was sent from Thionville to Metz with two

important dispatches addressed by MacMahon to Bazaine. On his way back from Metz, next day, he was noticed and pursued by a Prussian patrol. Flauhaut jumped out of the conveyance in which he was travelling, and dived into the Moselle. He swam for four kilometres, eluded the Prussians, and arrived at last, unharmed, at Thionville. For that piece of work he received fifty francs! A certain Anthermet and his wife received at the same time 1100 francs—200 for the purchase of his civilian dress, 400 francs for providing the horse and carriage, and 500 francs in addition. The reward of 4000 francs paid to one Heron, who went from Metz to Verdun after the battle of St Privat, was exceptional.

However, there were numerous patriotic and devoted people who, with no thought of gain, but anxious only to help their country, carried out the tasks set them with discretion and complete success. There is a case on record of a man who offered to undertake a perilous mission disguised as a Prussian lancer, and, as he did not know any German, to have his tongue cut out, so that he could not speak at all. General Jarras tells of a pedlar named Macherez who, in Metz, offered to act as a spy, and unconditionally. He had sworn to avenge the burning of the village of Jussy by Prussian troops. For carrying a dis-

patch to Verdun and bringing back the reply to Metz, he was offered 1000 francs. He, however, wanted no reward, thinking himself sufficiently paid by having had the privilege of serving France.

It was very awkward when dispatches in cipher, delivered often at such great risk to the bearer, could not be read; and that has been known to happen. Gambetta, for example, at Tours, received a dispatch dated October 26, from Metz, but as he did not possess the key to the cipher of the army on the Rhine he had to send it to Paris to be decoded. It was not returned to Tours till the 17th of December.

The badge of the Red Cross was frequently abused by the French for purposes of espionage. After the battle of St Privat, General Prince Hohenlohe writes, "A Frenchman was observed galloping round the bivouac. In the prevailing state of exhaustion and fatigue, our people had merely noted that he was unarmed and wore a white brassard with the red cross of the Geneva Convention. But when, for the third time, he circled round the guards, we thought it suspicious, and Major von Roon was instructed to question him. During the interrogation he was insolent and yet, at the same time, nervous. He was required to dismount. His armlet was found

to bear the depot stamp of a regiment of fusilier guards. He was a French staff-captain, and for this abuse of the neutral badge he might have been shot at once. The Prince of Württemberg, however, being forbearing and good-natured, had him handed over to the civil authorities."

Stieber, the chief of the military police, describes the curious case of a French diplomatist who was actually living in the German G.H.Q., at Versailles, under cover of the Red Cross. "Yesterday I made a great haul. The First Secretary to the French embassy in Berlin, Le Sourd, who played an important part after Benedetti had been requested to move—it was Le Sourd who handed to Bismarck the declaration of war—has been living here incognito in the home of his mother, a very great lady. No doubt he had some difficulty in deciding where he really ought to go, for he would hardly be a welcome guest in Paris at the moment, and perhaps he thought we should not notice or recognize him here, in the disguise of an attendant in a French hospital."

When, soon after this arrest, a general round-up was carried out, several secret emissaries of the French Government were discovered among the men who were ostensibly devoting themselves to the care of the wounded.

As far as their influence on the intelligence service was concerned, the activities of the representatives of France in neutral lands were insignificant. The only exceptions were Tachard, the ambassador in Belgium, and Cussy, the consul in Luxemburg, who worked in close association.

Tachard was extraordinarily busy, maintaining intimate relations with the general manager of the Luxemburg railways, with the editor of the *Indépendance Belge*, and with the prefect of police in Brussels, from all of whom he received valuable information. He had another source of news in Belgian spies, who were generally working for both sides. Dispatches received by him through these various channels were passed on to the Government at Tours by telegraph, while he also managed to get important and often encouraging news over the frontier of Luxemburg, into Metz.

Cussy maintained numerous agents all over Luxemburg, and especially on the French boundary. Their chief business was to send in reports on all persons coming from, or going to, Metz, and to watch Bazaine's dealings with Prussian headquarters.

Tissot, the French *chargé d'affaires* in London, endeavoured to keep his Government informed

of all important happenings, and was in almost daily correspondence with Tachard.

After the unfortunate issue of the war, the French General Staff was reproached with having had no good spies, and with its incapacity to organize an efficient intelligence service. Some critics went so far as to ascribe the disaster entirely to the lack of such an organization.

ROUND ABOUT THE NINETIES

A NAVAL EXCURSION

One of the best known military writers of France, Admiral Degouy, a former professor at the Military School in Paris, honoured Germany on two occasions with his mysterious presence. He was a naval officer in the service of the French General Staff, which was taking a very lively interest in the German coast defences. The first journey was made in the year 1890, ostensibly as a pleasure trip with his wife. His letters were addressed to Monsieur Crasse.

Three years later he received a second commission. Before he set out, his chief impressed upon him that he must not use bribery, must not make notes or sketches on the spot, and must be prudent. Along with another naval officer, Delguy-Malvas, he went to Cowes. There, under

the name of Paul Dubois, he hired for a couple of weeks, for the sum of four thousand francs, the small steam-yacht *Insect*. They first visited the Dutch coast, where the fortifications of Neuwerk were observed and sketched. Then they visited Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Borkum, Heligoland, Cuxhaven, and Kiel. Here their fate overtook them. They had been taking photographs as well as making sketches, and their carelessness in leaving drawings, plans, and charts lying about in the cabin proved their undoing. The customs officer in Cuxhaven certainly found no dutiable articles on board, but he was struck by the extraordinary abundance of those aids to navigation, and made a report of what he had observed to his superiors, who in their turn informed the police. When the yachtsmen landed in Kiel, on the 25th of August, they were kept under observation without their being in the least aware of the fact.

The supposed tourists made straight for Fort Pries, which had been built only a few years before and which occupied a very remote and well-concealed position. After observing it very minutely, they made excursions to other defence-works, and finally returned to the yacht, where they were arrested on the 28th of August. During the trial it came out that Delguey-

Malvas had already made a very profitable stay in Germany in 1892, in the guise of a commercial traveller for medical specialities. They were sentenced to imprisonment in a fortress, for six and four years respectively; but, by an act of grace on the part of the Emperor, they were granted their liberty after only a brief confinement.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

The evidence given during the Dreyfus trial sheds an interesting light on many aspects of our subject, especially on the accepted methods of counter-espionage. Lieutenant-Colonel Cordier, one of the witnesses, described one case.

“The usual method? We had, for a long time, an agent of quite remarkable gifts and only trifling faults. This agent was reputed to have a weakness for visiting the houses of the great, and in these houses to prefer the society of the servants to that of their masters: a matter of taste! Very often he brought away with him papers, which were sometimes whole and sometimes more or less torn. For years this agent kept these scraps of paper and pasted them together. He sorted them out himself, and brought his booty to the General Staff. He used often to come to the War Office to complete his work in the presence of the officer

who looked after this branch. In the end the officer took to helping him at the job. Some people, it seems, find much fascination in scissors and paste! I said that this agent had certain little faults. He had affairs with women, and particularly one that I do not need to retail here. In consequence of this particular affair, a lady named Madame Millescamp thought it appropriate to have her revenge by informing the German embassy that certain work was afoot. At once we ordered our agent to break off all relations and to be very circumspect. Then Madame Millescamp was arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. We were thus assured of *her* silence.

"Our next business was to find out how the Germans were taking the affair. We learned that they were laying a trap for a *lady*. This lady was in correspondence with our agent. It was *she* who had been securing the bits of paper; he had been receiving them from her. His meetings with her, which, because of her employment, took place generally at night, and often in churches, were arranged by postcard whenever she had anything to hand over."

Some of the tales told of the means applied to test the loyalty of French army officers are very curious.

In a house opposite the German embassy, in the Rue de Lille, Colonel Sandherr had fitted up a complete observation-post. A flat had been rented there, in which an agent permanently resided. In the window-shutters openings were made, through which, as Colonel Picquart himself admitted, every one who visited the German embassy was photographed. General Gonse stated in his evidence before the military court:

“Immediately below this flat the officers attached to the embassy had hired the rooms on the ground-floor, where the unmarried men took their lunch every day, the wife of the *concierge* doing the cooking for them. There was a dining-room and a smoking-room, in which coffee was taken. Right over this room Colonel Picquart had things arranged so that anyone sitting near a certain piece of furniture was able, by means of speaking tubes which he had fitted in the chimney, to overhear all the conversation that went on below. An agent, who was personally unknown to me, was sent to this upper room daily, and had to report every evening to Colonel Picquart.”

It was extremely imprudent on the part of a soldier to have dealings of any kind with aliens, especially with Germans.

There was a cavalry officer named D’Orval

who always had some special agent at his heels. He had ordinary social relations with the German ambassador and the military attaché, and his wife was an Austrian. All that surely constituted sufficient ground for regarding him as a traitor. His servant was bribed, and, "by the usual channels," letters of his found their way into the Ministry of War; they proved to be perfectly harmless notes, invitations to dinner, etc. When he went to Moscow he was followed and carefully watched, to see if he would make any attempt to procure military information by approaching the officers composing General Boisdeffre's mission to Russia. But here again no damning evidence of any kind could be discovered to confirm the suspicion harboured against him.

Thus, officers in the French service, the moment they became in the least suspect, and sometimes without any provocation whatever, were ruthlessly exposed to the attentions of informers and spies. As in the case of Esterhazy, official authority did not appear to be required before letters were stopped in the post or stolen from one's place of abode, and police raids carried out in one's absence.

The results of counter-espionage are, of course, most evident in the arrest and conviction of spies.

In the *Journal des Débats* of the 10th of November, 1894, a whole series of cases is enumerated, in which the French secret service had succeeded in revealing the extraordinary activity of Italian espionage in French territory.

For eighteen months an Italian officer of high rank was discovered to have assisted as an ordinary workman in the construction of the forts at Nice, while another was proved to have worked in the same forts as a mason in 1885–86. In the year 1887 an Italian staff-captain, disguised as a water-carrier, observed the mobilization of the 17th Army Corps at Toulouse. And in 1894 another Italian officer took part as an ordinary soldier in the manœuvres of the *chasseurs alpins*—French mountain rifle-regiment.

It was also quite well known to the French intelligence service that an Italian officer, entrusted with some such secret mission, was in receipt of twenty-five francs a day, and that, in order to avoid international complications in case of his failure, his own authorities had him posted as a deserter during the period of his absence. If he were arrested abroad, they could shrug their shoulders and say, “Well, after all, what was the sense in making such a fuss about a deserter?”

THE 'AGENT PROVOCATEUR'

A good type of the *agent provocateur* was Galanti. Captain Maréchal, who was acting for the French secret service in a frontier post, took him into his employment, at the command of Colonel Picquart. Galanti, half smuggler, half spy, was, in the opinion of the police in Belfort, a double spy, serving two countries at the same time, and doubtless serving best the one that paid best.

On the 19th of May, 1896, Galanti sent in a report that he had met, near Fort Bessoncourt, a man named Caïnelli, whose confidence he had gained by pretending to be an accomplice. This man had told him that he had been commissioned by a foreign power to make his way into one of the outer batteries of Fort Bessoncourt, in order to measure the calibre of the guns, and also to photograph five batteries and two forts. Galanti also stated that Caïnelli had already been into one of the batteries, but had found the muzzles covered with caps chained to the guns. As he had no tool with him to cut the chains he had had to give up the enterprise. Galanti, however, had lost no time in accompanying him to an ironmonger's to buy a file. Something went wrong, and toward the end of May Caïnelli found he was short of money and was going to

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leave Belfort. Galanti, instructed by his superiors, gave him money so that he might go on with his work; and it was decided that this should be carried out on the night of the 31st of May. Necessary preparations were made by the French authorities. The fort was surrounded with soldiers; others were posted in the battery and at the entrances. On the stroke of twelve the unlucky wretch appeared, and approached the guns. He was arrested. The agent Galanti was ordered at once by Colonel Picquart to betake himself to Switzerland. Caïnelli was condemned to three years' imprisonment.

The provocation to espionage is often in the interest not merely of the agent, who is anxious to prove his worth and earn extra pay, but of the Government employing him, which successfully exploits it for political ends, and uses it as a pretext for political or military measures that it would not be able to realize in any other way.

HOW TO SUPPRESS A SPY

In the picture of the French secret service agent one essential feature would be lacking if we failed to mention his peculiar relations to his superiors. It has seemed to be a principle of the French Government, in dealing with its agents, whether they enter the service from purely

patriotic motives, or are moved by greed of gold, to exploit them thoroughly, and then to thrust them ruthlessly aside when they have served their turn. The spy achieves either too little or too much; and, in the end, by reason of his intimate and special knowledge, is likely to become dangerous to his own Government. In short, once he is used up, no means are avoided of shaking him off and rendering him harmless. He may be merely left stranded without any means of livelihood, or locked up, or otherwise suppressed.

A man named Corninge had been for ten years with the Paris fire-insurance company, "Urbaine-Vie." He was in receipt of a fixed salary and entitled to a pension after twenty-five years' service. In November 1891 he entered the employment of the French Ministry of War as a secret agent, having been persuaded to do so, according to his own statement, both by Captains Rollin and Burckhardt and by Colonels Sandherr and Cordier, who appealed to his patriotism and held out to him prospects of a brilliant future. He gave up his appointment, then, with the insurance company, and joined the Second Bureau. His first mission took him to Geneva. For eight years he steadily served the French intelligence department and was

particularly successful in the work of counter-espionage. His relations with the Italian military officers in Paris proved very useful to his employers, who, however, began to think that he knew more than he ought. In January 1899 his monthly salary was suddenly reduced, and in April he was abruptly informed that he need expect nothing more, "as the Second Bureau was *in liquidation* and he was the unfortunate victim of an act resolved upon by higher powers." So he found himself suddenly on the street with nothing but his patriotism to live upon.

One of the ablest and most successful of French secret agents was Lajoux, who entered the *service des renseignements* in 1890. Major Rollin, one of the witnesses in the Dreyfus case, said, "He was a bold, intelligent agent, rather difficult to deal with and touchy. He rendered us very great service. During the time I was in the Intelligence, out of fifteen cases of treason and espionage that led to arrests, we owed four to Lajoux. He had been an N.C.O., had served in the Tunis campaign, and had passed ten years with the colours. In 1890 he was in Brussels, penniless and unemployed, when, in a *café*, he fell in with the chief spy of a foreign power—*i.e.* Germany—named R. C. The latter offered him handsome pay if he would serve as a spy against France.

“Lajoux professed his willingness to agree, and on the same day wrote a letter to the French War Minister, detailing his experience, and adding, ‘If you approve, I shall keep in touch with this person and hear all he has to say and ask, and perhaps you can make use of me.’ General de Miribel, then the Chief of the General Staff, gave his consent to our taking on Lajoux as a French secret agent; so, at the very moment that he entered the service of R. C., he was enrolled in the *section de statistique*. Lajoux received from the foreign agent one questionnaire after another, in which the most varied inquiries were made as to French military organization, fortifications, etc. An officer of our Intelligence drew up the answers, which were submitted to the Chief of the General Staff and his second in command. For three years a list of questions was thus sent in and promptly answered, almost every week. In this way the adversary was encouraged in the belief that his information was up to date, while we knew all the time how ignorant he was, and could act accordingly.

“When at length the questions became more and more precise in form, it was, of course, increasingly difficult to supply such answers as would continue the deception and prevent suspicion from being aroused. Lajoux, as an

accredited agent of the foreign power, had acquired a mass of valuable details concerning military matters and the spy-system of that state, which he had communicated to us. When the other side observed that the answers were becoming vaguer and that, about the same time, several of their agents in France were being arrested, they ceased to trust Lajoux or to show their hand."

Before describing the shady means adopted to get rid of this spy, once he was *brûlé*, *i.e.* once his usefulness had become gravely impaired, we shall give a brief extract from a long letter written by him to the Minister of War in Paris. "During the first years I was very successful. To me alone was due the unmasking and arrest of Lieutenant Bonnet, of Schneider, of Theisen, of Lieutenant Cunche, etc. To me alone, and no one can deny it, is likewise due the exact knowledge possessed by the French Staff of the working of the German secret service near our frontiers (Brussels, Geneva, Lausanne, Ouchy). There were the innumerable reports drawn up by officers of the Second Bureau, that I delivered to foreign agents in Berlin. There was that packet of cartridges that I sold them. What anxious thought that must have caused the German Staff! It was I who revealed the names of

German agents in Belgium and Switzerland. When the Russian military attaché in Paris asked Colonel Sandherr to recommend a reliable, intelligent, and devoted agent, to be at the disposal of General Gourko's staff in Warsaw, the choice fell upon me. It was soon after that, that Colonel Sandherr was decorated with the cross of Commander of the Order of St Stanislas.

"I did not hesitate to spend a fortnight in the intelligence bureau in Berlin, where I had managed to gain the good-will of the officers. But I was risking my life, for, while I was engaged in Warsaw, I had often come to Paris, and had had to travel *via* Vienna or Berlin.

"When I returned to Paris after finally leaving Russia, I was welcomed effusively by the officers attached to the Second Bureau—Sandherr, Rollin, Burckhardt, etc."

But all his devotion did not save him, for, after Lajoux had been five years in the intelligence service, the Ministry of War decided that it was time to dispense with his assistance. There was a suspicion that he was not merely a counter-spy but was actually in the service of Germany. On the occasion of a meeting he had with the agent of the foreign power, R. C., in Luxemburg, they had him under observation, and came to the conclusion that he was compromising the ser-

vice, by letting it be generally known that he was a French agent. They therefore announced to Lajoux that his salary would be paid for three months longer, and that he would then have to look out for other employment. They also let him know that he had been denounced by one of the double spies whom he had introduced to the French service. Lajoux was, of course, no longer able to furnish any information of consequence. But his most serious offence was that he knew too much, including things that might be highly disagreeable to his superiors, and very incriminating for Major Henry, of the Second Bureau and notorious in connexion with the Dreyfus affair. It was necessary to be rid of Lajoux. The department that owed so much to his co-operation, represented him as a drunkard, a liar, and a greedy, grasping wretch. While he was absent from Brussels, an agent entered his house, broke open his furniture, and stole his papers. Not satisfied with that, they endeavoured to induce his wife, in consideration of a heavy bribe, to leave her husband and to brand him publicly in the Paris press as a traitor. This criminal attempt failed.

Lajoux himself was persuaded to accompany two police-officers, who said they were taking him to General Boisdeffre, with whom Lajoux

had just been in telephonic communication. Their real destination was the lunatic asylum of Sainte-Anne, where Lajoux was confined for a week; the medical officers dismissed him at the end of that time, certifying that he was perfectly sane. He fled to Genoa, where the French authorities made his stay impossible by informing the Italians that his mind was deranged. Finally they paid the price of a third-class fare to Brazil, and in 1897 he was packed off from Antwerp to San Paolo. They then apparently felt safe: his papers had been stolen and the ocean lay between him and Europe.

Sandherr said Lajoux had been worth two army corps. Cordier referred to "R. C., Lajoux, and Company," for it was alleged that Lajoux had brought to the French service five other agents, all, like himself, ostensibly in the employment of R. C., and all double spies.

A note made in 1895 by the Ministry of War confirmed his initial successes, but summed him up as a traitor.

A radical means of getting rid of an agent who is suspected of knowing too much, or has, for other reasons, become superfluous, is to bring about his arrest by a foreign power. Suppose there is in Cologne an employee of the French service whom it is desirable to drop. Naturally

he does not receive his correspondence directly from Paris. It comes through some roundabout channel, say by the intermediary of a merchant in Berlin who is supposed to have ordinary business relations with Paris or some other French town. This person receives an envelope containing some communication for the gentleman in Cologne, which he slips into an envelope bearing the printed address of some Berlin wholesale house, and sends it off to "Mr Franz Gebhart, Poste-restante, Cologne." The agent calls for the letter at the post-office. One day, however, a letter arrives with the address "Mr A. Gebhart," and the postal officials, in obedience to their regular instructions, refuse to hand it over. The letter is returned to the Berlin wholesale house, whose address is printed on the envelope. Here it is opened and found to contain, not some welcome payment of an overdue account, but a document in French that makes the reader open his eyes very wide. The police are informed, and next time the agent calls for his letters, or without waiting so long, they have him arrested. The apparently accidental substitution of "A." for "Franz" procures the unfortunate spy some years of imprisonment, and his late employers have nothing more to fear from him.

Chapter 3

THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

THE NAPOLEONIC ERA

TWICE in the course of history has British espionage attained to the highest pinnacle: at the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially in the time of Napoleon's Continental Blockade, when he was striving to unite all the states of Europe into one phalanx directed against "Perfidious Albion"; and during the last War, when England with its "Fleet in Being" successfully carried out its policy of subduing the Central Powers by blockade.

It is astounding to what a degree of perfection British espionage had already been developed in the Napoleonic era. It was quite a match for the organization created by the Corsican, although the latter had its secret threads running all over Europe and was certainly the most remarkable system the world has ever seen, serving to this day as an ideal model. In respect of the financial means at its disposal the British system was superior. While French chief spies, in their confidential reports to the Emperor, were continually complaining of empty exchequers and the

lack of secret funds, the cabinet of St James scattered gold with lavish hands, and was therefore in a position to procure the most important information, by using the well-tried means of bribery to induce highly-placed persons in the enemy's camp to turn traitor. According to all appearances even such a man as Napoleon's Minister of Police, Fouché, in whose hands were gathered all the threads of counter-espionage, was in Wellington's service, was, in fact, simply a double spy, taking money from both sides.

A great share in the work of espionage directed against France was taken by the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain in Germany. The British minister at the court of Stuttgart, the plenipotentiary in Cassel, and, above all, Drake, the minister-plenipotentiary at the Bavarian court in Munich, sent numerous agents into France. The last-mentioned had bribed the director of the Bavarian post-office and so enjoyed facilities for making himself acquainted with all French correspondence. One of those British agents, however, was in the pay of France. He passed on to his English employer misleading information, and secured for the French intelligence service important documents of Drake's which Napoleon published, compromising very seriously the British minister.

The representative of the Danish minister Kunad, and Forbes, the American consul in Hamburg, also supported British espionage to the best of their ability, by supplying agents with false passports bearing Danish or American names, thus facilitating very greatly their entry into France. Especially active in the interests of the British service was the American consul in Dunkirk, who ran the American ship *Elizabeth* between Dunkirk and Calais, on board of which, in specially constructed hiding-places, secret correspondence was carried: even oars were hollowed out for this purpose.

Payment of the spies serving in France was made chiefly through the agency of the Frankfort banker Chamot, head of the house of Sweitzen, who often stayed in Paris. The French police were rather suspicious of him, for they had got to know that his house in Frankfort was a rendezvous for members of the diplomatic body of known British sympathies, and for English wholesale merchants visiting the Frankfort fair.

About the year 1805 the centre of British espionage on the continent was Hamburg, from which city most of the spies went by an exactly determined route to France. The fact was finally discovered by the French counter-espionage, and Marshal Moncey lost no time in intimating to

the Emperor the exact stages of this road, which led by Münster, Turnhout, and Nymegen to Bois-le-Duc. For wheeled traffic the route was impracticable; spies had to travel on foot or on horseback, and found necessary shelter and food in Trappist or Capuchin monasteries, which were friendly to the British side. Another valuable link in the chain of espionage led from Belgium through Dunkirk and Calais. The Channel Islands, especially Guernsey and Jersey, were used as bases, which were in constant communication with espionage bureaux in Cherbourg and St Malo. Two similar nests of spies were found and suppressed in 1805, in Boulogne and Abbeville. The secret service was so organized that agents employed at inland points could pass on their information to others stationed on or near the coast, who forwarded it to the Channel Islands, or signalled it directly to English ships cruising in the offing, a code having been pre-arranged.

The British also made attempts to land in France from the sea. In a letter written by Napoleon in 1804 to Rear-Admiral Decrès, he says, "English cruisers are making it a practice to board neutral ships about to enter our harbours, taking off a couple of members of the crew and substituting for them two spies, who are thus

enabled to remain in French ports as long as the neutral ship remains." Very often subjects of neutral states, found on board of prizes captured at sea, were nothing but British spies provided with foreign passports. The flag of truce was also a useful and successful emblem in the hands of secret service agents. During the first wars of the Revolution, British officers were to be found in French ports, ostensibly for the purpose of arranging the exchange of prisoners; in reality, however, they were busily studying the condition of the coast defences.

The motley army of spies was composed of merchants, hawkers, pedlars, Jews, and women. They were of many nationalities, Russians, Swedes, and Spaniards being especially well represented. In the forwarding of information the most incredible wiles and tricks were already in use. For example, three American seamen who had deserted from the British service, betrayed the use, in the secret traffic with the Channel Islands, of hollowed-out tree-trunks and of a box made to look like a carved stone. News was also sent by the post itself. Such letters were written in code, for there already existed the most improbable and cunning ciphers, which, however, in most cases, the French counter-espionage soon learned to read. On one occasion

a letter from London was deciphered, which was written entirely in the staff-notation and represented on the face of it a harmless musical composition. In a letter taken from the person of a suspicious character there occurred the curious and arresting line, "Wash the linen I am sending you, before you use it, in order to remove the stickiness." This seemed to suggest very clearly that there must be some passage written in invisible ink. As there are many kinds of invisible ink, a regular series of chemical experiments had to be made, before the matter of interest could be read. Another device employed to deceive the enemy was the use of conventional token-words. A police report submitted to the Emperor on the 7th of August, 1804, shows the French counter-espionage to have been recently informed that, instead of words borrowed from music and botany, the vocabulary of watch-making, cookery, and catering, was in future to be exploited in British cipher.

In the campaign of 1815 the British Intelligence Service, concentrated in Wellington's headquarters in Brussels under the control of Colonel Hardinge, achieved remarkable success. An employee of the French War Office, as well as certain officials who must have been very exactly informed about the military operations, were

bought by England. So there was no lack of valuable political and military news coming direct to Brussels, or *via* London to Brussels. One of such reports of the very highest strategic importance arrived at Brussels, *via* Mons, on the 6th of June, that is, only a few days before the battles of Ligny and Waterloo. It ran, "Officials familiar with the plan of the military operations state that the Emperor will go in person to Avesnes with the intention of carrying out a feigned attack from the Maubeuge side upon the Allies, while the main attack is to be made on the Flanders side between Lille and Tournay, in the direction of Mons."

Concerning popular feeling in France the following information had been received as far back as the 25th of April, "Enthusiasm for the Emperor is strong in the army but not among the people. The National Guard will be induced to march only at the point of the bayonet. One lost battle will cause this army to break up, for it cannot escape the influence of political factions." A prophecy which, as events showed, was fully justified. And about the position, strength, armament, and order of battle of the French army, English spies furnished the most detailed information, which proved to correspond exactly with the facts.

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BADEN-POWELL AND THE SOUTH-AFRICAN WAR

The modern British secret service is concentrated in the Intelligence Department of the General Staff in London. Its organization owes much to experience gained in actual military operations in India and during the Boer War in South Africa.

On the whole, except for the rise of one eminent man, the secret service in South Africa appears not to have been very successful. Admiral Lord Fisher stated explicitly that it was a wretched failure; but Fisher could be at times unduly pessimistic in his judgments. Certainly the information available does not suggest that the achievements of the intelligence branch in those years were as brilliant as they had been at an earlier date, or as they were to become ten years later.

In August 1900 an English lieutenant of artillery was captured by the Boers, convicted of espionage, and shot. Lord Kitchener, the Chief of the Staff in South Africa, afterward Commander-in-Chief and War Minister, created a "Peace Committee" which included treasonable Boers. Apart from the name, this committee had little to do with peaceful aspirations; it served simply the purposes of espionage. That, at least,

was the Boer view of it, as is clearly indicated by the terms of a War Office dispatch of the 13th of January, 1901: "The agents sent by the Peace Committee of Boer prisoners in Pretoria were *captured* by De Wet, on the 10th of January. One of these emissaries, a British subject, was shot; the other two were flogged."

Natives rendered the British most valuable services; the artful cattle-thieves, especially, managed repeatedly to steal through the enemy's lines. The reports carried by these native runners were written in cipher or in Hindustani in Roman script. The paper was rolled up into a tiny ball and pressed into a hole bored in a stick, the opening being then stopped with clay or soap. Sometimes it would be forced into the bowl of a pipe, and so, if danger threatened, the message was burned when the tobacco was lighted. Or the paper might be inserted into a boot-sole, or sewn into the folds of the clothing. The natives in German South-West Africa adopted another device for the same purpose. They also pressed the sheet of paper into a tiny pellet, which they covered with the tinfoil that was used in the packing of tea, and hung one or more of the pellets on a string round the neck. When danger threatened, they quickly dropped the string on the ground, where it was hardly distinguishable

among the stones, made careful note of the exact spot, and picked it up when the air was clear again. By fire-signals too, by smaller or greater columns of smoke, the natives informed the British of the strength and movements of the enemy. Specially noteworthy was a certain Zulu or Kaffir named Jan Grootboom. As a hunter and guide he had come much into contact with white men. He wore European dress, spoke English fluently, possessed the cunning and pluck characteristic of his race, and proved a trusty and competent assistant to his able chief, afterward Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell.

For it was in the South-African war that Baden-Powell won his spurs. He is the founder of the boy-scout movement, now world-wide. He was certainly the most distinguished officer of pre-War times to serve as a spy, and is beyond question one of the most gifted secret-service agents that ever lived. Like the real Englishman he is, although he practised espionage as an officer on professional duty, he took it at the same time as an interesting sport, that stimulates the nerves and makes demands on all a man's powers. After all, it is a game in which the least little bit of carelessness, the most trifling negligence, may lead to instant discovery and entail the loss of

liberty for many years; in time of war it may mean even death. A second Sherlock Holmes, Baden-Powell was up to all the cunning tricks of a skilled detective, and he was endowed with such a marvellous gift for quickly transforming his exterior as would have done credit to a seasoned actor, so that he was ready to face even the most perilous situations.

Once he was ordered to obtain exact information as to the position and power of the ordnance mounted in the fortress of Cattaro in Dalmatia, a point that was, as everybody knows, bombarded more than once in the World War. He carried out this mission in the innocent guise of an entomologist. His whole equipment consisted of a sketch-book that contained quite a number of finished or only half-finished drawings of butterflies, in addition to a paint-box and a butterfly net. Catching butterflies as he went, he came close up to the forts built on the lonely mountain slopes, and then with the utmost coolness he sketched into the wings of his butterflies the outlines of the separate forts, the situation, and the calibre of the guns, in such a way that the uninitiated took the harmless-looking lines and dots for the natural representation of the markings of the insects, and the artist himself merely for an eccentric Englishman.

Disguised as an ordinary trout-fisher he executed the instructions of his Government to determine whether specified mountain passes in a certain country could be used by troops. When he was discovered, a very sympathetic little picture, entitled *Dawn in the Mountains*, which he had calmly sketched in the very heart of the region where the special troops were carrying out their manoeuvres, enabled him to pass himself off as a talented landscape artist, to whom the officers politely offered coffee and cigarettes, and in whose presence they chattered freely about the operations that were taking place. They thought, of course, that he could not understand a word of what they were saying. As a matter of fact, he heard and saw so much that he was able to furnish his superiors with a detailed report of his observations upon these mountain troops, their guns, their maps and signalling, their commissariat and hospital arrangements.

Before the War the British secret service manifested a very lively interest in the military affairs of Austria, Turkey, and, above all, Germany. After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Danube monarchy, the latter acquired, along with the new subjects, additional raw material for its armies. Great marching ability and other wonderful military qualities were

expected from these troops. Baden-Powell managed, without being observed, to watch their manœuvring, and came very quickly to the conclusion that their fighting value was insignificant.

From an old grain-carrying steamer, trading between Odessa and Liverpool, he reconnoitred the fortifications of the Dardanelles. The captain, who, of course, was in league with him, took the ship on a zig-zag course from one shore to the other and kept continually anchoring, as if by accident, under one or other of the forts. The explanation given to any pilot-boat that happened to take an interest in their erratic behaviour, was that the steering-gear had gone wrong. Baden-Powell himself got into one of the boats to do a little fishing, as it seemed. He was really taking soundings and making sketches of the gun-positions, and charts of the spots that might possibly be considered as landing-places.

In Germany he strolled into one of the naval dockyards. He simply walked in with the workmen. His business was to view the construction of a new machine-shop and the lay-out of a new dry-dock. In spite of the fact that he was observed and followed, he succeeded in making the necessary observations and in avoiding capture. On another occasion he was commissioned to

secure particulars of the efficiency of a new machine-gun, with which experiments were just then being made. Dressed in very ordinary clothes, with a brandy-bottle in his pocket, he went to the firing-point, which was surrounded with a hoarding and guarded by sentries. He managed to loosen one of the laths or planks and to look through. But presently he heard one of the guard approaching. Quickly he pushed back the plank and sprinkled his coat with the strong-smelling contents of the bottle. When the sentry started to question him, Baden-Powell boldly offered the man a drink and staggered to and fro like a drunken man, waving the bottle about to improve the effect. The German soldier was quite taken in, supposing him to be a harmless sot who had just been having a nap in the grass. Instead of arresting him, he gave him the kindly advice to get away home to bed. Baden-Powell did not wait to be told twice. His wise foresight and histrionic ability had saved him. When, however, he made an attempt to penetrate the secret of a recently invented German light-rocket and of a new observation balloon, he was arrested, along with his brother, in the interior of a fortified position. But even then, thanks to the fact that he was an officer, he escaped.

THE YEARS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

As has been indicated in the sketch of Baden-Powell's adventures, British espionage, during the period of the Entente Cordiale brought about by Edward VII, was directed mainly against Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Quite a special interest was taken in the German and Danish coast, its harbours, estuaries, and defences; it was a question of determining the most suitable points for a possible landing. In 1910 and 1911 the British officers Brandon and French and the barrister Stewart were arrested on a reconnoitring expedition in Kiel Harbour and round the canal.

The chief centre on the continent for British pre-War espionage was in Brussels, the headquarters being established in No. 7 rue Garchard, under the charge of a Staff officer. There were two branch offices in Spa and Amsterdam. The driving-power was the engineer-officer Dale Long, who sent numerous agents into Germany, of whom several were caught. In Switzerland Lord Fisher's efforts, assisted by the private means of a few wealthy and patriotic British business-men, had brought into existence a bureau that succeeded in getting hold of all messages in code sent out by the foreign embassies

and consulates in Bern, the capital of the country, and in procuring the keys to all the ciphers.

The British counter-espionage in those pre-War years scored one tremendous success, which was destined to produce the most far-reaching military and strategical consequences at the outbreak of war. The personnel of that particular branch was indeed not numerous: it consisted of four officers, three detectives, and seven clerks. But it functioned very accurately and, above all, it was lucky. Its success was due in no small measure to culpable slackness on the part of its opponent, for it was the chief of the intelligence service of the German Admiralty himself, who, by his incomprehensible imprudence, supplied the key which enabled the British authorities to unlock the German mystery in Britain. When the Emperor was visiting London, this personage was a member of his suite. One evening, after business was over, he called at the hairdressing establishment of a certain Mr Ernst, situated in a very out-of-the-way part of North London. This strange proceeding was, of course, not unnoticed by the detectives of Scotland Yard, who set about investigating the history and activities of the hairdresser. He was a German, but had been born in England. They soon discovered that he was serving the German secret service in the

capacity of letter-box, *i.e.* it was his business to receive letters arriving from Berlin, to readdress them, to supply them with British stamps, and post them to the various German secret agents stationed in Britain.

For four years, the British counter-espionage read the entire correspondence of the German naval staff with its twenty-two agents in Britain, and was consequently perfectly informed concerning German aims and intentions in military and naval matters. While Berlin had not the slightest inkling of the fact—and that is perhaps the most remarkable feature of this very remarkable affair—the whole network of German espionage lay open to the British service, which very naturally took good care not to disturb these people in their work and so to dry up this precious source of information. The German secret service was working, so to speak, under British supervision. Not till the 4th of August, the day of the declaration of war, was a hand stirred, and then twenty-one of the twenty-two spies, whose exact addresses were, of course, well known, were arrested. One managed to escape *via* Hull. The consequence of this step was, in a military sense, of enormous importance: for a long time after the commencement of war the German naval staff had no information what-

ever of the movements of shipping and of the transport of the English Expeditionary Force across the Channel, which perhaps very materially influenced the final outcome of the War.

THE GREAT WAR

The basis of the existing secret intelligence service in Britain was laid in 1907 by Colonel Edmonds and his successor, Colonel MacDonogh. The latter, at the outbreak of war, took over control of the espionage service on the staff of Sir John French.

But the real creator and organizer of British espionage during the World War was General Cockerill, who, in September 1914, was placed at the head of the "Special Intelligence Section" at the War Office. He had already acquired wide experience in this province by years of active service as intelligence officer in various parts of the Empire. Within a very short time he was able to bring into existence a mighty organization that stretched over the world like a gigantic net, covering all that which we usually include under espionage and counter-espionage, as well as the military supervision of harbours and dockyards, and the censorship of telegraph and postal services and of the press.

The corresponding naval department was in

the hands of Sir Reginald Hall. In this office he was a successor to his father, for it was the latter who, forty years before, had called the Naval Intelligence Department into existence. Sir Reginald Hall rendered specially valuable service in the field of counter-espionage and the capture of spies. Thirty German spies fell into his hands, of whom eleven were shot in the Tower of London, while one was hanged.

It is indisputable that the British secret service met with great success during the last War. This it owed in the first place to the unlimited funds placed at its disposal. Assuredly British agents had to work for their money, but on the other hand they were well rewarded for what they did. The Admiralty paid as much as a thousand pounds for information concerning the naval strength of the enemy. However, in contrast to other powers, the British Intelligence Service never paid its agents in advance, which afforded the principal some guarantee against the likelihood of being swindled, the material supplied always being carefully tested before money was handed over. *Per contra*, it never happened, as it certainly did with the French and the Germans, that the agent was denied the fruits of his perilous labours, or worse still, cynically betrayed to the enemy, when for any reason it was

desirable to get rid of him. The secret of the success of British espionage in the War lay in the sober and business-like application of those in charge of the nodal points, and in the employment of no agents that were not absolutely trustworthy. Once these had been thoroughly tried out, no hesitation was shown in placing at their disposal large sums of money, so that they might adopt the only means recognized by the British authorities of acquiring secret information by hired spies, *i.e.* bribery. Women spies were not directly employed. But great things in the way of espionage were accomplished by British military officers acting from purely patriotic motives, and regarding the work as an exceptionally exhilarating kind of sport. Further, neutral journalists were frequently employed by the British, both in Germany and on the German front.

The chief centre of the British intelligence and counter-espionage service was in Holland. Its main concern was the observation of the Dutch and Belgian coasts and of the German fleet. The most important station was in Rotterdam, in the office of the "Uranium Steamship Company," which consisted of fifteen rooms. Outwardly it bore the appearance of a business house, posing as the "Commercial Adviser to the British

Government" and employing an army of travellers, *i.e.* spies. It was under the management of a captain who had organized the espionage system in Switzerland. His second in command was the son of the Russian consul-general in Rotterdam, who had previously been assigned to the British espionage bureau in Copenhagen.

British espionage was also directed against the neutral state, Holland, and took special interest in the fortifications of the harbour of Flushing. In April 1916 a band of six spies was arrested after photographing the forts composing the land-defences of the Scheldt estuary. They were all provided with British passports bearing distinguished and even aristocratic names. In December of the same year, no fewer than twenty-seven individuals were taken into custody, charged with espionage in Holland on behalf of Britain; among them were one English major, a captain, a lieutenant, two pilots, and twenty-one Belgians.

In Switzerland the British secret service did not make itself so conspicuous. One of the offices assumed the clever disguise of a school of languages with branches in Zurich and Bâle. The latter was suppressed in April 1916, five persons, four citizens of Bâle and one woman, a subject of Luxemburg, being arrested. In Switzerland the

chief preoccupation of the British was to find out all they could about the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen. The British air-attack of the 21st of November, 1914, upon this point was proved to have been made possible only by information supplied by a fitter named Rieser, who was a native of Switzerland, in the pay of Britain. This man was afterward caught by the Germans and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

In the Scandinavian countries it was chiefly in trade and commerce that British espionage developed its activities, Sweden especially had to suffer severely under this infliction; ports such as Malmö and Trelleborg were simply swarming with commercial spies. In 1915 it was discovered that a duplicate of all the foreign correspondence of a well-known Gothenburg firm had been communicated to the British embassy in Stockholm. A comprehensive system of espionage had been practised by a certain Mr Philpotts, who had resided for a long time in Gothenburg and Nyköping in the guise of a "commercial attaché." Two of his subordinates were deported. A similar fate befell the Englishman, Henry Duncan Ross, who lived for years in Sweden as a teacher of languages, and was finally unmasked as a trade spy.

What may perhaps be described as the master-stroke of British espionage during the War was the interception of the famous Zimmermann telegram. On one of the last days of February 1917 Mr Balfour invited Mr Page, the American ambassador in London, to call upon him at the Foreign Office and handed him a document that the English secret service had just captured, a document that was to be of capital importance through its influence upon American policy. It was telegram 156 from Zimmermann, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to von Eckardt, the German ambassador in Mexico, informing the latter of the intention to begin unrestricted submarine warfare, and requesting him to persuade the Mexican Government to enter into an alliance with Germany and to undertake an invasion of the United States. To this telegram there was attached telegram 157, bringing to the knowledge of Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, the decision to embark upon the unrestricted U-boat campaign and instructing him to withhold communication of the fact from the American Government for the space of fourteen days. In order to make the transmission of these messages, which were in cipher, as certain as possible, the German Foreign Office had forwarded them by four dis-

tinct routes. They were sent by wireless, by cable from Stockholm, by cable from Copenhagen, and actually by the American diplomatic express post.

As, from the moment of the outbreak of war, Germany had no direct connexion by cable with America, the German Government had requested and obtained from the American Government permission to have its messages sent to America by the good offices of the American embassy in Berlin. This was generally done by cable. With obliging magnanimity England declared her acceptance of this arrangement; it was her cable connexions that would have to be used. Thus it was that all the German diplomatic telegrams were sent in cipher to Washington *via* London. How far this very method of transmission was in the peculiar interest of Britain, the German Foreign Office, it must be admitted, had not the vaguest notion, for they thought that the secrets of state were quite adequately protected by the cipher. This confidence was all the more misplaced, because, in the opinion of experts, the ciphers used by the Foreign Office were quite out of date and stood badly in need of revision. Colonel Nicolai, the head of the intelligence department of the Supreme Army Command, states that his depart-

ment, taught by experience, had in vain besought the Foreign Office "to lose no time in having their code carefully scrutinized and adapted to the state of modern science." This warning fell, unfortunately, on deaf ears. The fact is—and at this time of day nothing is served by trying to keep it dark, seeing that the British have themselves admitted it—from the first days of the War onward the British secret service was in possession of the German diplomatic cipher-code and was therefore able to read all the secrets that fell into their hands, as they passed *via* London to America.

So it was, that the contents of the Zimmermann telegram were known in London, before it came into the hands of the State Department in Washington, and from there reached Count Bernstorff and after him von Eckardt, in Mexico. The British secret service also intercepted the messages as they were transmitted by the other routes. In Mexico, for example, the dispatch, like so many others, appears to have been bought from postal officials who had accepted bribes. What care was taken by the recipient to maintain the most absolute secrecy about this telegram is proved by this other telegram sent by von Eckardt to the Foreign Office in Berlin, and likewise intercepted by the British: "The

original was burnt by Magnus and the ashes scattered. The telegram was kept in a burglar-proof steel safe in Magnus' room, until the moment when it was burnt. One could not possibly take greater precautions. The text was whispered to me in the night-time by Magnus. My servant, who knows no German, sleeps in the next room."

Vice-Admiral Hollweg has already pointed out that every wireless signal of the German fleet was an open secret to the British, seeing that the Russians had passed over to them the code-books captured when the cruiser *Magdeburg* was sunk in the Gulf of Finland, at the beginning of the War. But the fact that, for nearly four years, they were in a position to check every movement of German shipping, and to know whenever a German submarine left harbour and where it was stationed, was an advantage that they owed to the incomprehensible and unpardonable carelessness of the German naval staff, who might at least have considered the possibility of their code having been deciphered. From certain signs, one would think that they might have come to the conclusion that the thing had been done. The War was far advanced before the plan was hit upon of changing the cipher at frequent intervals.

How admirable was the reliability of British information about the most intimate happenings in the German navy, about matters that even escaped the notice of official persons on our side, is shown by a fact that came to light only a short time ago. In the first half of October 1918 the representative of an English newspaper was able to inform a Dutch journalist that the Germans were proposing to risk a great naval engagement, but that the spirit prevailing among the men was so depressed that they would refuse to put to sea and would simply mutiny. And that is, as we know, just what happened.

SINCE THE WAR

FRANCE

After the War Germany, being reduced to a position of military impotence, had considerably less interest for the British Intelligence Service. Its place was taken by France and Soviet Russia: France, the strongest military power on the continent, with its superior air-force and long-range guns capable of reaching the heart of London, and Russia, seeking to undermine the foundations of the British Empire in Asia, and to attack it in its one vulnerable spot, its Achilles-heel, India.

Even before the War, an affair of espionage in

which Britain had been involved had caused a great sensation. The post-War conditions in this respect were illumined as by a search-light, when the news was published that, in October 1925, important secret documents had been stolen from the house of the naval attaché to the French embassy in London.

Shortly after, in December of the same year, there followed the sensational discovery of a British espionage bureau in Paris, working in the innocent disguise of a shop for the manufacture and sale of wireless apparatus. This establishment, which curiously enough was set up close by the Blériot aeroplane factory, was, however, always closed. Of course, it was merely a screen to conceal more important purposes: the reconnaissance of the French air-force and associated organizations, such as aeroplane-works and aerodromes on the northern and Atlantic coasts of France. In this case again, we find British officers at work as spies. The 'engineer,' Leather, the 'manager' of the shop, was an intelligence officer attached to the General Staff, and, before he went to Paris, had served in that capacity from the armistice till the year 1924, in Cologne, in the occupied zone. His 'book-keeper,' Philipps, was likewise a British intelligence officer, who had been employed in the War years 1915-16 as

a spy. He carried out several bold flights in the air, landing behind the German lines and remaining for some time in disguise in German depots and *étapes*. He was regarded as one of the cleverest British spies. The 'packer' was a naturalized British subject of Polish birth, named Fisher.

These three used to meet in an international bar on the Boulevard Malesherbes, where Leather, under his assumed name of Roger Gérard, also received his correspondence—love-letters, he said, from his lady friend, which he was having sent there so that his wife should not get to know of the affair. This lady friend was the *demi-mondaine* Marcelle Moreuil, who, after serving for some time as a nurse in a private hospital in Neuilly, had worked as a model in the art studios of Montparnasse. Finally she had become an airwoman and parachutist. This profession had led to frequent intercourse with French flying officers. She had an intrigue with a French colonel, who had even allowed her access to the military camps. That, of course, was the one reason for her newly developed taste for doing stunts in the air; she was, in fact, the executive agent in Leather's pay, whose job it was to procure the desired information.

It is quite interesting to hear what Britain

really wished to learn. It wanted to know the strength of the air-force, the numbers and composition of the squadrons, the situation and extent of aerodromes, connexions by rail and water, and the arrangements for wireless communication. But all these observations had to be supported by photographs. Even this demand was satisfied by Moreuil.

The discovery of this nest of espionage appears to have ensued quite accidentally upon the arrest of a swell Dutch swindler, who was going about in the uniform of a French naval officer and had intimate relations with Moreuil. Several indications seem, however, to suggest that the latter was possibly a French counter-spy, who had only pretended to fall in with the aims of the British agents, the more surely to unmask them. She may have been a double spy, accepting good money from both sides. One thing at least is certain, that at their trial both Leather and Philipps admitted that they were in the secret service of the General Staff of the British army.

This affair, which was extremely awkward for Britain, led to a special interview between the British ambassador in Paris and M. Briand, whereupon the storm of indignation that had arisen in the French press, somewhat died down. With reference to the business the *Journal des*

Débats wrote, "While the British have been working in Geneva for the disarmament of France and serving up to us all manner of dreams of universal peace, their espionage service is trying to penetrate the secrets of our air defences and to paralyse our achievements in this field by corresponding counter-measures."

RUSSIA

After the collapse of the tsarist *régime* in Russia the British secret service began to pay particular attention to its former allies. The Intelligence Department had its established bases in the British military missions close to Russian frontiers, both in Reval and in Kovno. Here again it was officers like Captain Sidney George Reilly, Captain Hill, and Major Ally, who performed the most distinguished service.

Reilly, especially, was a man who might bear comparison with Baden-Powell. He was the son of an Irish merchant and a Russian Jewess renowned for her beauty. He spoke Russian and German fluently. He was of a foolhardy adventurous nature, a bold, nay, a reckless, gambler with fate, whose most ardent desire it was to meet death in the most romantic fashion possible, a desire that was destined to be satisfied.

In the year 1900 we find him at Port Arthur, in Manchuria, where he founded the house of "Grünberg and Reilly," timber-merchants, and became soon after manager of the world-famous Danish "East Asiatic Company." But all that was merely make-believe, to conceal his real activities as a spy in the service of the Japanese Government. When Reilly, however, discovered one fine day that one of his subordinates, whom he had himself engaged, was an agent of the Russian counter-espionage, he preferred, like a wise man, to disappear in a hurry from Port Arthur. In order not to awaken suspicion, he carried off with him to Japan a lady with whom he had been flirting. The Japanese paid him handsomely for his successful service. After the Russo-Japanese War he went to St Petersburg, where, with the help of an intimate Russian friend, Countess R., he succeeded in entering the circle of Rasputin, a most influential personage, as we know, in Russian politics.

From this time onward he appears to have been active in the British secret service. In 1910 he reconnoitred the Russian air-forces and actually laid down an aerodrome himself. During the World War he lived in Germany, as a spy, from 1917 till the end of 1918, when he betook himself to Moscow. There he rose to be a

responsible official of the Soviet Government. As such he was in a position to procure the most important and confidential Soviet documents, which he received many a time directly from Trotzki's room and from the office of the Third International. These documents were conveyed to London by his faithful henchman, Captain Hill. Even the most secret decisions of the All-Russian Chief Executive Committee (the Vyk) were reported to the British Government by Reilly, within a few days of their being taken. The transmission by him of the famous Zinoviev letter assumed a world-wide political importance, for its publication in the British press brought about the fall of the Macdonald ministry, frustrated the realization of the proposed Anglo-Russian commercial treaty, and, as a final result, led to the signing of the treaties of Locarno, in virtue of which the other states of Europe presented, under the leadership of Britain, a united front against Soviet-Russia.

When a communist agent returning from England openly denounced Reilly as a British spy, he was able to defend himself with such skill, that not *he*, but his accuser was arrested as a suspect. However, he began to think that it *was* nearly time for him to vanish. He did so, and then it became quite clear that he had, after all, been a

spy. A high price was put upon his head, his description was circulated all over Russia, and the officials of the G.P.U., the Russian secret police, were instructed to shoot him at sight. Nevertheless, even after this, Reilly rashly made several excursions to the forbidden land. On his last journey he had received from the "provisional tsarist government" in Paris instructions to find out the real state of opinion among the peasants. After waiting for weeks at the frontier in the disguise of a peasant, he ventured to cross and was employed in the village of Allekule, until, on the 28th of September, 1925, he found himself face to face with members of the G.P.U., who shot him on the spot. His romantic destiny had been fulfilled. In London he was honoured as a hero who had died for his country.

Chapter 4

THE WAR IN SPAIN

GERMAN AND ENTENTE COMPETITION

OF all the nations in Europe that remained neutral during the War, apart from Switzerland and Holland, the most important, as a centre of activity for the espionage practised by the belligerent powers, was Spain. Although it was far removed from the battle front with its shot and shell and poison gas, the war was waged in Spain with no less grim determination and persistence, not of course with instruments of violence, but with the much more delicate and equally dangerous weapons of cunning and intrigue. From the embassies and consulates, from the offices of the military attachés, the secret and invisible threads extended to the fashionable hotels in Madrid, to the wretched hovels of Spanish anarchists and conspirators, and to the haunts of Catalonian separatists. And this finely woven network of espionage enmeshed the King himself, Alfonso XIII, who, in all probability, was not a little astonished when he learned, at the conclusion of the War, how important a figure he had been, how the agents of the Germans as well as of the British and

French, certainly the pick of these men, had striven, more than for aught else, to win him over to their cause. The one question, to which both the Entente and the Central Powers sought an answer, was, "Is Spain going to remain neutral or not?" To that question no one, in a state like Spain under a monarchical form of government, would be in a better position to give a reliable answer than the King. This state-secret *par excellence* was, of course, the last that the King was likely to reveal, for it was the highest trump in Spain's hand and the most powerful lever in Spanish policy. It was this secret that provided the main object of all the machinations of German, British, and French spies; upon it they directed all their attacks, endeavouring by every means in their power to attain the desired goal.

In spite of the extensive propaganda carried on by France during the War, propaganda issuing from the "Comité International de Propagande" and the "Institut Français" in Madrid, as well as from the "Comité Catholique de Propagande" in Paris, the German position in Spain was considerably stronger: Spain is the most Catholic of nations, and, in spite of ethnic and intellectual affinities with its "Latin sister," the gulf between it and anti-clerical France was very wide. What was written in this connexion by the

Spanish Duchess de la Torre to Georges Louis, formerly the French ambassador in Russia, is very interesting. The time was September 1915. She expressed herself in these terms: "In Spain 'society' is pro-German. But it is pro-German without being on that account anti-French. The Germans have the women and the priests on their side. The women are pro-German chiefly because the queen-dowager, being an Austrian, has, naturally, Austro-German sympathies. It is the queen-mother who controls the distribution of invitations to court. Further, she still exerts great influence, as the ministers are disposed to be very complaisant, whenever her wishes are concerned. So people are pro-German, simply because she happens to be so. It is the proper thing; one must please the queen-mother."

The ground, then, being thus prepared, the representatives of the German secret service, whose head-offices were stationed in Madrid and Barcelona, did not find things on the whole too difficult for them. The amiable disposition and easy manners of the King, contrasting so strongly with the stiff ceremonial traditionally associated with the Spanish court, made their task very much easier than it would otherwise have been. These characteristics of the King had indeed sub-

jected him to some criticism on the part of those who were not well-disposed toward him, and, in particular, had caused an extremely bitter attack to be made upon him by Blasco Ibañez, the famous novelist. Ibañez, who was a leader in the Spanish republican movement, had no scruples in broadcasting his hostility to the monarch, and in a pamphlet entitled *Alfonso XIII Unmasked* he gave free expression to his feelings. He lived for years as an exile in France, and it was there that he died, although Primo de Rivera was apparently willing to allow him to return.

The German authorities were fully alive to the importance of securing the friendship of Spain and, probably at the instance of Prince Ratibor, the German ambassador, they sent to Madrid, as military attaché, a young cavalier whose address and charm were calculated to render his society particularly acceptable to the King. The hopes which animated the German authorities in appointing him proved to be well-founded. He succeeded very quickly in winning a high place in the King's good graces. There was a community of feeling and an understanding between them which soon made them inseparable. The German attaché, being thus in close touch with the King and his *entourage*, was placed in a most favourable position for justifying his appoint-

ment to those who had sent him, and it was a comparatively easy matter for him to gather a great deal of useful information which could be passed on to the German secret service. Sometimes very intimate military intelligence that had been quite recently communicated by the British and French came to his knowledge and, naturally enough, he did not hesitate to exploit to the uttermost the advantages of his position. It is hardly necessary to add that such information was of priceless value to the German Government and army staff.

The exceptionally cordial relations existing between the German military attaché and the King could not remain hidden for long from the British Intelligence Service, and in all official circles in London, in the War Office and elsewhere, that state of things caused no little anxiety and perturbation. It was quite obvious that the Germans were in possession of a channel of information that would have to be stopped at all costs, if there was any possibility of stopping it. It was then that the British authorities decided to take a hand at the same game which the Germans had been playing and, in this way to counter the influence of the military attaché whom they had sent. They resolved to send to Madrid an unofficial envoy whose qualities

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would make him as acceptable to the King as the German attaché had been, and they chose, as the person best qualified to undertake this mission, a certain English nobleman of high rank. This aristocrat knew Spain intimately and had been for many years on friendly terms with the King. They were both enthusiastic devotees of the game of polo, which, as is generally known, is the most popular sport of the Spanish nobility. The King and the English nobleman had previously played together in many a match. Thus community of interest in sport was the means adopted by the Englishman for the purpose of countering the German propaganda and of enlisting, if possible, the sympathies of the King.

It is not without interest to note what the British secret service in Spain was able to report concerning the general situation in that country. According to the statement of one of the intelligence officers, "the King was in his heart quite well-disposed toward the Allies, but was under the influence of a completely pro-German clique and of a General Staff of the same way of thinking, as they would not have been averse to the idea of taking advantage of the situation to snatch Morocco from France. Queen Christina, being an Austrian, was moving heaven and earth to support the Holy Roman Empire of the

Habsburgs, and there was no doubt that she was a source of information communicating with Vienna directly or by way of the Vatican, whose strongest supporter she was in Spain." The officer then refers to the exceptionally charming and jolly young man sent by the Germans as military attaché and he mentions that the King was continually in his company. He continues, "Extremely important was the submarine question. German U-boat commanders did just what they liked in Spanish waters and harbours." It is quite clear from this that the British were not at all badly informed concerning the state of affairs, and it is certain that, in this connexion, the nobleman rendered excellent service.

The French intelligence service set about its business with great *élan* and its customary shrewdness. In the year 1916, when the bitter struggle round Verdun was raging and the prospect for France was anything but favourable, the continued neutrality of Spain became for France almost a question of life and death. It was feared that Spain would profit by the difficulties that tied the hands of France for the moment to realize its ambition in Morocco. The situation of France about that time had not been made any easier by the treachery of the woman spy, who had deserted to the enemy and brought

about the destruction of their entire espionage organization in Belgium¹. In this year it was, that "a great Parisian star," as Comte Massard writes, came into action. She was a beautiful singer and dancer who had been received with rapturous applause by crowded audiences in the variety-theatres and music-halls of Paris and Brussels, of all the capital cities of Europe, the United States, and South America. She had not only the most handsome pair of legs but the rare gift of making even the most indifferent spectators rock with laughter, for she was the personification of *esprit*, even to the finger-tips. This alluring singer had already carried out various delicate commissions to the fullest satisfaction of the S.C.R.—*service central des renseignements*, the central intelligence service. For example, at the beginning of the War, she had gone to Italy and resided in one of the well-known hotels in Rome, for the purpose of keeping an eye upon negotiations between Germans and Italians. In this first undertaking she had gained such complete success that, later on, she was sent to Switzerland, provided as usual with a false passport, and accompanied by a German chauffeur, who had formerly been in the service of Prinz Eitel Friedrich. In Bern she had "quite acci-

¹ See page 234.

dently” made the acquaintance of the head of the German espionage bureau, who, of course, was charmed by this beautiful and elegant woman. After an intimate supper she knew the names of all the French agents who were known to the German secret service.

But, by her Spanish mission, this cunning agent was to put all her previous intrigues quite in the shade. This was the *rôle* the S.C.R. recommended her to play. She was to seek admission to the innermost circles of the Spanish Court and to endeavour to procure the liberation of a very dear friend of hers, a young artist, who was a prisoner of war in Germany. In Paris they counted upon the victorious personality and temperament of the fascinating dancer to enable her to succeed in gathering much useful information under cover of this apparently innocent mission. Nor had they miscalculated. The ruse succeeded exactly according to programme, and, on her return, Mademoiselle showed herself marvellously well informed concerning Spanish policy. She brought back to France the assurance that Spain would remain on good terms with France and—what was by a long way most important—that it would preserve its neutrality to the end of the War.

The epilogue to this intrigue is not devoid of

a certain comic interest. Monsieur X., confined in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was, to his no small amazement, suddenly repatriated as a result of the intervention of the King of Spain, who had made a personal appeal to the German Government. He had not the faintest idea to whom he owed this astonishing piece of good fortune. Comte Massard, however, the military stage-manager of the forty-five executions carried out at Vincennes during the War, could not conceal his indignation that this "clever Parisian," this "good Frenchwoman," did not receive the little red ribbon of the Legion of Honour, which, as he acidly remarks, adorns the bosoms of so many unworthy "*ladies*."

Chapter 5

RUSSIA

MILITARY ESPIONAGE UNDER THE TSARS

CHARACTERISTICS

WHEN the tsarist espionage in Russia is mentioned people nearly always think of the political secret police of tsardom, the notorious Ochrana, that exercised a veritable reign of terror from the times of Peter the Great, Catherine II, Nicholas I, right down to the last of the Romanovs. While, however, the espionage of the political police was chiefly directed against the enemy within the State, and had as its main purposes the suppression of all efforts to overthrow the absolute tsarist *régime*, the personal protection of the sovereign, and the incessant observation of ministers and prominent government officials, military espionage, as the name itself indicates, is a purely military affair and is directed against the external enemy, that is, the countries not included by the frontiers of Russia. It must be admitted that in this connexion, too, the services of the Ochrana were brought into requisition whenever the circumstances made it possible; and it is just this fact that distinguishes the Russian secret service

from that of Germany and England, in which the co-operation of the police plays only a subordinate part.

Russian espionage has at all times been centralized in the General Staff, the origin of which goes back to the time of Peter the Great. In the reign of the Empress Catherine II, the General Staff was responsible, even in peace-times, for the task of collecting and working up information of all kinds concerning the borderland and neighbouring states. In time of war it accompanied the armies and organized the intelligence service in the field.

One characteristic of Russian espionage, all through its history, was the exorbitant amount of money that the Government was willing to place at its disposal. According to the figures quoted by the French Lieutenant-Colonel Picard, which may be taken as thoroughly reliable, the expenditure incurred by the Russian intelligence service in the year 1905 amounted to two million francs, which much exceeded that of any other nation. Another feature was the far-reaching activity, in the province of espionage, of the military attachés—officers whose standing as diplomatic representatives should, by international custom, have deterred them, in all circumstances, from abuse of the hospitality they

enjoyed. From much that has already been related in these pages it would appear that other nations have not been guiltless in this respect.

1812

A case of this kind of the greatest historical importance occurs as far back as the time of Alexander I and Napoleon. On the 3rd of March, 1812, Napoleon dictated to his Foreign Minister, the Duke de Bassano, a communication of some length, which was addressed to the Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin. The French Emperor complained bitterly of the persistent espionage practised by Colonel Chernichev, aide-de-camp to the Tsar and military attaché to the Russian embassy; he speaks of him bluntly as an "agent of bribery." As a matter of fact, when this man had left Paris a few days before, his lodgings had been searched and a letter had been found of a very compromising character. It was from a certain Michel who promised to supply him with valuable, up-to-date, and very private information, and demanded increased payment. This Michel was a French official employed in a special department of the War Office. Through the agency of the *conciierge* at the Russian embassy he was in constant communication with Chernichev, and

furnished him with nothing less than a complete account of the plans drawn up for the projected invasion of Russia by the "Grande Armée." His treacherous dealings with the Russian Government dated from the year 1804, when he had sold for two thousand francs to d'Oubril, a Russian secretary of legation, military information that proved to be very important; for, on the strength of it, Alexander I had joined the Third Coalition, bringing Russia into the war against France, on the side of Britain, Austria, and Sweden. Michel, who had three accomplices, was condemned to death and executed.

During the war between Russia and France the famous partisan Colonel Figner became very prominent. Disguised sometimes as an ordinary Russian vagrant or pedlar, sometimes even as a French officer, for he understood and spoke French perfectly, he went boldly into the French bivouacs around Moscow, and so was able to procure most valuable information.

After the destruction of French hopes of success in Russia in 1812, there were still certain points in Eastern Europe to which the French army clung. Danzig endured a siege that lasted nearly a year. In January 1813 the Russians were before the city. Figner donned the uniform of a French officer and found his way into the

city. There he managed to gain the complete confidence of General Rapp, the commandant of the fortress; and he was actually entrusted by him with important dispatches for Napoleon. These, of course, were conveyed with all speed to Russian headquarters. In spite of Rapp's able and courageous defence Danzig was obliged after all to capitulate.

AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR

Among the secret papers in the Tuileries there was found a lengthy document written by an agent of the French intelligence service named Tonnellier. It contains very interesting details of the activities of the Russian military attaché, Colonel Albedinski, who appears to have been quite a busy spy. Tonnellier had been one of the French secret agents during the Crimean War, and had, in Brussels, made the acquaintance of Grothie, a man who was attached afterward to the Russian embassy in Paris. Toward the end of December 1856 Grothie called upon Tonnellier in Paris upon some pretext or another, and took him to the Hotel Sinet in the Faubourg Saint-Honoré. There he introduced him to Colonel Albedinski, the military agent of the Tsar in France, who very quickly explained to Tonnellier what his (Albedinski's) mission really was.

He dwelt at great length upon the difficulties with which he was surrounded, and proposed that the French agent should render him services which, he knew by that time, he was perfectly willing and able to render. It was a matter of procuring for him certain books and maps that were absolutely indispensable for the completion of inquiries he had been instructed to make. From these confidential French sources Albedinski was able to draw first-hand information about the movements of troops; one of the chief questions upon which he had to keep up to date and report being the disposition of French corps, the exact situations occupied by garrisons, and all changes that might be effected. His social relations brought him into touch with the higher ranks of the French army, and he made skilful use of his numerous opportunities to hear through them news of the most recent developments in army organization and equipment. All such information was useful and valuable to Albedinski, but it was not precise enough upon many matters of detail, for him to feel that he had reached the goal he had set before him. Before long he was enabled to send much more that was of interest to his superiors.

In March 1857 he succeeded in making personal contact with an aide-de-camp of the Em-

peror Napoleon III, who delivered into his hands highly valuable documents, containing among other things drawings and specifications of a new mountain-gun, with which experiments had been made only a short time before. The French Government was preparing an expedition against the Kabyles, a Berber tribe occupying the territory in North Africa situated between Algiers and Constantine. The expedition was, as a matter of fact, carried out during the year under the leadership of Marshal Randon. Albedinski's informant secured for him descriptions of the fuses just devised for use in this campaign, plans for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, and many other interesting details.

From 1859 to the beginning of 1862 Bismarck represented the King of Prussia at St Petersburg. In his *Thoughts and Recollections* he describes how, during the time he was serving there as ambassador, he, too, was the victim of Russian espionage. He relates how one day a Russian diplomatist said to him, "My first indiscretion compels me to perpetrate a second. You will, of course, report the matter to Berlin, but do not make use of your cipher-number so-and-so for this purpose. That one has been in our possession for years, and as things are at present, our people would at once conclude that I had been the

source of your information. Further, will you, please, do me the favour of not suddenly giving up the cipher in question completely. Employ it for a few months yet, when you happen to be sending telegrams of no special import." Bismarck's note to this conversation runs, "For my own peace of mind at the time, I thought I was justified in the belief that, in all probability, only that particular one of our ciphers was known to the Russians. It was an extremely difficult business in St Petersburg to be sure of the secrecy of any cipher, because every embassy was inevitably obliged to employ Russian servants and subordinates in the domestic affairs of the house, and it was an easy matter for the secret police to obtain agents among their number."

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND AFTER

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 it was not easy for the Russians to find spies among the Turkish population. Nevertheless, the fall of the fortress of Plevna, which was heroically defended by Osman Pasha, is to be attributed in a very great measure to the brilliant achievement of one exceptionally able Russian spy, whose amazing performance is vouched for, and detailed in writing by, the chief of the staff of the Russian army.

This spy, who had been a volunteer in the Greek Legion of Nicholas I, swam across a river, hid in a mill, where he put on Turkish uniform, and made his way into Plevna along with the Turkish troops. Thence he brought out in person, or sent out by messengers, reports on newly constructed batteries, with exact indications of their names and situations, on the lie of covered communication-ways to and among the batteries, on the positions occupied by powder-magazines, on the results of bombardments, on the strength and temper of the garrison, and on the numbers of killed and wounded. Finally, he crept through the Turkish outposts after they had been strengthened, and brought word to the Russian staff of Osman Pasha's decision to force his way out by the Sofia road.

On the 19th of May, 1884, before the Austrian High Court, the Polish author Kraszewski, a Prussian ex-officer Hentsch, and a person named Adler were tried for treason. And this trial revealed the fact that General von Feldmann, the Russian military attaché in Vienna, was very seriously implicated. It was proved that he was a spy with regular official credentials. A whole series of letters addressed by him to Adler was included in the documentary evidence in the case. The relations between the General and Adler

dated from the year 1879, Adler having served as go-between, while Hentsch supplied the material required by the Russian officer.

In one letter Hentsch offered to betray the strategical plans concerning every one of the army corps stationed near the frontier, at the rate of three hundred marks per corps. The Russian General's letter in reply contained a definite contract for future delivery. In this letter he announces his readiness to pay seven thousand marks for the proffered information, provided it should prove to be absolutely authentic; he insists upon a certain lapse of time for the purpose of testing it; and adds, "If the material turns out to be of no use, I shall simply send it back, and there will be no payment." In another letter the General expressed the desire to be supplied with immediate information concerning the fortifications of Metz, the construction of the gun-carriages (upper and lower parts), the maximum load of the carriages, and particulars of the shell-proof iron shields. He also wanted to know all about the coast defences.

WAR WITH JAPAN

A short time before the opening of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Manassievitch-Maniulov, an agent of the Ochrana, managed to possess

himself of the cipher used by the Japanese embassy in The Hague, with the result that the Russian Government was in a position to read the diplomatic correspondence of its rival. The advantage, however, did not remain long with the Russians, for the Japanese soon became aware of what was happening, and quickly asserted the superiority of their intelligence service, which continued to dominate the Russians throughout the war. People who are most likely to know have had no hesitation in ascribing the victory of the Japanese arms to the extraordinary success of the Japanese secret agents.

In the Far East there was established at the Russian army G.H.Q. a special office to deal with Japanese espionage, and General Harting, the chief of the political police abroad, took over the supervision of the Russian officers, the Government making him an extra allowance of one hundred thousand francs for this additional responsibility. The Russian intelligence service has no particular success to its credit at the seat of war.

It developed its activities in the Baltic as well as in Manchuria. In all the ports of any consequence Russian spies were posted, especially in Danish and Swedish harbours. Antwerp was also one of their principal centres. They went about in the guise of dock-labourers, workmen,

and street-vendors, their chief employment being to keep an eye on all ships bound for the eastern coast of Asia.

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

In the period of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Entente Cordiale the Russian secret service became particularly active in Germany and Austria. In numerous cases of treason tried by the courts Russian military attachés were gravely compromised. For example, Michelson and Basarov were obliged to resign their posts in Berlin, as it was proved that they were involved in acts of treachery committed by Germans. In the Prussian Criminal Court it was shown that German military men had been frequenting Basarov's house. One of the many facts that came to light was that, for a reward of five hundred marks, a German sergeant-major had furnished the Russian plenipotentiaries with drawings of the fortifications at Lötzen, in East Prussia.

It was very difficult for the Germans to protect themselves in East Prussia. Every year some thirty thousand Russian labourers used to find employment on the farms at those seasons when work is plentiful and hands are few. Among them, in the disguise of harvesters or ploughmen, there were always Russian officers reconnoitring the district.

Before the Great War the espionage service of the Russian Empire ranked, in general opinion, with that of France and Germany, as the best organized in the world. The remarkable success of the system was made manifest at the very beginning of military operations in East Prussia and Galicia, which were at first so favourable to the Russians only because, in time of peace, they had taken care to prepare the way by the work of their spies. The Russians owed the thoroughness of this preparation, above all, to the capable officers directing the intelligence service at the frontiers: in Wirballen, Myassoyedov, colonel of *gendarmérie*, gave his attention to Germany, while Colonel Pietrovski, stationed in Kiev, managed the affairs of the military espionage in Austria. Myassoyedov was a brother-in-law of Suchomlinov, the Minister of War, and as a chief of spies proved extraordinarily successful. But, although he was one of their best men, the Russians did not spare him, once fortune deserted them. At the outbreak of war he was assigned to the staff of General Rennenkampf, but after the battle of the Masurian Lakes which was so unfortunate, so disastrous, for the Russians, he was accused of having had suspicious dealings with the enemy, and was hanged. Pietrovski achieved the master-stroke of securing all the

Austrian plans for mobilization against Russia from the Austrian Redl, who was a lieutenant-general on the staff and chief of their espionage service in Prague.

The headquarters of the organization was in the seventh section of the General Staff in St Petersburg. From this point the threads radiated to all the news-collecting centres in the military districts close to the frontier. Thus, this department of the Staffs in Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw worked against Germany; in Warsaw and Kiev it gave its attention to Austria-Hungary. In foreign countries, the military attachés to the embassies in Stockholm, Brussels, Paris, Copenhagen, and Bern, took a very active part, some of them becoming involved in very awkward affairs. The *gendarmérie* stationed on the frontiers and the agents of the Ochrana rendered valuable services.

The fruitfulness of the pre-War efforts directed against Germany by General Batyushin, the chief of the Russian espionage service in Poland, during the years 1907 to 1910, was strikingly revealed when the German troops entered Warsaw in 1915. One small but interesting part of the booty that fell into their hands was a list of German and Austrian official papers, that had been passed on to headquarters by the Russian

intelligence branch in that city. Among these were enumerated no fewer than one hundred and twenty strictly private documents and plans.

The Russian invasion of Galicia, in the early part of the War, also afforded very remarkable evidence of the extraordinary measures that had been adopted by the Russians to prepare for their coming. Gold had smoothed away many obstacles. The country had been inundated with priests trained in Moscow and Kiev, who had erected crucifixes and images along the highways, at points likely to be strategically important. To the initiated the form and colour of these objects supplied valuable military information. Behind the priests there was the Russian General Staff.

DURING THE GREAT WAR

During the World War the Russian intelligence service was operated chiefly from the Scandinavian countries. In Switzerland it worked in close association with the French service. In Sweden the central office, directed by the military attaché Assonovitch, intrigued against Sweden as well as Germany, and was only put out of action in 1917, as a result of legal proceedings. Copenhagen was the real headquarters, consisting of four distinct offices. Here it was that

the agents received their final instructions, after completing a five-weeks' course of training in Russia and passing an examination. Then they were given false passports and sent to Germany by a roundabout way which took them first to Switzerland. Twelve of these agents were discovered and rendered harmless.

The most distinguished agent employed by the Russians in Copenhagen was the Swede Liander. He was a man of quite exceptional social gifts and an excellent linguist, speaking German like a native. At the commencement of hostilities he was sent at once to Germany to recruit suitable personnel for the Russian secret service. Thanks to his confident bearing and his charming personality he had no difficulty whatever in finding the *entrée* to the highest ranks of society, thus getting into personal touch with officers occupying influential positions. Belonging to a neutral state, and that state Sweden, he was safe from all suspicion, and was thus enabled to remain for months on end at various railway junctions of first-class strategic importance, and consequently most suitable for the practice of his real profession.

When at length he ceased to feel that he was quite secure in Germany he transferred the scene of his activities to Copenhagen. In order the

better to mask his genuine occupation he founded, along with a Danish merchant, a business-house, which occupied as an office a little room in Company Street, and carried on an export-trade in all sorts of articles. He was continually on the road, staying frequently in Sweden, where he saw a great deal of certain people whose relations with the diplomats of the Entente powers were quite well known. He was really concerned in the more private business entrusted to him—the recruiting and dispatch of spies to serve in Germany, and the forwarding of news as it came in from the various addresses to which it was sent, always in cipher, in Copenhagen and Malmö.

In February 1917 things became too hot for him even in Denmark, and he went to Stockholm, where, however, the Swedish authorities soon had their suspicions aroused by his being so continually in the company of a Russian naval officer, whose trips to Stockholm seemed to be curiously frequent. In the course of that year he was at last arrested along with two of his subordinates, both Germans, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for espionage on behalf of Russia.

An interesting glance into the work of the Russian counter-espionage is afforded by a report

of Dolin, an agent of the Ochrana, who was in intimate relations with the German embassy in Bern and the military attaché there. It was from this person that Dolin received, according to his own account, various commissions. For example, the Germans were very anxious to put an end to all communication with the Far East, by cutting the Trans-Siberian Railway, and Dolin was asked to go to Siberia, to help them to attain this object. He was to blow up the bridge that carries the line across the Yenisei. This would have served very effectively to prevent munitions sent by Japan from reaching Russia. First-hand information of that kind must have been of the highest importance to the Russian army command.

On the military collapse of the tsardom, the Russian intelligence service abroad was taken over by the Entente. Soon after, the Bolshevik propaganda, under the direction of Joffe, the Soviet representative in Berlin, was going in full blast.

THE OCHRANA: THE SECRET POLITICAL POLICE

One of the most remarkable phenomena in the tsarist civilization of Russia was, without doubt, the Ochrana, the political secret police. The

word means 'guard' and is derived from the Russian verb *ochranyát* (to 'ward' or 'watch over'). If the unhappy land can be said to have suffered under one special scourge or poisonous spring, it was certainly this institution, of which it was said that it, and not the Tsar, was the real ruler of Russia. One of the few achievements of the revolution that may be put down to its credit was that it made a clean sweep of the members of the Ochrana—and there were thousands of them—that it summoned to the bar of its courts, created for the purpose, those hosts of venal traitors, informers, and spies, and condemned the lot. The first act of the provisional government was to order the opening of the secret archives of the political police, thus ascertaining the names and precise activities of its countless agents, and rendering it possible to exterminate utterly, if only temporarily, the mainstay of tsarism. The tragedy of Russia is that the successors of the first revolutionary government have re-established the detestable system under new names.

ITS DEVELOPMENT AND ITS OWN VIEW OF ITSELF

As far back as the time of Peter the Great there was an Ochrana. In the year 1697, and after, it was designated the "Special Office of the

Tsar," and was under his personal control. Its authority and powers were determined by an *ookáz* (a ukase, 'decree') of 1702. Whoever had to accuse another of any crime against the State, was obliged to refer to the *preobrazhénski prikáz* (the Office of the Transfiguration), the name given at the time to this department, the Tsar's residence being called the Palace of the Transfiguration. It was not long before the functions of this office became strictly confined to political affairs. After the Tsar had transferred his residence to Petersburg, the *preobrazhénski prikáz* was united with the "Secret Cabinet or Office" which had been founded in 1718, the whole department being controlled by Prince Romadonovski.

Peter II abolished the "Secret Office," but the Empress Elizabeth brought it back into being. Once more it was suppressed by Peter III, only to become, in the reign of Catherine II, the terror of the empire under the title of "Secret Department." The Russian word had changed: the meaning was the same. As the rack had been officially abolished, it was found that the knout was equally efficacious as an instrument for the extortion of confessions.

This "Secret Department" continued to exercise its functions till the revolt of the Decembrists

on the 14th of December, 1825, that first movement in the struggle for liberty of an enslaved people. The revolt was completely drowned in blood. Nicholas I then took measures which led to the organization and perfecting of a secret political police, the like of which had never existed in any state before his time. He called it the "Third Section of His Majesty's Cabinet," and the abbreviation "Third Section" continued in use as an alternative designation right down to the last years of the tsarist *régime*. However, the Tsar soon found that he was being submerged by his own creation, so that, in the end, he became simply a creature in the hands of Count Benckendorff, who was then at the head of the secret police and at the same time in command of the corps of *gendarmerie*.

The principal aim of the political police was the discovery and prosecution of crime directed against the autocracy. And even though, from the year 1871 onward, political cases were tried by the courts, the whole of the material used as evidence in such trials continued to be furnished by the organized secret political agents, who finally dominated the whole of the police department. The Ochrana and the *gendarmerie* had become the real masters, and maintained that position to the end. A. Lopuchin, one of the

chiefs of the police department, wrote in the year 1904, "The political views of the members of the *gendarmérie* and the Ochrana may be very briefly summed up. There is the people and there is the governing power. As a consequence of the existence of the first, the second is in a permanent state of danger. This danger has to be guarded against, and to that end all means are permissible. Therefore, in the hands of the Ochrana and the corps of *gendarmes*, the protection of the governing power is transformed into a struggle against the whole of society, and finally brings about the fall of that governing power itself." It was indeed the object of the Ochrana to prevent criminal attempts upon the lives of the Tsar, of members of the imperial family, and of the great dignitaries of state. But its own existence, and the vast sums, amounting to millions of roubles, that flowed into its exchequer, had in a sense to be justified. And it is established beyond possibility of doubt, that the Ochrana simply invented plots and crimes that did not exist at all and even staged crimes of its own devising, and that, while it was continually occupied in suppressing revolutionary factions, it always arranged that some of the active spirits should escape arrest, in order that the revolutionary movement should never completely die out.

ORGANIZATION

After this brief review of the historical development of the Ochrana, let us now consider its organization, once wrapped in impenetrable mystery, but now revealed to all by the opening of the secret archives. The most important section of the Ochrana, that in which the secret agents were employed, was quite independent of all other sections. Its activities were kept strictly private, and not even its own officials were initiated into all the secrets known to exist there. It had its purveyors of information and secret assistants, who were known by their assumed names and who were never to be seen in the offices of the Ochrana. The method adopted, as a rule, for the delivery of information, was simple enough. An officer, working along with a particular agent, would arrange a meeting anywhere in the town or country, provided it was neither the government office nor the known private address of either of them. There he would receive the report. Or this might be transmitted by telephone, in some concerted jargon. The chief of the service had a complete list of the agents employed. As the question of expense hardly mattered, or more exactly, as increased expenditure was almost an object in itself, the number of these agents was continually

growing. They were not to be found merely in the great cities, but were especially numerous in the industrial parts of the country, in the villages and barracks.

Denunciations sent in by agents were always written on a special form, with the assumed name of the agent at the top, and containing a clear indication of the section to which the matter was to be referred; for example, to the section that dealt with the revolutionary socialists, or to the one that dealt with the social democratic party. Every document received a running number and was added to the dossier, while a duplicate went to the dossier of the assistant himself. Every note handed in was the subject of most careful examination and was studied in the most minute detail. On one note, for instance, we find the following marginal observations: Plechanov (*son of the captain*), Korley (*inquiry being made about him*), Dr Jäger (*his name is not in the Moscow directorv*), the poet Verhaeren (*abroad*), and so forth.

Whenever a person's name occurred in such a note, search was immediately made in special pigeon-holes to see whether other data were already to hand. If this proved fruitful, the new facts were added. If no previous reference to the person in question were found, inquiry was at once made at the prefecture of police, where a

complete list of the inhabitants of the city was kept, or the services of some of the 'assistants' were called in. The new name was then entered on a card of a special colour, according to the group to which the person in question belonged. If he were a member of the revolutionary party it would be red; for the social-democrats it would be blue; for students it was yellow. Very often, when it was available, a specimen of the handwriting or a photograph would be filed along with the card. Many persons, about whom a great deal of information had been forthcoming, would have quite a pile of these cards under their names. This is partly explained by the circumstance that the same person would often be reported upon by quite a number of agents unknown to each other and working independently. The latter had, of course, their own cards containing the most detailed account of them and their doings, for each one of them was being watched by others.

The officials of the secret police could be divided into several categories. There were the *gendarmes*, who formed a special corps and were, for the most part, entrusted with what might be called executive duties. The secret agents, on the other hand, were under the control of the chief of the Ochrana. They fell into several distinct

classes. There were the *agents provocateurs*, numbering, in Petersburg and Moscow, about two hundred. One of these might, for example, visit the lodgings of a revolutionary, conceal there some prohibited publication, and then denounce him. They were also employed to foment trouble or disturbances, when it suited their superiors. A lower grade was occupied by the thousands of informers. Many of these were not constantly employed, but practised their delicate calling only on occasion, receiving as their fee from one to ten roubles. They would make their communications either by word of mouth at the police office, or send them in writing like the regular staff. If they did finally rise to the dignity of professional secret agent, they might draw a monthly salary of three thousand five hundred francs. Even the lowest rank of regular spies drew a fixed salary and were allowed from sixty kopeks to one rouble for daily expenses.

The informer's job generally consisted in keeping close at the heels of some suspected person, and never letting him out of sight by day or night. Of such spies there were more than eight hundred in Moscow, over one thousand in Petersburg, and some ten thousand in all Russia. Sometimes the spy did not himself know who the suspect was, or why he was required to keep a

watch upon him. He merely knew his outward appearance. And his task consisted simply in furnishing a report of his comings and goings. Such a report would commonly take this form: "He came out of this or that house and went to this or that place. He met So-and-so and came home at such and such an hour."

On the basis of the data supplied by the spies a graphic representation of the facts was made. It took the form of several concentric rings. At the centre of the first circle stood the name of the suspect; round the circumference of the second circle the names of the premises visited were noted; on the third circle were the names of his friends and acquaintances, these being marked with a cross, if they had been already 'settled,' *i.e.* arrested. Once the name in the centre had received the cross, the graphic representation found its way into the archives. The case was closed.

Quite apart from professional reports by regular or occasional spies, there were also received innumerable denunciations from members of every social class, from nobles, doctors, priests, literary men, and people of the lower orders. These persons might be thinking of adopting the unsavoury profession of informer, or they might be simply indulging some special

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personal malice. Such denunciations were classified as "From Outsiders," "Anonymous," "Re political parties," etc. One such communication, from an ignorant person with aspirations toward higher things, was in these terms: "Your Grace, there is a great conspiracy that I know about. They are plotting to commit a murder. I have proof, and I am able to give you the names of ever so many persons. You need only make inquiry. I assure you that I shall do better than Azev, who betrayed Lopuchin. In a word, I mean to do things on a big scale. Will you therefore, please, send me six roubles, so that I may go to Moscow." This letter bears the name and address of the sender; and, in the margin, the officer of the Ochrana has written an order to send on the six roubles asked for.

An important source of news for the Ochrana was provided by letters in the post. They were confiscated; that is, they simply vanished. Or they were copied or photographed before being delivered. The most exhaustive inquiries were made into the personality of writer, addressee, and any persons of interest mentioned in letters.

RASPUTIN

One of the principal tasks of the Ochrana was to guard the persons of the Tsar and his ministers.

This service alone occupied two hundred and fifty secret agents in Petersburg. Not the ministers only, but all the higher state officials had their spies, whose duty it was to see to their safety, and, at the same time, to be perfectly informed about all their actions. The disreputable Rasputin was watched over with quite peculiar care; every step he took set a whole army of spies in motion. A report upon him, drawn up by the chief of the Moscow branch of the Ochrana, runs: "March 1915. According to information supplied by Lieutenant-Colonel Semenov, the Commissary of Police for the second district in Moscow, the famous Rasputin went to the 'Tsar' restaurant on the 26th of March. It was eleven o'clock at night when he arrived, accompanied by the widow Amalie Ivanovna Ryechetnikova, a journalist named Soyedov, who contributes to Petersburg and Moscow papers, and a young woman whose identity has not been determined. The whole of the company were pretty gay. They retired to a private room and 'phoned to S. L. Kagulski, the editor of the Moscow journal, *News of the Season*, to join them. Then they sent for women, who sang songs and danced the cake-walk. Wine was served and Rasputin, who was obviously drunk, began to dance the russkaya. Then he set about making confessions to the

ballet girls, such as, 'This caftán, the Old Woman [*i.e.* the Tsaritsa, the Empress] made it and presented it to me.' He also said, 'What would she say, if she saw me here?' Then Rasputin's conduct assumed a sexual-psychopathic character. He paid the dancers ten or fifteen roubles, receiving the money from the young woman who had come along with him. She thereafter paid the bill. The company left the restaurant at two in the morning." The commander of the *gendarmérie*, General Dyenkovski, who handed this report to the Tsar, was removed from his post by the sovereign.

THE OCHRANA ABROAD: SOME FRIENDS OF LENIN

The activity of the Ochrana was by no means confined to Russia, where it penetrated every circle of society and made its influence felt in the bosom of private families; it was displayed with equal intensity in other lands. There, its principal occupation was to keep an eye upon Russian revolutionaries, who had escaped its vigilance in Russia and were living in exile. The secret agents entrusted with this task were themselves continually spied upon by Russian *gendarmes*. The whole organization was centralized in Paris and had its regular connexions with the other capitals—Berlin, London, New York—and with Geneva.

How completely the Russian secret police had permeated the political groups residing abroad is shown by the fact that, at the congress of extremist parties held at Prague in 1912, out of thirteen Bolsheviks present ten were agents of the Ochrana. At the head of one section of revolutionaries, whose special duty it was to smuggle into Russia prohibited political writings, were two of these secret agents!

Let us take a closer look at some of these sinister figures, who were also among the trusted friends of Lenin.

There was a certain Sergyeyevitch Romanov, an enthusiastic follower of Gorki, with whom he was living in Capri in 1909. In the following year he returned to Russia, his most urgent business being apparently to offer his services to the political secret police. His offer to act as a spy was readily accepted, and his first achievement was to denounce a whole series of revolutionary committees in the provinces. In 1911 this spy was invited by Lenin to be present at an important party meeting to be held abroad. Of course, the Moscow Ochrana was delighted to grant permission for him to go on such a promising expedition. When he came back he was in a position to deliver a detailed account of the proceedings. It was this report which led to the arrest of the

socialist members of the Duma. In a communication of the 3rd of September Martinov, a colonel of *gendarmérie*, writing to the Minister of the Interior, states, "Your Excellency cannot imagine how valuable we have found the co-operation of this man [he refers to him by his assumed name], who has so often informed us of all that takes place in the meetings of socialist parties summoned by their central committee and held abroad. He is in very close and friendly association with Lenin and others. And quite recently he furnished us with such intelligence as made it possible for us to lay our hands upon members of the socialist groups assembled in Ozaki near Petersburg. Among them were included members of the Duma." And it was this very Romanov who was commissioned by Lenin to open an office in the industrial quarters of Moscow, for the organization of Bolshevist propaganda.

Another supporter of Lenin—as well as of the Ochrana!—was Miron Chernomatov, chief editor of the *Pravda* (*Truth*), who was arrested in the early days of the revolution. While he was still a schoolboy, he was an active member of the left-wing party. In 1903 he apprenticed himself to a printer, for the sole purpose of purloining the type, which was so badly needed by the party for their secret press. After a brief imprisonment

he went to Paris, where he began his career as a spy. For ten years he was active in the service of the Ochrana as an *agent provocateur*. In 1913 he met Lenin and his friends in Cracow, where he soon gained Lenin's complete confidence. He was sent by him to St Petersburg. Shortly after his arrival in the capital, he became the editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda*!

But the finest specimen in this collection was the member of the Duma named Malinovski, whom Lenin called, in his enthusiasm, "the Russian Bebel." This Malinovski was a Bolshevik and, at the same time, in receipt of a monthly salary from the police. He worked in the same factory as a certain foreman named Krimov, who was a rival candidate at the elections. They did not love each other, and the foreman threatened to have Malinovski dismissed, as the simplest method of making sure that his candidature should not be successful. But what happened? During the period of the elections Krimov, at the instigation of the Ochrana, was simply thrown into prison, and Malinovski was elected. Meantime the police department had been rather carefully examining Malinovski's record, and was horrified to discover that he had been convicted four times over of theft, and consequently, according to the law, was absolutely excluded

from standing as a member of parliament. As, however, the Minister of the Interior had given his official sanction to the election, things were left as they were; and the ex-convict, now a deputy, received the hearty congratulations of Lenin and his wife. His salary from the Ochrana, which had formerly been at the modest rate of fifty roubles a month, was then raised to five hundred.

But what interest, one may ask, had the Government in introducing this thief, by hook or by crook, into the Duma? The Government's interest was simply this, that, by his assistance, they hoped to be able to bring about a dissolution of the House. His business was to serve as an *agent provocateur* and, by making inflammatory speeches, to provide good grounds for putting an end to the representative assembly. All his speeches were composed by Lenin and Zinoviev, but before he delivered them they were 'corrected' or revised by the officials of the police department. When General Dyenkovski revealed the double game he was playing, Malinovski had to make himself scarce. He fled over the frontier into Austria, where he had a meeting with Lenin. The latter refused to believe that he had ever acted as an *agent provocateur*, and continued to favour him as blindly as ever with his unreserved confidence.

So Malinovski went on, undisturbed, with his treacherous work. When, in October 1913, in Galicia, the Bolshevik Congress was held at which Lenin took part, he lost no time in passing on all the details to the Ochrana. In spite of all this, Lenin went so far as to send him back to Russia, with a letter of recommendation for Gorki, for the purpose of raising funds for the party. And he actually proposed him as a member of the international socialist bureau, where this informer would have been sitting with men like Jaurès.

SOVIET MILITARY ESPIONAGE

CO-OPERATION WITH THE G.P.U.

The Ochrana and the detestable secret service agents generally were shown up and partly extirpated by the Revolution; but, under new designations, the old system still persists. It becomes more and more difficult to distinguish between the secret police and the military intelligence. The features already cited as pre-eminently characteristic of the latter: the vast amount of money at its disposal, the unscrupulous conduct of the military attachés—now called ‘military agents’—the intimate association with the secret police, are still the most essential characteristics of the military intelligence service of contemporary

Soviet Russia, which is in no way inferior to that of the imperial Government. On the contrary, in respect of its efficiency, it is much superior to its predecessor. This is no exaggeration, for it is certainly the case that the subterranean activities of the Red military espionage are directed along the same lines as those adopted by the revolutionary and terrorist Komintern (International Committee), the Bolshevist order whose subversive propaganda embraces the whole world, whose fixed and final goal is a world revolution, and the dominant influence in which is the Soviet Government. This correspondence is, of course, exactly the reverse of the state of matters existing before the Bolsheviks came into power. The Russian Government and the Third International are aiming at the same social and political ends, whereas, in the time of the Tsars, they were in deadly opposition.

On the other hand, there is, as has been indicated, this in common between the present Government and the tsardom, that the military espionage still works in hearty and complete co-operation with the secret police. The only difference is that this institution, which was for a time called the 'Cheka,' is now the 'G.P.U.' 'Cheka' or 'Ch.K.' is a contraction for *cherezvicháika*, which is itself a contraction for Com-

mission Extraordinary. G.P.U. (pronounced 'gay-pay-oo') is an abbreviation for *gosoodárstvuyennoye politséiskoye oopravlyénnyye*, which may be interpreted, the State Police Department.

The headquarters of the Soviet Russian military intelligence department is in the Supreme Revolutionary Military Council in Moscow. This central office is connected with numerous branch establishments within the limits of U.S.S.R. (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), these being situated, in many cases, as close to the frontiers as possible. Smolensk, for example, serves as a head office for the working of the Polish districts lying near it, being linked up with the espionage offices in Poland, which exist in Vilna, Bialystok, Lemberg (Lvov), and Lublin, and are at the same time controlled by the Soviet embassy in Warsaw. From Warsaw, again, the Free City of Danzig is exploited.

ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Although the Red espionage is naturally interested above all in Russia itself and in the neighbouring lands, upon which it weighs most heavily, it has its representatives all over the world, in Asia and America as well as in Europe. The European centres are especially active and have to do extremely important work. Their task

is very considerably lightened by the extensive abuse of ex-territorial rights and privileges and of the diplomatic post, by which the secret correspondence is forwarded. The better to conceal their purely military character, these espionage offices are often found in the innocent disguise of commercial missions. There are three great centres at which the main organization of the espionage abroad is carried on. They control branch-offices everywhere in Europe outside Russia. The first centre is really in Berlin, but, for various reasons, is supposed to have been transferred to the Russian commercial mission in Prague. Its province is Central Europe, and its subordinate agencies are in Austria and Hungary, and in the states that march with these. These territories evidently enjoy the attentions of a double service—one directed from headquarters, the other from this office in Berlin or Prague. The second (the eastern) centre is in Constantinople, and looks after the agents in Turkey and Greece. The third centre has its station in Paris, from which France, Belgium, and Britain are worked.

THE NEW BALTIC STATES

Between the Gulf of Finland and the frontier of East Prussia lie the old Baltic Provinces, once ruled by German barons and for long incor-

porated in the empire of the Tsars. As a result of the rearrangements brought about by the Peace, which refused to some European territories the right of self-determination while granting it to others, these lands are now occupied by the independent peoples of Esthonia, Livonia, and Lithuania. These recently created states, the windows through which Russia for many generations looked out on to the sea, windows which are now closed and which it would fain force open again, are naturally the scene of lively activity on the part of the Red spies.

Esthonia. On the 1st of December, 1924, an abortive attempt was made to organize an insurrection in Reval. The failure of this ill-timed effort was due chiefly to the Esthonian troops, which proved steadfastly loyal to the State. But the incident showed to all who knew anything of the facts, the real aims and intentions of the Muscovite authorities. Three years before, in the frontier town of Narva and the surrounding district, quite an extensive organization of Russian spies was discovered. They were collecting information about the army and the measures that were being taken by the Government for the defence of its territory. In Leningrad, too, the good work was going forward. Here the Bolshevik spies found a fruitful field of operations in

the Esthonian consulate, as was proved by the Rostfeld case. It was the old, old story of a disloyal servant. Rostfeld was one of the secretaries in the consulate, and had taken advantage of his opportunities to supply important information to the Russians.

In August 1921—that is, in the same year—two Russian officials in Reval were arrested and imprisoned for espionage on behalf of their Government; one was Jurkovski, attached to the consulate, while the other, Ackerberg, was on the staff of the Soviet embassy. They were convicted of suborning two Esthonian subjects, an official in the Ministry of the Interior and a sergeant-major, employed as a clerk in the frontier guard. They had bribed these men to enter the Russian secret service and to secure for them State papers of considerable value. These two Esthonians had been carrying on their nefarious practices for two or three years, before they were found out; and for their services they had been receiving a regular monthly salary of 14,000 Esthonian marks. It was also proved that they had procured other agents.

Lithuania. Instances of the lively interest taken in Lithuania have also been numerous. But, a few months before the discovery of the affair mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the

Lithuanian Government had rather a stroke of luck; they managed to lock up two of the best known organizers of Russian espionage on their frontiers: Pospelov, an assistant in the Pleskau section, and Solovyev, the second-in-command of the Ostrov section of the G.P.U. These were both valuable captures, inasmuch as the two spies were found to be in possession of confidential documents containing a mass of detailed information about the ramifications of the Russian system in Lithuania. Those districts situated nearest to Poland are particularly infected with the plague, and for obvious reasons: should there ever be war between Russia and Poland, it is that part of Lithuania that would be of the greatest strategic value.

POLAND

In Poland itself the Soviet secret service attains perhaps its highest pitch of intensive energy; and there is little doubt that the ruthless methods in use have enabled the Russians to bring off many a successful move. The Polish counter-espionage service, the *Defensive*, has certainly got its hands more than full, and court-cases involving treachery and spying are therefore the order of the day at present.

The vast majority of the agents employed in

Poland are recruited among the Jews, who are numerous in that country, forming a large proportion of the merchant class. And so the spies usually employ the simple disguise of inoffensive business men or dealers; no other mask could more successfully conceal their real relations with the traditional enemy. Women drawn from every class of society also act as Russian spies. But, as it has been already pointed out, the G.P.U. has at its command almost unlimited financial resources; and in this shady business, as in all others, money tells. So we find that the demoralizing influence of the Soviet secret service makes itself felt also in the Polish army, among the civil servants, even in the General Staff and in the ministries of State. The Soviet embassy in Warsaw is the centre of the whole network.

A few years ago three Jews were arrested in Bialystok, an important railway junction and manufacturing town. They had been collecting news of the movements of troops on the eastern frontier, and had managed to procure plans of fortifications. In the course of their examination it also appeared that they had undertaken to work for the demoralization of the soldiers and officials stationed in those districts. It is interesting to observe that these three men had been

at the same time receiving money for services rendered to the espionage system of Lithuania.

In the year 1923 ten Jews were convicted in Warsaw of having acted as spies for the Russian Government. They were all members of the communist party, but that did not prevent some of them from being owners of *cafés*, restaurants, and prosperous commercial houses. Although they were Jews of the trading class, they were proved to have had dealings with military personages of high rank.

It was in June of that year, that the attention of the Polish Government was drawn to an interesting pair, who had been busy for some time in the capital: a man named Zubov and his lady friend, Balaszova. Zubov escaped the arm of the Polish law by losing no time in seeking sanctuary in the premises of the Soviet embassy; but Balaszova was found by the police. She was arrested, as it happened, when she was in the act of making a tour of the sub-agencies in her charge. She had no further opportunity of passing on any news or documents they may have had ready for her. In her rooms were found not only a considerable sum of money—it was said to amount to four hundred dollars and seven thousand zlotys—but numerous valuable papers, which, it turned out, had been surreptitiously

removed from government offices and especially from the Ministry of War.

Less than one month after that episode a great sensation was caused by the arrest of six persons who were found to be involved in another espionage affair. The leader of this group was a man named Ininicz. At an earlier date he had been the manager of an Agrarian Co-operative Society. His next public appearance was in the bankruptcy court. Not long after he had obtained the permission of the police to keep a gambling den. In all probability to mask his real purposes, he had also appeared in the capacity of agent for the textile industry—he had acted in some sense as intermediary between the manufacturers of Wniesctorp and those of Lodz—and was actually contemplating the publication of an economic journal. The paper was to advocate the commercial *rapprochement* of Soviet Russia and Poland. This versatile person had found a precious ally in his principal agent Lamcha, an officer in the Polish reserve. It was he who supplied the military information, and even documents, which he procured from the War Office. These documents were not always stolen. A certain Mme Kokowska had been summoned from Paris to Warsaw, for the special purpose of photographing them. Another agent

who collaborated with Ininicz was Strcelecki, who was a captain in the special branch of the General Staff entrusted with the work of counter-espionage. His particular task was to carry on communist propaganda among the officers, holding out, as an inducement, the prospect of their being employed on a Polish-communistic general staff, which was some day to come into existence.

THE BALKANS

Rumania. The Red military espionage has found a particularly congenial sphere of action in that classical storm-centre, the immemorial seat of European troubles—the Balkans. Before the War, Bessarabia, the land between the two rivers Pruth and Dniester, belonged to Russia; it now forms part of Rumania. Along the common frontier there are almost chronic disturbances, while the Russian Black Sea fleet indulges in frequent manœuvres, made to look as provocative as possible and carried out off the coast of Rumania, in close proximity to its ports. It is therefore to be expected that the Soviet secret agents should be very much alive in that country.

In December 1924 there was great excitement over the sudden disappearance of Mme Ivony, the *prima donna* of the Royal Opera in Bucharest.

At the same time, her most devoted admirer, Flight-Lieutenant Brailu, had set off on an excursion by air to Moscow, and with him had vanished from among the treasures of the Rumanian General Staff the plans for mobilization in Bessarabia, if the necessity should arise. The beautiful singer, who had fled from the Rumanian police agents and taken refuge in the Soviet embassy in Paris, was the centre and principal agent in a gigantic network of Russian espionage, the threads of which were unravelled by the military court that inquired into the affair. The total number of persons accused of complicity was forty-five; of these no fewer than twenty were Rumanian officers who had been bribed by Russian gold. Some of the ring-leaders were Major Tchaikovski, a Russian who had transferred to the Rumanian army; Lieutenant Nitza, the husband of Mme Ivony and brother of the ex-minister for Bessarabia; and the Russian, Kisselov, who was an official attached to the Bulgarian embassy and had been for years the real head of Russian espionage in the Balkans. The last mentioned had, of course, had almost unlimited sums of money at his disposal, and had sent to the Rumanian garrisons stationed near the frontiers whole swarms of women agents and spies, singers, actresses,

waitresses, and barmaids, with a view to getting the officers into their toils and to inducing them to part with military secrets. Among his valued assistants there were also found ladies belonging to the higher ranks of the Rumanian aristocracy.

Bulgaria. In Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, there suddenly came upon the scene not long ago a woman of extraordinary beauty, the Princess Elisabeta Alexandrova. She was a distant relative of the Russian imperial house, and, to all who cared to listen, she had a wonderful tale to tell of how she had just managed, and no more, to save herself and her family jewels from the clutches of the Bolsheviks. She visited the houses of the great and was a particularly frequent guest in diplomatic circles. A young attaché to one of the legations fell head over ears in love with her and they became engaged. They went together to visit his parents who resided in the capital of a neighbouring state. Scarcely, however, had they arrived at their destination, when he received a telegram intimating that he had been dismissed the service. The explanation of this sudden change in his prospects was that he was suspected of downright treachery or, at least, of gross negligence in the performance of his duty, for important diplomatic documents, which had been in his keeping, had disappeared. Their

absence was noticed immediately upon the departure from Sofia of the young man and his fairy princess. The latter had really come of very humble stock. She was nothing more than a professional Bolshevik spy, and had stolen the papers on behalf of the Soviet intelligence service. Of course, nothing came of the proposed marriage, and the 'princess' had to move on. Nor was this the only promising career ruined by the malign influence of that woman.

For some time she remained in Vienna, and thereafter visited in succession Paris and Berlin. She actually had the audacity to return to Sofia, and again scored a success. There was a well-known barrister named Georgiev, who had taken a prominent part in the criminal attempt made upon the cathedral. By offering him a monthly salary of 15,000 lei she persuaded him to throw in his lot with the Bolshevik cause. Whether the money bribe would have sufficed to make Georgiev transfer his allegiance, we cannot tell, for he, too, had fallen desperately in love with this highly dangerous person, and, in the end, paid for his infatuation with his life.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It has been the Soviet policy in later years to try to induce the neighbouring countries to enter

into trade agreements. Czechoslovakia concluded such a commercial treaty, but soon had reason to understand that the Russians had on hand more pressing business than the furtherance of international trade. They regularly abused, for purposes of espionage, the special rights and privileges enjoyed by the newly created missions, and, as usual, took advantage of diplomatic postal facilities, in order to carry on their secret correspondence. Under the old tsarist Government Colonel Pietrovski had organized and directed a very extensive espionage system in Prague, which suited so well the purposes of the Bolshevist authorities, that they continued him in his office of chief spy. His organization did not cover merely Czechoslovakia, but extended its operations to the western military districts of Rumania and the northern part of Yugoslavia.

The Supreme Revolutionary War Council in Moscow was interested in many things that concerned Poland and the countries of the Little Entente. Some of the more vital matters are indicated in the following instructions issued to the head-office of the intelligence service in Prague. "1. We want you to determine what would be the strength of the forces that would be opposed to the Red army, if it should be engaged west of the Vistula-San-Pruth line. [These rivers

flow respectively through Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.] 2. To determine whether there is any sort of co-ordination between these forces, and to what extent and on what basis it exists. 3. To see that we are exactly informed as to the obstacles that are in our way and must be removed, before we can hope to weaken the fighting efficiency of Central and Southern Europe, or to feel any assurance that we should be successful in breaking through to the line of the Carpathians and in crossing the Danube, in order to reach the Balkans."

General military organization, and especially innovations introduced from time to time in the air force, are subjects of ceaseless interest to the Russian spies. The greatest attention is also being given to the investigation of all that is done in the Skoda Works in Pilsen. This is the great arms and munition factory, notorious at the beginning of the Great War for the manufacture of the monstrous Austrian siege-guns that demolished some of the more troublesome of the Belgian forts.

In face of the continual pressure from the east, the counter-espionage services of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, find it useful, at least occasionally, to work in collaboration. They have been able to establish the facts that

all movements of troops and means of transport are carefully observed and noted by Russian agents, and that every consignment of arms and ammunition is accurately checked by them. It is worthy of note that the great explosion in Bucharest took place immediately after the arrival of a very important train-load of ordnance stores from the Skoda arsenal.

In the early part of 1925 the agents of the Czechoslovakian counter-espionage were fortunate enough to lay their hands upon the correspondence that had been passing between Pietrovski and Cherski, the chief of the Soviet espionage system in Central Europe, with his headquarters at the time in Vienna. Pietrovski was arrested and sentenced to a long period of confinement.

PENALTIES FOR ESPIONAGE

Soviet Russia, like all other lands, itself suffers from espionage practised within its borders by agents of other states. In order to protect itself from such exploitation, the Soviet Government not so long ago issued a new decree having reference to both military and commercial espionage. In the time of the Tsars, espionage came under article 253, sections 2 and 5, and article 256, of the Russian code. In ordinary circumstances the

penalty for treason was death. In less serious cases it was punished by exile to the remotest parts of Siberia. According to the new Soviet law, to collect secret military information with a view to passing it on to foreign powers is now an offence punishable by three years' imprisonment. Commercial espionage renders one liable to imprisonment which may, also, run to three years. In cases of more aggravated military espionage, the guilty person may be condemned to death by shooting.

Chapter 6

POLAND

WHAT THE SECRET SERVICE OWES TO FRANCE AND RUSSIA

THE organization and training of the Polish army are in a large measure the work of the old ally of Poland, our neighbours beyond the Rhine. In like manner the secret intelligence service of the Polish Republic, as it exists to-day, may be regarded, in one sense, as a peculiar creation of the French General Staff. In the pre-War period and during the War, the chief of the French intelligence service was General Dupont. It was General Dupont who, as head of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, had the opportunity of making himself intimately acquainted with the conditions prevailing in Germany. And it was General Dupont who took up his quarters in the luxurious Hotel Polonia, when he was appointed chief of the French Military Mission in Poland. When a master-spy has the good fortune to occupy such a post, it is not difficult to imagine that his main preoccupation will be to plant firmly in the countries friendly to the policy of France, the system that he knows so well. His most important

function in the East was to arrange a well-organized espionage system, capable of intensive application and of continued independent action along the lines laid down.

The Polish secret service really represents a curious combination of the Russian and the French systems. For, if it is true that it owes much to the guidance of able French brains, it combines with that element, to a very remarkable extent, many of the methods characteristic of the old tsarist *régime*. A nation does not bear the Russian yoke for generations without acquiring some of the vices of its masters.

The Polish system is certainly far more efficient than the imperial system ever was. A feature common to both is the hearty support and energetic co-operation of all the civil authorities. This is especially true of the diplomatic corps serving abroad, and of the political police, which is exceptionally active, and, in Poland to-day, has simply taken over the functions of the infamous Ochrana of tsardom.

Polish representatives show no greater reluctance than the former Russian military attachés to misusing the rights of hospitality. Numerous instances have already occurred of Polish consuls who have been gravely compromised in affairs of espionage. A Polish consul in Berlin had to be

recalled by his Government, and a similar fate befell his colleague in Marienwerder. The latter thereupon transferred his activities to the Free City of Danzig, where he continued his work without let or hindrance, and became shortly afterward the editor of a Polish newspaper. Further, the editor of another Polish newspaper, published in Berlin, was convicted of espionage on behalf of Poland; but, as his Government had attached him to the Council of Ministers, and as he, consequently, could appeal to his ex-territorial rights, it was impossible to arrest him. All the Germans could do was to invite him to quit the country.

As for the persistence of the old Russian model and ideal in the political police, it is well illustrated by the case of the secret agent Kowalewski. Graudenz is a town of some forty thousand inhabitants situated on the Vistula, in what used to be West Prussia and is now part of Poland. The population is mixed, as it is in many of the towns in that region, and the new authorities are not disposed to be too kindly in their attitude to the race that was once dominant. That is quite natural; the tables are turned. Every institution or movement savouring of German nationalism is obviously suspect. Even the German Good Templar Lodge in Graudenz did not

escape the severe scrutiny of the political police. In the autumn of 1924 members of this lodge were arrested, haled before the tribunal and accused of high treason. They were perfectly harmless people and their innocence was completely established. But the interesting feature in the trial was the light shed upon the methods adopted by the police to procure a conviction. The principal material evidence in the case was a small stock of powder and a carrier-pigeon, which, it was alleged, was intended to serve the purposes of espionage. It came out that the secret agent Kowalewski had himself smuggled these objects into the house and cellar of the accused. Even the *Nowe Pomorskie*, which is far from being a pro-German paper, expressed its opinion of the proceedings of the police agent very bluntly, characterizing them as "the disgusting methods of the tsarist Ochrana."

On the other hand, the Polish secret service, which works in close collaboration with the French service and its news-collecting stations in Warsaw, Posen, and Upper Silesia, has adopted the brutal procedure of its ally: it does not stop at committing crime, if only the desired goal be attained, and goes in for mass-action, employing a regular army of spies and *agents provocateurs*.

BRIBERY

A special distinction of the Polish military intelligence service is the frequency with which bribery is brought home to its officials. Under Sikorski, the Minister of War who retired three or four years ago, this corruption appears to have been almost typical of the Polish army in general, for several officers of high rank were proved to be involved in the most incredible scandals connected with army contracts. Various affairs have gone to show that the large sums of money placed at the disposal of the chiefs of the different espionage bureaux do not always reach the right address; that is, instead of finding their way down to the agents, they frequently remain in the pockets of those officers, who are thus enabled, without toil or danger, to enrich themselves, while the underlings, who risk freedom and often life itself, have their trouble for nothing.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

The entire Polish intelligence service was re-organized in the year 1920; it is composed of three sections which are occupied respectively with diplomatic, military, and economic matters. The supreme control and management of the

first section is in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military section is concentrated in the Second Department of the General Staff in Warsaw, while the work of counter-espionage—this is officially styled in Poland the *Defensive*—also concerns this central office. The executive power of the *Defensive* is supplied mainly by the political secret police. The Second Department of the General Staff also serves as a collecting and distributing centre for commercial intelligence, all such information being sent there in the first instance and then forwarded to the appropriate centres officially appointed to make use of it.

The states against which Polish espionage directs its principal activities are Germany (especially the provinces of Upper Silesia and East Prussia), Soviet Russia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and the Free City of Danzig. Branch offices working under direction from Warsaw are established in close proximity to the frontiers of these states. Thus the offices from which Germany is reconnoitred are found in Posen, Soviet Russia is worked from Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok, Lithuania from Vilna, Czechoslovakia from Cracow; and, seeing that Poland has secured a firm footing in Danzig, there is hardly any need for concealing the fact that Danzig itself con-

tains the office attending to Polish interests in that city. The real reason for the existence of these outlying branches is that they provide the best means of organizing, in the neighbouring lands, bands of spies who always work under the guidance of a well-trying agent in the enjoyment of the complete confidence of his superiors.

Agents employed in the Polish secret service are recruited from all classes of society; persons of military training and habits are numerous, and, of course, are welcomed because of their competence in special departments. Against Germany we find, very extensively employed, men who have been regular officers in the German army, soldiers of the *reichswehr* (second reserve) and police officials in the territories transferred from Germany to Poland by the Peace Treaty. Former Russian officers are found in the ranks of Polish agents spying upon Lithuania. The most capable men are selected for special training in schools of espionage, and are obliged to sign a contract which binds them to the regular pursuit of the profession which, of their own accord, they have adopted and for which they are now equipped.

IN GERMANY

The possibility of a revival of commercial prosperity and of military power in Germany gives the Polish secret service much food for anxious thought. Its activities are particularly obvious in the Upper Silesian borderland. One very clear proof of this is afforded by the number of trials for treason and espionage that have occupied the criminal division of the Provincial Court of Appeal in Breslau, and the corresponding division of the Supreme Court of Justice in Leipzig.

Toward the close of 1923 a group of spies, consisting of thirteen persons, was discovered and suppressed. The case was dealt with by the Supreme Court. The principal agent was that Kowalewski, alias Berger, whose name has been already mentioned. He had been an officer of the *reichswehr*, but had deserted and entered the Polish service. Having proved himself very efficient in his new sphere, he had been entrusted with the responsible task of determining the actual strength and organization of the *reichswehr* and of the Upper Silesian home defence forces. He had, working under his instructions, twelve subordinates whose part in the enterprise was to procure the material evidence required. It was

proved that these assistants had not hesitated, in the course of their investigations, to commit serious crimes, such as house-breaking, which would, in any case, have made them liable to prosecution. They were convicted and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment and penal servitude.

Another case tried by the Supreme Court in 1925 was that of a man named Lepiorz, belonging to Kattowitz. He was a German ex-police official, who had rendered the Polish authorities very important services by giving them access to documents connected with the German police. He had also betrayed numerous military secrets. The exact period covered by the offences proved against him was from May 1922 to September 1923. He was sentenced to penal servitude for five years.

The same sentence was pronounced by the Appeal Court of Breslau upon the newspaper-editor Restel, also of Kattowitz. And in May 1925, which appears to have been a profitable season for the German political police, no fewer than ten persons, inhabitants of Breslau and the neighbourhood, were arrested and condemned for practising espionage on behalf of Poland.

Concerning the intensive campaign of espionage carried on in Upper Silesia by the Polish

agents during the plebiscite period, the Polish editor Korfanty has made most interesting confessions in his newspaper, the *Rzeczpospolita*. While the Allied Commission was sitting in Oppeln, Korfanty was kept posted by his agents in all that took place at the meetings; and by this means he managed to get possession of the secret report drawn up by the British commissioner Percival. Korfanty describes the commissioners' waste-paper baskets as "veritable gold-mines." From them his men removed the torn and crumpled bits of writing that had been carelessly thrown away, and occasionally found them to be precious sources of information. When he learned from his spies that the English and Italian commissioners were in opposition to the French vote, and were of opinion that only the districts of Pless and Rybnik, along with a part of the Kattowitz district, should be ceded to Poland, he decided that it was time to take more radical measures. In the critical "council of war," held on the 30th of April, 1921, it was resolved to have recourse to armed resistance.

The creation of the "Polish corridor," which the Germans naturally regard as perfectly senseless, has resulted in the separation and isolation of East Prussia from the rest of German territory. It is now a detached colony of Germans, sur-

rounded by Letts and Poles, and its exposed situation, in spite of its strong nationalist feeling, makes it an obvious mark for military espionage. The zeal that the Polish espionage system throws into this sphere of action is also quite clearly illustrated by several notorious cases before the courts. In one, the accused persons, both natives of East Prussia, were ex-Lieutenant Fleuhs and a merchant named Zollherr, who had entered into a formal contract with officers of the Polish intelligence service stationed in Königsberg and Danzig to convey to them confidential military information. Another case, tried in October 1925 by the criminal division of the Appeal Court in Königsberg, was even more famous. It ended with a long term of imprisonment for five persons concerned, among whom were an ex-Russian officer, a woman belonging to Lyck, and a Polish agent officially attached to the intelligence office in Bialystok.

IN RUSSIA

By the Treaty of Riga the relations between Poland and Russia were put upon some sort of regular basis, but not in any real sense consolidated. That treaty is but a precarious instrument, especially in view of the unconcealed opinion of

the Soviet Republics that war is inevitable, sooner or later, with those states that have not yet adopted communism as a national policy. The ever-increasing strength of the Soviet military preparations suggests that the danger threatening from the east is no idle fancy. It is, therefore, comprehensible that the Polish intelligence service should be particularly active in the U.S.S.R. (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The espionage in Russia is directed to economic as well as military affairs.

As in other lands, the most incontrovertible evidence of such activity is provided by the cases of espionage dealt with in the courts. In Charkov and Kiev, more than elsewhere, the local authorities have been successful in their counter-measures. In Charkov the Polish spy Wenglinski was tried in December 1924, and condemned to death. He had occupied the post of trade representative attached to the Polish delegation in Kiev, and was convicted of having carried on an extensive system of espionage and of having illegally possessed himself of military secrets and documents, which he had been forwarding to his chiefs in Poland by means of the diplomatic courier. Another agent was sentenced at the same time to ten years' imprisonment. Not long afterward the G.P.U. (the Russian secret

police) discovered that Pavlowski, the secretary of the Polish delegation in question, was the guiding spirit in a regularly organized band of spies.

LITHUANIA

Since the violent intervention of General Zeligowski at Vilna, Poland and Lithuania have been living in a state that might be described as latent war. Lithuania is consequently much exposed to the irritating attentions of Polish secret-service agents. Polish interest in Lithuania is largely centred in Memel and the neighbourhood. The town is situated on the K urische Haff, a land-locked inlet of the Baltic, and possesses a harbour which the Poles think very desirable and, no doubt, dream of commanding some day.

In the Rossgartenstrasse, in Memel, the centre of a network of spies was discovered and destroyed in the month of September 1924. The principal persons involved were Vladimir Galin, an ex-officer of the Russian army; Noviski, formerly a lieutenant-commander in the Russian navy but employed at the time of his arrest as a harbour pilot; and an ex-Lithuanian officer named Polianin. As a screen for his real business, Galin had opened an advertisement agency, which was called the "Echo." With the assistance

of his two colleagues he had been collecting information about the Lithuanian army, the press, and the state of public opinion. Equally interesting to his Polish employers were his reports on arrivals and departures of shipping, the tonnage of vessels using the port, and the cargoes carried. He was also convicted of spreading lying tales about Lithuania.

All the information of a confidential nature received by him was very handsomely paid for, the price of an item sometimes running to hundreds of dollars; and as soon as received it was conveyed to Major X., the chief of the secret service in Danzig, under whose control he worked. X. forwarded everything to the more central agency in Vilna.

Galin was ordered to be shot, and the sentence was carried out in the presence of the wife he had married two days before. Both his accomplices were punished by imprisonment, Noviski receiving a life sentence.

In July 1925 the chief of the Polish espionage office in Vilna went over to the Lithuanians; and, thanks to his co-operation, the Lithuanian police succeeded in cutting for the time being all the threads of the Polish organization in Lithuania. In the course of undoing this network it was found that a great many persons of standing

were implicated, including even officials on the staff of the Lithuanian War Office and Civil Service. This inquiry revealed the fact that individual agents were not then in receipt of exceptionally generous pecuniary reward, for they were not being paid more than from twenty to thirty-five dollars a month.

DANZIG

In the Free City of Danzig the headquarters of the intelligence service, commanded by Major X., are found in the military section of the Polish Commissariat-General. Not only Danzig, but all that goes on in East Prussia, and especially the local *reichswehr*, constitute the province worked by this branch.

During the time of the plebiscite in Marienburg a very ingenious, if not unique, bit of work was executed by a man in the pay of Poland, who had once played a prominent part in German journalism. He had published in Danzig a bi-weekly paper of ultra-nationalist and chauvinist character, called *Die Ostwacht* (lit. 'east-watch,' say, *The Eastern Guardian*), which served him at one and the same time as a cloak and as a direct means to his end, for it enabled him to gain the confidence of legal circles in Danzig. Among his

correspondents were leading German personalities, even generals and ministers, for example, Helfferich. He founded *Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ostwacht* (say, *The Eastern Guardian Fellowship of Labour*), which spread to Germany and included in its membership people of all sorts and conditions, university students, policemen, officials of the law, and other public services. This fellowship was nothing more or less than a cleverly camouflaged spy organization, although the members were totally unaware that all they were doing was to work for Poland. This wonderful scheme enabled him, for a whole year, to collect political and military information from Danzig and Germany, which he sent on to the Polish intelligence service by a female agent named von Brakel. Another person whom he had in his pay was a serjeant-major in the Danzig police force, who betrayed to him confidential data concerning the organization and equipment of the body to which he belonged. It was not till October 1921 that the *Ostwacht* swindle was laid bare by the chief of the Danzig home service organization. The publisher of the paper fled, and under an assumed name managed to conceal his identity, until he was arrested in Berlin, in 1925, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

Chapter 7

JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

THE WAR OF 1904-5

IN his historical notes to the German Field Service Manual for the year 1908, the famous military writer, Colonel Immanuel, pointed out the splendid and efficient service rendered by the Japanese espionage organization, which, as is notorious, contributed in most vital ways to the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The war ended in victory for Japan and established the claim of that country to a place in the ranks of the Great Powers. According to *bushido*, the Japanese code of morals and conduct, espionage practised in the service of one's country is regarded as honourable and fair; after all, it demands courage and daring, two of the virtues most highly prized by the Samurai and generously recognized by them even in their enemies. An incident that occurred toward the end of September 1904 will illustrate this. A Russian soldier, disguised as a Chinese, was captured, convicted of having acted as a spy against Japan, and executed; but the Japanese were so deeply impressed by his bravery and his ideal of devotion to his own country that, after

the sentence had been carried out, they sent a communication to the Russian headquarters, in which they lavished unstinted praise upon his patriotism and fearlessness.

Just as in the British army we find that master-spy, Sir Robert Baden-Powell, and many another distinguished professional soldier, most successful in the work of espionage, so, too, in the Land of the Rising Sun it is the military officer who, both in peace and in war, has undoubtedly achieved the greatest success as a spy. In the first chapter of this book mention has already been made of the capture, shortly before the outbreak of war, of two supposed businessmen in St Petersburg, who turned out to be naval officers. It was, by the way, sentiment which, in this case as in so many others, proved the spy's undoing, for most of the documentary evidence was found in the house of the Russian woman who was about to be married to one of the two. In the middle of September 1904 another Japanese naval officer was arrested at the Skaw, the most northerly point of Denmark. He was waiting there on the look-out for the passing of the Russian Baltic fleet under the command of Rozhdjestvenski, and dispatching telegrams in code to the Japanese embassy in Berlin. And it is a fact that numbers of Japanese officers worked

in Eastern Russia as barbers, cooks, domestics, and in any kind of humble, inconspicuous employment, in order to go quietly about their business of collecting information. The hero in the story already related (see p. 15) of the Japanese naval officer, who had played the part of steward on board the American cruiser, must have been a past-master in the art of dissimulation and disguise.

The Japanese spies had no scruples in committing acts of sabotage, as is shown by a case reported from the Far East. In the early part of 1904 Russian patrols captured near the East-China Railway two Japanese officers, who had found their way into Manchuria for the purpose of destroying the Russian railway works and telegraph lines. The better to conceal their nationality and their connexion with the Japanese army they were wearing Mongolian dress. They were found in possession of various implements and tools to be used in the performance of their nefarious work. By the court-martial which tried them in Harbin they were condemned to lose their military status and to die by hanging, a sentence which was modified to death by shooting, the revision being ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, General Kuropatkin, in consideration of their rank.

Long before the beginning of the war, Port Arthur especially was swarming with Japanese spies, who disguised themselves as Chinese or Manchus, and were indistinguishable in the population of workmen and *hunhulze*¹. Every tenth coolie was really a Japanese. As servants to the 1st Tomsk Regiment and the 25th and 26th Siberian Rifles, which formed part of the garrison in Port Arthur, as porters on the Liao Tiah Shan Railway, and above all as navvies employed in the construction of the fortifications, they were able to render their country the most valuable services. The situation of the electric power-station, the concealed positions of the search-lights among the hills, and the distribution of the mine-fields laid down to protect the harbour, were all made known to a detail to the Japanese army leaders by the masterly work of their espionage system. It was accordingly no wonder if the search-lights that were intended to dazzle Admiral Togo's attacking squadron with floods of blinding light were shot to pieces at once by the Japanese guns, or if, in the course of five attacks made by the Admiral on Port Arthur only one of his ships was destroyed by a mine, and that mine one that had broken adrift.

¹ This word, I am informed by a Chinese scholar, means 'red beards' and denotes 'bandits.' *Translator's note.*

In contrast to the Russians, the Japanese found it a very simple business, during the war in Manchuria, to procure people among the ordinary inhabitants of the country who were willing to act as spies for the price of a rouble or two. They were for the most part such Chinese as had, in peace-time, served the Russians as interpreters, business-employees, and couriers. They knew that they were held in suspicion by the Japanese, but had not fled, as many of their countrymen had done, because they owned some little bit of land or had their families settled in the district. The Japanese gave them to understand that, if they wished to escape arrest as suspects, and to avoid other unpleasant consequences, they had better do what the Japanese required, that was, enter their service as spies. Others who were out of work or had lost all their worldly goods in the disorder and confusion caused by the war, were also ready to serve in that capacity. They had to be ready to do anything merely to live and the payment they received for the highly dangerous duties they undertook was miserable enough: not more than about five pounds a month for professional spies, just enough and no more to cover the purchase of mere necessities, for the cost of living had become very high.

The organization of the military espionage was very systematic: along the army front bureaux were established under the command of officers whose business it was to regulate the service in their sections, to sift the information as it came in, and to pass it on to the General Staff. Corresponding to these offices were others on the Russian side, managed by Chinese, who had to arrange for sending spies to the towns behind the lines and to the concentration points of the Russian army. The spy worked with two or three persons who had to carry the information he had collected to the Chinese bureaux, from which it was conveyed by men who had to pass through the Russian outposts, in order to reach the Japanese front. As the depth of the Russian front never exceeded from fifty to sixty versts, a spy, assisted by three runners, could answer an inquiry put by the Japanese within three or four days and maintain an almost uninterrupted flow of reports.

The Chinese carriers of information were pedlars or poor coolies from the lowest class of the town population, and were absolutely indistinguishable from the beggars that swarmed in Manchuria. For conveying a message they were paid five or six roubles, and were hardly conscious of the hazards they ran; they were glad

to be able to earn their daily bread by such simple means.

Another kind of Japanese espionage organization consisted in the formation of completely independent groups of three or four spies, operating from a particular base and entrusted with the solution of some very accurately defined problem, such as, for example, the reconnoitring of one specified section of the army, the observation of movements of troops, etc. Such a group of spies was always provided with considerable financial means, to enable it to establish a centre consisting of a small shop, very often a baker's shop, frequented by people of every social class, including officers and soldiers, from whose conversation much important information could be gleaned, and to whom casual questions might be put without exciting suspicion. The latter part of the work, being rather delicate, was always performed by the senior member of the group, while the others interested went about as waiters or attendants or, outside the house, as pedlars.

The stricter the Russian measures of counter-espionage became, the more perilous, of course, grew the transmission of military intelligence. To conceal it, new devices were continually being invented and employed. Reports were carried in the soles of shoes or worked into the pig-tail.

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They also used the trick, tried everywhere among spies, of sewing them into the seams of footwear and clothing, the message being written on a tiny bit of paper very tightly rolled.

Information of very great importance was not put in writing at all. It had to be committed to memory and communicated orally to the officer in charge of the Japanese bureau. Toward the end of the war the Japanese were fond of using the stratagem described on p. 19, by means of which hawkers used their goods to convey the message.

A spy, in the garb of a Chinese coolie or pedlar, who carried no written communication, who avoided lonely or little-used tracks, whose identity was submerged in the vast multitude of Chinese ever on the move from place to place, was practically certain of escaping detection. Only through some rare accident could he be unmasked. And in the circumstances it is not a matter of astonishment that the Japanese were informed of almost every step taken by the Russians.

That the cavalry corps of General Mishchenko was going to make a surprise attack on Inkou and the Japanese railway connexions was known at Japanese headquarters two weeks beforehand, and actually sooner than the plan was made known to the participants in the raid. As the

spies' reports had furnished the smallest details of the scheme the most thorough counter-measures were taken, with the result that the Russian enterprise was an absolute failure.

Before the Japanese set about their attack on the Na-Shao position, they had in their possession plans of the Russian fortifications. Upon these were marked the exact location of the batteries and of the mines, along with the positions of the electric connexions for exploding them—a masterpiece of espionage. It was, therefore, an easy task for them to reduce the Russian artillery to silence, in spite of all concealment, and to render the mines harmless.

Chapter 8

GERMAN SPIES

THREE OF MANY WHO WERE CAPTURED IN BRITAIN
LODY

ON the 22nd of November, 1914, a simple announcement appeared in the German papers, to the effect that Naval Lieutenant Karl Hans Lody had died for his country in England on the 6th of the same month. Many years have passed since then, years filled with manifold vicissitudes, especially for Germany; and the name of this man, the first German spy to be shot in the Tower of London, is to-day almost forgotten. At the time, however, the case made some little sensation, although, owing to the censorship of all news touching military affairs, the published details of the circumstances that led to his death were naturally very meagre. It may, therefore, appear not inappropriate to set down here some more detailed information on the matter, especially as the British sources, now allowed to flow more freely, may be used without reserve.

Lody, a native of Berlin, after retiring from the navy with the rank of lieutenant, entered the service of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and en-

joyed the best possible opportunity of visiting the four corners of the earth. He settled for some time in the United States, and there became so familiar with the manners and customs of the country that he could easily have passed for an American, and spoke English with a marked American accent. He married in the States a beautiful American lady. The shipping company by whom he was employed organized for its wealthier patrons conducted world-tours, Lody acting as guide. In the very summer of 1914 he was showing the beauties of England and Scotland to the members of American societies participating in an International Medical Congress, and every one of them regarded their very competent guide as a fellow-countryman.

As is related in pp. 90—92, at the outbreak of war the intelligence service organized by the Germans in Britain collapsed at one blow: that is, just when Germany needed it most the supply of news failed completely. As a consequence, so far as British war-measures were concerned, the German naval and military staffs were simply groping in the dark. As late as the 21st of August the Supreme Army Command had no idea of the dispatch or movements of the British Expeditionary Force. This is proved conclusively by an army order of that date. Lody, who happened

to be in Berlin when the War began, placed himself at once at the disposal of the naval staff, and, as he was found to be medically unfit for active service, he was assigned to the secret intelligence branch. He received instructions to go to England and from there to report the movements of the British fleet, and all losses suffered by it, up to the date of the first encounter with the German fleet, whenever that should be. After that he was to be at liberty to go and reside in the United States. The obvious thing for him to do was to appear in the guise of a neutral American, and so he was furnished with an original American passport that, by various manipulations, the German authorities had managed to get into their possession. It bore the name Charles A. Inglis.

It was the end of August when Lody embarked upon his fateful journey. He travelled by way of Norway, and reached Edinburgh, which means that he was in very close proximity to the naval base and the most important seat of British maritime operations. Edinburgh is situated on the Firth of Forth, and there the greater part of the British fleet was concentrated. He had not been long in Edinburgh when he met an American with whom he had been acquainted in earlier days, but who, fortunately, did not

know that he was a German and that he had changed his name to Inglis. This incident, though quite awkward enough, led therefore to no further immediate complications.

Lody sent his information by letter or telegram to one of two different addresses—either to a certain person named Burchard, in Stockholm, by whom it was forwarded to Berlin, or directly to a person named Stammer, residing in Berlin. The first shadow of suspicion was cast upon him by an apparently harmless telegram conveying the following information: “Must cancel. Johnson last four days very ill. Shall start shortly.” This was an indication to Berlin that the British fleet was to leave the Firth of Forth in four days. But since the 4th of August—and Lody was totally unaware of this—all British correspondence for Norway and Sweden had been most carefully scrutinized. Several letters addressed to him, and others posted by him, had been confiscated because of their suspicious contents, and never reached their destination.

On the 7th of September Lody noticed for the first time that he was being observed. He risked a bold stroke. He went straight to the police and complained that they were annoying him, an innocent American subject. His confident demeanour did not fail to produce the desired

impression, or so it seemed, and a very polite apology was forthcoming, for the police were not yet quite sure.

Lody disappeared from Edinburgh, and for a time it looked as though all trace of him had been lost. They came upon his tracks again in London, where he was busy reconnoitring the defensive measures being taken against the Zeppelin attacks. From that moment his fate was sealed. Detectives from Scotland Yard were set to watch him and never lost sight of him. From London he went back to Scotland. Toward the end of September he betook himself to Liverpool to study defence works on the Mersey, and then to Ireland, where he was arrested.

He was brought before a court-martial that was held with all the ceremonious pomp and formality associated with such proceedings in Britain. The court was composed of the president, Major-General Lord Cheylesmore, and eight officers in full uniform. The accused stood in the dock between two khaki-clad soldiers with fixed bayonets. The ground of the indictment was that, on the 27th and 30th of September he had sent to Karl I. Stammer in Berlin two letters signed Nazi which contained information about British military preparations and defensive measures. Very incriminating, too, were the entries he had

imprudently made in his notebook. They included not merely a copy of the 'Johnson' telegram and of four letters to Burchard, but also particulars of British losses in the North Sea, and a list of the German ships that had been sunk. His reports were characterized as the best that had fallen into the hands of the British authorities, and "their accurate observation and clear expression" were specially emphasized by the Court.

The conduct of the trial did all honour to British justice and may be described as a model of fairness. Lody himself, in his farewell letter, gratefully admitted that he had received a just hearing. Although his case was hopeless from the start, Mr George Elliott, one of the most distinguished men at the English bar, had been assigned to him as counsel. He praised Lody in eloquent words, as a hero doomed to die for his country, and as an officer and a gentleman. "I defend him," said Mr Elliott in his brilliant speech, "not as a miserable coward or as a faint-hearted fellow, but as a man faithfully devoted to his native land, its history, and its traditions. His grandfather was a great soldier who successfully defended a fortress attacked by Napoleon, and as a soldier he claims to stand before this Court. He was ready to sacrifice himself on the altar of his country. I am not here to beg for mercy for him. My

client is not ashamed of what he has done. Many would gladly do for England what he has done for Germany, and may actually be doing it at this moment. Whatever his fate may be, he will meet it as a brave man."

As he was a gentleman, there was a suggestion that he should be pardoned, but the authorities insisted upon his death in order to make a deterrent example of him. As is customary in British court-martial proceedings, the sentence was not promulgated until several days after it had been already executed. He was shot in the early morning of the 6th of November, in the Tower, where no execution had been carried out since the middle of the eighteenth century.

Sir Robert Baden-Powell writes, "In the Lower House they spoke of him as of a patriot who had died on the battlefield for his country." On the evening before his death Lody wrote a letter of farewell to his relatives in Stuttgart, which affords a striking testimony to his manly spirit. He says, "My watch is run down and I have to go through the dark valley, like many of my brave comrades in this dreadful war of nations. A hero's death in battle is certainly more beautiful, but this is not vouchsafed to me: I am to die here in the land of the enemy, alone and unknown. The consciousness that I am dying in the service of

my country makes death easy for me to bear. I have had just judges. They have condemned me for conspiring to betray their plans. I am to be shot to-morrow here, in the Tower. Good-bye."

Many similar cases might be cited of men who came from a distance to offer their services to the German Government in its time of need, men who might have arranged to find safety beyond the seas. They were not impelled by desire of riches nor by a taste for mere adventure, but by devotion to the country that had been theirs. Whatever may be thought of their natural gifts for the career of spy, or of their skill in carrying out their appointed task, they were brave men, who knew that the odds were against their achievement of success and nevertheless took their lives in their hands. Many of them met the fate that so often awaits the spy: an obscure and unhonoured death. Two such men deserve particular mention.

KÜPFERLE

Anton Küpferle was born in the neighbourhood of Rastatt, in Baden. He was not more than nine years old when he emigrated to America, along with his parents. While he was still quite a young man he opened a drapery business in Brooklyn under the style of "Küpferle

and Co.” At the beginning of the World War he happened to be visiting his old home, and he entered the army as a non-commissioned officer. He took part in the first battles on the western front, and in a hand-to-hand encounter was very severely wounded in the face by a bayonet-thrust. Then we find him once more in America, where he became associated with the German secret-intelligence service, being entrusted with an important mission arising out of that incident which caused the Germans so much annoyance and involved so many of their agents in personal disaster¹; the complete breakdown of the spy-system in Britain on the eve of the declaration of war. It was of supreme importance to the German military leaders to obtain, somehow or other, news of British shipping, and particularly of the movements of troops. K pferle was therefore instructed to go to England and to send his information to a certain address in Holland.

On the 4th of February, 1915, he started out from New York upon this hazardous adventure, embarking as an inoffensive American businessman on the White Star Liner *Arabic*. Toward the middle of the month he landed at Liverpool. But though he was, of course, provided with an American passport, scarcely five days had

¹ See page 91.

elapsed before the British counter-espionage was at his heels. In London the postal censorship had been functioning with marvellous reliability and thoroughness from the early days of the War, and one of Küpferle's letters, addressed to his principal in Holland, had excited suspicion. The contents of the letter did not appear to include anything to arouse special attention; there was merely an intimation that he would be going to London on business and expected, at the end of the week, to be in Rotterdam. But the censor's sharp eyes had noticed, scarcely perceptible between the lines, the traces of invisible ink. When this had been rendered legible—no very difficult task—there was revealed in plain brown characters a description of all the British warships that the writer of the letter had met on his way across the Atlantic. The secret text concluded with the words, "To-morrow to Dublin." So Küpferle betook himself to Dublin, without being in the least aware that Scotland Yard men were watching his every step. From Dublin he wrote another letter, and then made for London, where, a few days after his arrival, he was arrested.

As in Lody's case, all the customary ceremonial was observed at his trial, which took place in London. He stood there in the dock, as

a civilian, with black frock-coat tightly buttoned over and looking round intently with his undismayed blue eyes upon the august assembly. As he was found in possession of writing-paper exactly similar to that used for his incriminating letters, of a pen with dried lemon juice still sticking to the nib, and of a bottle of formalin, his case looked pretty hopeless.

The first day's proceedings followed the usual course, and on the second day a strange thing happened: judge, advocates, clerks, all were present, only the accused did not put in an appearance. Something quite unforeseen had occurred. Just before the trial should have been resumed, the warder in charge of Küpferle's cell in Brixton prison suddenly heard a strange noise. He looked through the grating, but to his astonishment he could see no sign of the occupant in his usual place. On opening the door he was horrified to find that Küpferle had hanged himself from the bars of the cell-window, having managed to make use of a scarf or of some other article of clothing for the purpose. On a slate was written a last message in which, among other things, the prisoner said, "They are giving me here in the United Kingdom quite a fair trial, but I cannot bear the strain any longer, and I am taking the law into my own hands. I have

fought in many a battle, and death is a deliverance for me. I have faced my destiny like a man, but I do not wish to lie or to perjure myself." Like Lody he consoled himself with the thought that, like a soldier, he was giving up his life, and that what he had done had been done for his country's sake.

BUSCHMANN

A few months later fate overtook another young German in London, who was engaged there upon similar business. His name was Fernando Buschmann. He, too, had lived much abroad, his youth having been spent in Brazil. Both in music and in engineering he had given proof of remarkable gifts, for, while he played the violin like a virtuoso, he had also achieved great success as a constructor of aeroplanes. In the year 1911 he had actually been allowed by the French Government to carry out experiments at the Issy aerodrome with a machine designed and built by himself. He was rich, for his wife was the daughter of a very wealthy soap-manufacturer in Dresden. He had travelled all over Europe, visiting Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Hamburg, Genoa, and Madrid.

To help Germany, which he regarded as his own country, he entered upon the dangerous

path that was to lead him, like so many others, to destruction. Carrying a false passport, he landed in England as a traveller in cheese, bananas, and potatoes, representing the Dutch firm Dierks and Co., of The Hague. It was anything but a suitable disguise for him, for, as it happened, he might easily have passed for a fashionable man about town or a gentleman, but no one would ever have taken him for a bagman. After a short stay in London, where, in order to cover up his tracks, he resided in various hotels and boarding-houses, and became a general favourite because of his violin-playing, he visited Southampton and the dockyard town of Portsmouth, in order to make the necessary observations.

Very unfortunately for him his financial resources were quickly exhausted, and, what was even more serious, the firm he represented, and to whom he sent a written request for money, had long figured on the British black list as suspect. On the strength of this letter addressed to a suspicious house, it was decided to arrest him at once and to take him for examination to Scotland Yard. They found upon his person letters from the German consul-general and the German military attaché in Holland, as well as notes of observations upon British warships.

On the 20th of September he was brought before a court-martial which sentenced him to be shot for espionage. He was granted permission to play his violin in prison, and during the night before his death the gloomy corridors of the Tower echoed the sweet and plaintive melodies he drew from his beloved instrument. On the morning of his execution he bade farewell to this last comforter, and went fearlessly to his death, refusing the bandage with which they would have covered his eyes. Not even a notice in the papers marked his end.

TREBITSCH-LINCOLN

Ignatius Timothy Trebitsch-Lincoln, the international adventurer and spy, may justly lay claim to the doubtful glory of being acknowledged as the greatest political charlatan and humbug of his time, for he managed to take a hand in an extraordinary number of notorious scandals and disturbances in public life. His versatility in the province of political crime and the chameleon-like gift he displayed in changing his coat bordered on the marvellous. He was an actor, or, to speak more accurately, a quick-change artist, with the talent of a professional in the performance of all the parts demanded by his

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dangerous game, while the scenes of the amazing dramas in which he appeared embraced the continents. We find him not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia, as a journalist, political agent, priest, member of parliament, forger, double spy, buddhist monk, and mandarin. What led him to adopt this many-coloured kaleidoscopic sort of existence? Was he merely cool and calculating, with an irresistible thirst for wealth acquired anyhow and at any cost? Was he impelled by morbid ambition to attain political power, and skilful enough, for a time, to choose the easy path opened to him by unexpected but favourable opportunity? Was he possessed by the love of adventure, the desire for exciting experience, the exhilarating enjoyment of danger? We cannot tell what it was that brought this remarkable Hungarian, for a brief period, into such a prominent position upon the political stage. This only we know, that his meteoric career was run on bluff; that it was as full of sensation as an American film; that it came to a sudden end, after all its brilliance, falling to earth like an exploded rocket.

Lincoln, or, to give him his real name, Trebitsch, was born in the Hungarian town of Paks, situated on the Danube. It was not a big place, but its trade was prosperous. There his

father, who was a Jew in comfortable circumstances, had a thriving boat-building yard. Ignatius was a younger son, and as he was destined for the profession of rabbi, he received a very careful and thorough education. His chief intellectual interest was the study of foreign tongues.

When he reached the age of twenty years he set off on his travels, and presently arrived in London. Here he took a rather unusual step for a budding rabbi: he joined the Anglican church. After a certain lapse of time he returned home and found his father very naturally indignant at the conduct of his renegade son. Ignatius, therefore, found it advisable not to postpone too long his second departure. In fact he left the house of his parents with all possible speed, and betook himself to Hamburg, where, in 1899, he changed his religious denomination for the second time, on this occasion going over to the Lutheran church. By his brethren of this persuasion he was sent to Canada, as a missionary to the Jews. But, strangely enough, he had not long exercised his new functions when the mission was transferred to the Anglican church, with the result that Trebitsch promptly changed his faith again. For some years he remained in that position of Anglican missionary, earning a reputation as a

sound and able preacher. Then we find him on furlough in Germany. At his own request he was appointed by the authorities of the church in England to the living of Appledore in Kent. However, the worthy villagers in this parish appear not to have taken very kindly to this ex-Hungarian Jew as a pastor, and the latter, after remaining with them for some fourteen months, decided that his best policy was to leave his flock to their own devices. He went to London, where he discovered a talent for journalism, and contributed for a year or two to several newspapers.

The year 1906 brought with it a decided turn in the affairs of this man. He went in for politics. He made the acquaintance of Mr Seeborn Rowntree, the well-known Quaker who was also a distinguished member of the Liberal Party. The young Hungarian was undoubtedly capable and gifted, and Mr Rowntree was so much attracted to him that he made him his private secretary. It must be admitted that Trebitsch had a strange way of showing his gratitude, for he rewarded the trust of his patron and friend by relieving him of the handsome sum of seven hundred pounds: he forged his signature to a bill. His crime was not discovered till years after, but it was paid for.

His efforts to win political laurels were crowned

with success, for, in 1910, he made his entry into the House of Commons, as member for Darlington. The House did not take him very seriously, however; he was a stranger, and his foreign pronunciation often excited noisy mirth. He was sent at various times by his Party on tours of investigation, for the purpose of studying economic conditions on the continent of Europe, and was thus brought into touch with eminent politicians and diplomatists. But these continual journeys began to excite a certain degree of suspicion. When he lost his seat in Parliament at the last election before the War, he found himself in a financial situation that was anything but favourable.

Then came the War. His civil status, as an alien and really a subject of one of the hostile belligerent powers, made his position decidedly more difficult. However, there were influential people to supply him with credentials, and he applied to the War Office for employment as censor of Hungarian and Rumanian correspondence. And he actually received such an appointment! He was not maintained in it very long, for his colleagues naturally looked askance at him, considering him as an enemy within the gates and suspecting him of double-dealing, although, possibly, he had not yet been guilty

of any conduct that would have justified their attitude. In any case, he was obliged to give up his post in the censorship. Once more, then, he found himself in difficulties. In the club which he frequented people began to turn the cold shoulder to him, and it seemed evident that his expulsion was merely a matter of time.

It was then, so far as we can judge, that the thought entered his head of avenging the insults he had suffered at the hands of Englishmen, by betraying them; and he did not delay long in taking the steps necessary to achieve this purpose. Trebitsch became a German spy. He immediately got into communication with the British Intelligence Service, and, again with the aid of influential persons who could not believe the late M.P. capable of any evil design, he succeeded in obtaining an interview with responsible officials of the secret service, to whom he intimated his desire to assist in the work of counter-espionage. But Trebitsch did not present himself empty-handed. He was in the unexpected position of being able to submit to the British naval staff a plan, a really ingenious plan already fully worked out, which, in his opinion, would prove of the utmost value and importance to Britain. This fantastic scheme was, in a few words, as follows: Britain was to send out into the

North Sea a small squadron, and he would then inform the German Admiralty of the fact. The Germans would send out a more powerful fleet and annihilate the British ships. But that would have enabled him to gain the confidence of the Germans. After this manœuvre had been repeated two or three times the great affair was to follow. The British would have a mighty fleet of dreadnoughts in waiting, and thus the whole German navy would be wiped out. That was Trebitsch-Lincoln's plan—far-fetched and stupid at one and the same time.

But somehow the British did not show any great appreciation of the naval strategy evolved by this zealous ex-M.P., for they saw through the sly proposals of the crafty Hungarian. They understood what he was after. Had such a project been realized, he would have acquired very reliable information concerning the station and distribution of the British naval forces, and would then have passed it on to the Germans. After ten days of futile expectation, he was told very drily that his suggestions could not be accepted, as the authorities had no intention of letting him know anything of the whereabouts of British ships.

Trebitsch was never at a loss, however, and he had another proposal to lay before them. He

offered to go to Rotterdam. He would pretend to place himself at the disposal of the German espionage service, and so be in the best possible position to serve the interests of Britain, by procuring information at first hand. The British authorities affected to approve of this scheme. He was given his passport, and in December he went to Rotterdam, where he at once made advances to the German consul-general. What he did not know was that his every step was being most carefully observed by agents of the British counter-espionage, who, before long, were quite convinced that it could not be Britain that he was working for. The information that he brought back from Holland was examined by Sir Reginald Hall, the chief of the naval intelligence staff, and proved to be utterly worthless. He was kept hanging about for a week or two, and was then summoned to appear before the chief, bringing his passport with him. Sir Reginald Hall had no doubt whatever of the fact that he had been playing the dangerous part of double spy, and gave him clearly to understand that the sooner he turned his back upon England, the better it would be for him. He realized that the game was up so far as his stay in England was concerned; and, very much relieved at not finding himself under arrest, Trebitsch did not

wait to be told twice. The very next day he sailed for New York on board the steamer *Philadelphia*.

He arrived at New York on the 9th of February. The first thing he did on landing was to present himself to the German secret service, but they refused to have any dealings with him. Apparently they, too, distrusted him. So Trebitsch resumed his journalistic activities and contributed articles to the pro-German American press.

In the meantime his act of forgery had been discovered in England, and the British Government made an application to the American authorities for his extradition. This was granted only after protracted negotiations. On the 4th of August, 1915, Trebitsch was arrested and was at once conveyed to England, where he was tried and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. His time expired during the summer of 1919, and on coming out of prison he was to be deported to Hungary. But it happened that Bela Kun's reign of terror was just then raging in Budapest, so Trebitsch-Lincoln's expulsion was delayed for some weeks. In September of that year he was sent out of England, and found himself once more in the capital of his native land, where, however, the atmosphere proved, after a short stay, rather uncongenial. He therefore quitted

Hungary and went to Germany where there were then brighter prospects of fishing in troubled waters.

He made some attempt to approach the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm, in the palace of Amerongen in Holland, but had no success in that venture. That did not stand in the way of his being taken up by the reactionary and monarchist circles of Berlin, who had grouped themselves round Kapp. He managed to win the confidence of men like Colonel Bauer and Captain Pabst; and, his journalistic ability once more standing him in good stead, he became the director of the press campaign that was being carried on in preparation for Kapp's abortive insurrection, in the execution of which he also played a considerable part. After the failure of this rising a warrant was issued for his arrest, but he fled with the other braves to Munich, where their new headquarters were established.

Here Trebitsch succeeded in doing what Major Stephani had failed to do, that was, to induce Pöhner, the chief of police, and Kahr, the Bavarian Prime Minister, to join the new project of the conspirators, who were planning to bring about the simultaneous action of Bavaria against Saxony and of Mecklenburg against Berlin. But as money—a great deal of money—

was absolutely necessary for this purpose, Trebitsch received from the chief of police in Munich a false passport and went twice to Berlin, to interview Ludendorf or some other member of the initiated, who had control of the funds required. The Berlin detectives were on the lookout for him, and were occasionally close at his heels, although the Bavarian police had expressly warned him to be on his guard against them. On the occasion of his second visit to Berlin, he happened to come across Captain Pabst, who was still in possession of a large sum of money remaining from the treasury of the original conspiracy in Berlin, and who also knew Ludendorf's secret place of abode—a lonely house in the forest, in the neighbourhood of Rosenhain. The two of them went to call on Ludendorf, where Major Stephani also put in an appearance. It was resolved, for reasons of personal security, to transfer the headquarters to Budapest. The idea was, that the Hungarian and even the Russian monarchists should be persuaded to interest themselves in the movement, and that the revolution should be organized and directed from Budapest and Vienna. On the 8th of May a monarchist congress was to be held in Berlin. Trebitsch, therefore, betook himself once more to the German capital, but, for some

reason or another, he was not very warmly received by the other partisans, who advised him that the police were after him and that he should make himself scarce. He followed their advice and disappeared, at least for the night, finding shelter in Trebbin, a little town near Potsdam, in the house of a governess who had once been employed by him. Next day he was standing on the platform, waiting to get into the train for Berlin, when he was recognized and stopped by an official of the criminal police. Trebitsch got the latter to allow him to go back, under escort, to his own quarters, in order to pack his things. The attention of his warder being distracted for a moment, the prisoner took advantage of the fact to jump through an open window, and so he made his escape.

But the police did have something to show for their trouble. One valuable piece of booty fell into their hands: a trunk containing the secret correspondence of the conspirators.

Trebitsch remained concealed for a short time in Potsdam, being sheltered by a political sympathizer. Then he made his way by Frankfurt to his friends in Munich. Pöhner, the chief of police, gave him a note of introduction to the Hungarian consul-general in Munich, who was so well satisfied with his initiation into the im-

mediate plans of his fellow-countryman that he supplied him with a guardian angel as far as Vienna, in the shape of a consular official. In Vienna his difficulties threatened to become serious, for he noticed that he was being followed by detectives.

However, he found Gratz, the Hungarian ambassador in Vienna, quite willing to have a new passport made out for him, and he arrived without further molestation in Budapest, hoping to obtain congenial employment. Without any loss of time he made the acquaintance of the deputies Gömbös and Eckhardt, and of Colonel von Pronay, the chief press-agent of the Hungarian Government. To them he unfolded a plan that was comparable in value to the one he had proposed to the British admiralty during the War. A large number of German soldiers, dressed as civilians, were to be smuggled into Hungary, and there to receive their military equipment, after which they were to be sent against Vienna and Czechoslovakia. Colonel Bauer, who had accompanied Trebitsch, had actually received from Ludendorff plenary powers to conclude a preliminary treaty with Hungary. But Colonel Pronay did not look with approval upon this mad project, which struck him as being risky in the extreme. The whole scheme ended in smoke.

Trebitsch now understood that there was no further opportunity of using his talents in Germany and Austria, so he moved to Italy, trusting that, among the Fascists, there would surely be scope for his activities. And he was not disappointed. There is still a dark veil of mystery surrounding the intrigues in which he became involved as a Fascist, and perhaps this is not incomprehensible, if it be true, as has been alleged, that he had some connexion with the murder of Mateotti.

Then, for a fairly long time, nothing more was heard of him, until people concluded that he was dead. But it was not so. He had certainly shaken off from his feet the dust of an ungrateful Europe. The astonished world heard through the reports from an American correspondent in China, that were being published in the *New York World*, of a certain Chilan, said to be the political adviser of Wu Pei Fu, and to have organized the anti-British propaganda in China. At the same time we learned that this Chilan was no other than the notorious Trebitsch-Lincoln, who had found a new outlet for his energies in the turmoil of the Far East. With cynical frankness he had related to the American newspaper man the vicissitudes of his adventurous life, making no effort whatever to conceal his employment as a

double spy during the World War. It will hardly astonish anyone who knows his previous history to hear that in China he had once more changed his religion and gone over to Buddhism.

The last news of this incorrigible adventurer, that had interest for the world, was the announcement that he was returning from China to England. His son was under sentence of death for murder, and Trebitsch wished to see him once more before his execution. The British Government was magnanimously willing to put no obstacle in his way. But as a matter of fact the father was too late. During the course of his chequered career he had many a time had vast sums of money placed at his disposal for various purposes of conspiracy and underhand work. To mention only one case, Lieutenant-General Krauss had once opened for him a credit of 230,000 dollars. On this occasion, however, by the time he reached France, his financial resources were so completely exhausted, that he was not able to pay the fare that would have brought him over the last short stage of his journey to London. He never saw his son again in life.

Since that last melancholy appearance, Trebitsch-Lincoln has faded completely from public notice.

Chapter 9

WOMEN SPIES

OPINIONS AS TO THEIR USEFULNESS

ALL the world knows that, during the Great War women, as well as men, paid their tribute of sacrifice. Many of them suddenly discovered that they had a heart ready to brave the fatigues and perils of the soldier's lot, and, boldly taking the rifle in their hand, marched with their brothers against the enemy. Hundreds of them, of all nations, fought in the ranks. In Russia, one especially courageous amazon actually attained the rank of major, while, in the Austrian army, whole companies of young Ukrainian women were enrolled.

Another set of women brought more characteristically feminine qualities—beauty, cunning, and guile—to the service of Mars, and, impelled by various motives, taste for adventure, greed of money, or even love of country, took part in the equally perilous career of espionage.

The woman spy is indeed not merely an interesting character in fiction or the fascinating heroine of cinema plays; she exists not simply in the imagination of authors of sensational criminal and detective stories, but, as many a case before

the courts in peace-time, and numerous executions during the last War, go to prove, a very real being. Such women have been found in all nations and classes. For the most part they have been adventuresses or ladies of the *demi-monde*, actresses, dancers, artists from the music-halls and cabarets, and waitresses. But aristocrats, school-teachers, sempstresses, and laundry-maids also have been engaged with more or less success in secret service. While, however, the French, Germans, and Russians have often employed women—for, after all, there are many problems of espionage that would appear to be most easily solved by prepossessing ladies of fashion or of humbler station—the British intelligence service seems less disposed to use them. During the whole course of the late War we knew of no woman spy being directly engaged in the British service. Unsatisfactory previous experience, and observation of the failure of women in the service of other states, account, no doubt, for this attitude, which at first glance is surprising.

A British naval officer once advanced a very interesting justification of the point of view. In his opinion, women are lacking in patience, method, and persistence. Worse still, they are indiscreet, and their heart is often stronger than their head. In proof of this he quoted examples

of women who, having been in the espionage service, had fallen head over ears in love with the person they were commissioned to watch, and simply repaid to their employers the money received, because they refused to betray their love. A young woman, very devoted to her chief, used to bring him the most valuable information, which had only one fault: out of love, it had been invented.

As for the matter of feminine indiscretion, we have reason to believe that the British were ingenious enough, during the last War, to make a virtue of this weakness, by communicating in the strictest confidence to ladies of known garrulity news that was certain, sooner or later, to reach the enemy and to mislead him. For example, it was believed not merely in Germany but in Paris also for a time, that several Russian corps had been transported *via* Britain to France; and it was even asserted that the Cossacks had been seen landing in Le Havre. This report was on every one's lips, and probably had its origin in an act of deliberately misplaced trust on the part of the British Admiralty¹.

¹ The translator has no means of verifying this suggestion that the British Admiralty invented, or helped in any deliberate way to propagate, this myth. But he has a simple theory of the origin of the tale of those ghostly Russian legions who landed in the far north of Scotland. He had an acquaintance who be-

A SUCCESSFUL AFFAIR IN GENEVA

But that a woman spy is also able to render masterly service was shown by the French agent Thérèse Prévost. Some time before the War the Russian Government was very anxious to find out the identity and the names of a group of revolutionaries who had their centre at Montreux, on the Lake of Geneva. For this purpose they applied to the "International Secret Service Bureau" in Brussels. On this important mission Thérèse Prévost, accompanied by a male agent, was sent to Switzerland. The young and beautiful Thérèse was to appear as an immensely rich heiress from Canada, who was making a trip to Europe with her brother. The leader of the Russian exiles was known to the Russian Government; his name was Goluhovski. He had a son twenty-two years of age; so the plan of campaign

longed to the county of Ross, and whose ordinary pronunciation of the name of his homeland was so peculiar that it seemed easier to believe one heard *Russia* than *Ross-shire*. If that pronunciation be typical of the men of the north, it is not difficult to imagine how the legend may have arisen. Suppose a troop-train going south stopped one night at a station for a few moments, and some idler on the platform or some railway-porter inquired where the travellers had come from. He may well have been deceived at first by the answer to his question: "Ross-shire." In those days many people did not stop to weigh probabilities: the world was so full of surprises. All that was necessary was to repeat the story and add the snow on the soldiers' boots. *Translator's note.*

was not difficult to draw up. Soon the young Goluhovski was seen daily in company with the fair Canadian, of whose wealth the wildest stories became current—she had been supplied with a fair sum with which to make a splash. One day the official betrothal of the pair was announced. It was to be celebrated by a sumptuous banquet, to which Thérèse insisted that all Goluhovski's Russian friends were to be invited. She was going to write out the invitations herself, but oh! those funny Russian names! It was impossible to spell them. So young Goluhovski, laughing, wrote out in his own hand the names of his friends, and handed the list to his *fiancée*.

The day came, and everything was prepared on the most lavish scale. After the ices Thérèse announced, with her sweetest smile, that she had a surprise for her guests. She would like to have a permanent souvenir of this, the happiest day in her life, and to that end she had sent for a photographer to take a picture of the company. This proposal did not seem to be quite agreeable to the Russians. Photographs were dangerous and might easily fall into the hands of the Russian secret police, the notorious Ochрана. But Thérèse overcame all objections, by assuring them that she would request the photographer to hand over all the copies to the elder Goluhovski. And

so a splendid photograph was taken of the whole group of revolutionaries standing upon the marble steps at the front-door of the hotel, with the laughing pair in the centre.

As quickly as possible Thérèse secured the prints, and the same night she and her 'brother' left Montreux for ever. In a couple of days the list of names in young Goluhovski's handwriting, as well as the photograph, were in the hands of the Bureau at Brussels. Thérèse received a handsome reward in cash, and the authorities in St Petersburg knew all that was necessary about the conspirators by the Lake of Geneva.

CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1905

There is a story, drawn from comparatively recent history in Turkey, which exhibits women spies at work on a large scale. This particular enterprise promised for a time to be brilliantly successful, and, if it had not been interrupted, might have modified considerably political developments in the Near East. In the year 1905 Constantinople was swarming with French and Russian female spies and Circassian *demi-mondaines*, whose business it was to bribe the higher Turkish court and state officials and military officers, in order to make them amenable to

French and Russian influence, and especially to alienate them from Germany. The method pursued by these agents was very simple and almost always crowned with success. By every means of feminine seductive art the charmer sought to attach her victim and to involve him in the greatest possible expense, so that he was soon inevitably living far beyond his means. The costliest presents were offered and accepted, and presently the devoted admirer would find that his resources were completely exhausted. He was faced with the alternative of resigning his post and consequently of quitting the gay life of the city—dreadful thought!—or of paying his debts. And here the lady played her trump card. She could settle all his accounts, if only he would supply the political or military secrets that, in virtue of his position, were known to him.

Among these secret agents the leading part was played by Mademoiselle Balniaux, the mistress of Abdullah, then the influential adviser to the Grand Vizier. It was no wonder that the latter, the chief personage in the Turkish Government—the nominal sultan Abdul Hamid had, of course, absolutely no say—had been, for some time past, placing all possible obstacles in the way of German diplomacy. Mademoiselle Balniaux worked in close association with an

English dancer, who was giving nightly performances in the Turkish cabaret "Folies Arabes." It was the latter who acted as intermediary between Mlle Balniaux and the French secret service. Dr Graves, the German secret agent, succeeded in discovering these underground intrigues at the Sublime Porte. The result was that the German Government, knowing where the trouble lay, was able to apply the lever at the required point. And so the revolution of the Young Turks took place, bringing into power the pro-German Enver Bey.

SENTIMENT AND ESPIONAGE

There are certainly on record many cases where women have suffered in the attempt to combine sentiment with espionage. It is beyond doubt that Olga Bruder paid for her love with her life. She was employed by the "International Secret Service Bureau" of Brussels, a semi-private institution, which, before the War, used to supply, on very expensive terms, secret information about military affairs, such as newly erected fortifications, guns, ammunition, and so on. Olga Bruder had been commissioned to procure the plans of a Russian fortress on the eastern frontier of Germany. And she managed

to get them. But at the same time it was learned that she had formed a very intimate friendship with the local chief of the Russian espionage, and her employers feared that she was going to play false. Further, she was discovered, contrary to the regulations, to have become acquainted with four other secret agents working against Russia, whom she might possibly betray. She had become a highly dangerous person, and one day the newspapers announced that, in a hotel in Memel, a certain Miss Olga Bruder had committed suicide. She had really been poisoned, for the interests of the State demanded her removal.

A similar fate befell, during the World War, the young and beautiful Pole, Marussia D., a widow and an actress, who had lived for many years in Paris. She spoke French, German, English, Russian, and Polish, and was very well known in artistic and theatrical circles. The French secret service suspected her of being an enemy spy. Her frequent excursions to Geneva had first aroused suspicion. She was the mistress of a Rumanian who lived there, a theatrical agent, whose brother had been convicted by the Swiss authorities of spying for the Central Powers. The French had put all manner of difficulties in the way of her crossing the frontier, but she continually managed to do so, and no material proof of her guilt

had been found. One day, however, they learned that she had written from Geneva to an acquaintance in Paris a letter in which she requested him to represent to the authorities that her presence in the capital was absolutely necessary, in order to study a *rôle* in a play, of which he was to pretend to be the author. It was decided to get to the bottom of the mystery. The French consul in Lausanne himself took an active part. All at once he appeared to have fallen violently in love with Marussia, for he followed her every step. When she applied for a visa to cross into France, this was granted on condition of her submitting to a sort of quarantine, and giving up all intercourse with the Rumanian and his friends. After prolonged hesitation she pretended to agree, and it looked as though she were on the point of making some sort of confession, when suddenly news of her death was published. She had been found lying dead on her bed, fully dressed and covered with flowers. It looked like a case of self-destruction. But the Geneva police proved that she had been poisoned. The very evening before her death she had taken supper in a restaurant, with a person known to be in the confidence of the French consul. Which country has her death upon its conscience will probably never be known.

The disastrous consequences that do sometimes follow from female indiscretion are well illustrated by the case of a certain Parisian actress in the French service, who, during the Great War, was sent to Belgium, in the interests of their counter-espionage. Her business was to 'make up to' the German officers; but she found the Boches so agreeable that she determined not to return to the "city of light," and, out of affection for a blonde Prussian, she passed on her remarkably detailed knowledge of the French spy organization in the occupied parts of Belgium. The German army command was thus enabled at a given moment to demolish the whole of that section of the French espionage system. No less than sixty-six French agents were arrested—a heavy blow for the French General Staff, which, at a critical juncture in the War, was quite in the dark as to German plans and became completely dependent, in this respect, upon the British secret service. One consequence was, that the great attack made by the Crown Prince's army at the beginning of 1916 was more of a surprise to the enemy than otherwise it would have been, and this may partly explain the initial success then achieved by the Germans.

WOMEN IN THE GERMAN SERVICE

Among such women employed by the Germans a few of the stars were: the "great unknown," dubbed the "Red Tiger"; the Polish princess Wisniewska; the Swede named Eva de Bournonville; the *demi-mondaine* Mrs Lizzie Wertheim; the little sempstress from Grenoble, Marguerite Francillard; the exotic dancer and cocotte, Mata Hari. Of all these only the first two escaped death or imprisonment.

THE RED TIGER

The most successful was the first-named. She was a very remarkable woman of German origin, who occupied an extraordinarily important position in the secret service of the German army. She had the direct personal control of the agents and spies sent out to work against France and England. This fact, remarkable as it may sound, is authentic, and is vouched for by no meaner authority than Colonel Nicolai, the chief of the German military intelligence department, in his book *Secret Powers*. He uses these words, "In the German military intelligence service, it was a cavalry officer belonging to an old family, and an exceptionally cultured woman, who proved most competent in dealing with the agents, even

with the craftiest and the most difficult characters." Apart from that admission, a thick veil of mystery still surrounds this unique woman. Even the French and the English secret services, in spite of all their efforts, never succeeded in removing her mask, or determining her identity. The French referred to her as "Mademoiselle Doctor," "the Queen of Spies," "la Grande Patronne" (*i.e.* "the Big Boss"). To the English she was "Frau Doktor Elizabeth"; they supposed, on no very clear evidence, that her surname was Heinrichsen. What was best known about her was the innumerable nicknames that the agents invented for her, such as the "Black Cat," "Red Tiger," etc.

One of the many agents, whom this magnificent figure of a woman with nerves of steel sent, without compunction, to his death, the Greek Coudoyannis, describes her thus, "She is marvellously beautiful. She possesses rare intelligence, and has an incredible fund of energy at her command. She exerts upon all who come in contact with her an irresistible charm, and not even officers of high rank, who are subject to her orders, venture to oppose her. Espionage is in her blood: she is not inspired by self-interest, but by passion for the work."

Her headquarters were in Antwerp, the centre

of the German espionage system, where she lived in a luxurious hotel. She often undertook hazardous motor runs, driving herself, into Holland, which was the point of departure for the German agents who were sent to England. In the streets of Amsterdam and Rotterdam she was quite a well-known figure. But she was never seen alone; two herculean fellows were always in her company, known, by all whom it concerned, to be well armed, so that there was never much chance of her being captured, though, doubtless, that must have been ardently desired by the opposition.

One of her most successful assistants was a man who worked for a long time in France under her instructions, and was afterward sent from Paris on a special mission to London, where he was able to collect and send over very valuable information about the transport of troops. According to his account of his first interview with her, she seems to have understood her job thoroughly. She had studied his appearance for some time, and then said, "You are a person of education and you speak several languages. That is of great value, but it is not enough by a long way. You've got to be adroit, ingenious, obedient, courageous, and bold. I wonder if you possess all these qualities. I know something of physiog-

nomy, and I believe you do. Before long, you will come to be passionately fond of your work. If you really like adventure you will find life interesting. Another suggestion: be temperate, and sober, and don't sleep long in the mornings. Go to haunts of pleasure, if you must, but don't become involved in any love affair, for every country has its counter-spies, men and women. Be circumspect, when you are trying to get anyone into your toils. Study most carefully the character and the mode of life of the people whose company you keep. Try to impress upon your mind the topography of the localities where you are sent to work. Make as few notes as possible, and then always in cipher; and afterward destroy everything as far as possible. Now then, just repeat all I've been saying to you!"

When this was over she gave the agent more precise instructions as to the information he was to send; concerning, for example, the spirit of the population, the prospects of a revolution breaking out, the possibilities of engineering one, the defensive measures being taken in Paris, movements of troops, shipping in Boulogne, Calais, Le Havre, Saint-Nazaire, munition factories, etc.

Correspondence with the spies working in France was sent *via* Geneva. It was conducted

in a secret script, with a cipher that was changed every fortnight. When a piece of work was well done she was generous in the amount of cash paid, spies receiving as much as six to twelve thousand francs a month.

Her arm reached well over the frontier and she never lost sight of an agent. She often had one watched by another. It was thus she learned that one of her men had formed a liaison with a French dancer of the Champs Élysées. She forbade him at once, on any account, to continue the affair, unless he could induce the lady to enter the German service. But in this case the warning was too late, for the dancer, though quite willing to amuse herself with him, was not in the least disposed to accept such a suggestion, and denounced him to the police, with the result that the imprudent lover was shot.

This woman did not hesitate to hand over her own agents to the enemy, if she had any reason to distrust them, or to suspect them of playing the double game. With hope and fear—francs or pound notes in one hand, and a revolver in the other—that was how she kept her dangerous army of spies in check.

Beyond doubt this mistress-spy, who, as she once put it, would not have exchanged her profession for a throne, was one of the most remark-

able phenomena of the whole War. Her work was, in her eyes, romantic, and intellectually a stimulus and a joy, but it dripped blood.

MARGUERITE FRANCILLARD

Most of these women, however, neither achieved great success nor escaped the supreme penalty of failure.

In January 1917 there stood at the stake in Vincennes, facing a squad of soldiers with loaded rifles, Marguerite Francillard, of Grenoble. Even in the hour of death her courage did not fail her. But, to tell the truth, she had helped more than she had harmed the land she had betrayed. And the country she had served as a spy had gained very little good by her. She was certainly a very good needlewoman, but a very awkward and artless spy. The news that she brought, concealed in her basket, from Savoy over the frontier to Switzerland, was of very little use, because at the French frontier they soon found out why the fair Marguerite was so often visiting Geneva, where, she said, her *fiancé* lived. She was watched, and so served as the involuntary betrayer of all the agents who had dealings with her. The French could not have desired a better assistant, for Marguerite was more useful than a first-class detective. One day, however, they lost all trace

of her. What brought the police again upon her track was a postcard rashly sent by her from Paris, where she had gone, to a friend in Grenoble. She was living in a modest hotel in the Latin Quarter. There she was visited by neutrals—Rumanians, Greeks, Spaniards, Swedes, and Danes—who were supplying her with information to be forwarded to Geneva. Her hotel was consequently a regular police trap, for the agents were easily arrested one after another. As Marguerite was fond of good wine she was not averse to accepting an invitation now and then to a little dinner, quite unaware of the fact that the gay gentlemen who entertained her were members of the police force. Advantage was taken of her absence to take stock of whatever happened to be in her rooms. Documents were photographed or copied, and then carefully replaced as they had been found. After all her international friends had been laid by the heels, her usefulness was at an end, and she, too, was arrested. She was sent to the St Lazare prison and occupied the famous cell, No. 12, in which Madame Steinheil and Madame Caillaux had lived for a time, and the inside of which the famous spy Mata Hari was afterward to know. She was condemned to be shot.

MATA HARI

Mata Hari, "the Eye of the Morning," was the poetic Javanese pseudonym adopted by a famous variety artist, who, according to her papers, was a divorced woman named MacLeod, *née* Margareta Gertruda Zelle. She was born in 1876 in Leeuwarden, in Holland, and became one of the subtlest and cleverest secret agents thrown up by the late War. This international courtesan, the mistress of ministers, officers, and artists of all nations; this woman, whose insatiable thirst for luxury and money brought many a man of substance to beggary, was at the same time a dancer, who, with the play of her supple naked body in Indian temple dances, roused to thunderous applause the music-hall public in London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome. This adventuress, who was as much at home in Sydney, New York, and Cairo, as in her elegant mansion, No. 11, rue Windsor, Neuilly, Paris, paid for by a millionaire marquis; this *demi-mondaine* with the airs of a great lady, who, in Germany, raved over her disappointed love for the Crown Prince, and, in France, indicated the Russian Captain Marov as the one man whom, in all her life, she had truly loved; this bewitching sorceress of love and art also entered the dangerous province of espionage, for which,

by her beauty, her great intellectual gifts, and her daring, she certainly seemed remarkably well qualified. Was it the titillating stimulus of danger that she sought, or was it the lust for gold that this career promised so quickly to satisfy, that made her enter upon the path that led her in the end to Vincennes?

In the trial that took place in the year 1917 behind closed doors in Paris the story of her life that was unfolded was like some sensational film drama. Some interesting details have been made public by Major Count Massard.

On the day of the declaration of War Mata Hari was in Berlin, where she was appearing in the "Wintergarten" as an Indian dancing girl. By the German secret service, who registered her as H. 21, she was commissioned to go to Paris, which did not entail any great difficulty for her, seeing that she was a Dutch subject and therefore neutral. She received the handsome sum of 30,000 marks, and went *via* Belgium, Holland and England, to Paris, on the pretext that she was going to break up her house in Neuilly. From Paris she went, after a time to the French front, staying in Vittel for many months disguised as a nurse. It was here that she devoted herself to the severely wounded and blinded Russian officer Marov, whom she appears to

have tended with really touching care, asserting that she loved him passionately. All through this period she was in uninterrupted correspondence with the chief of the German intelligence service in Amsterdam. Her letters were forwarded by the Dutch embassy in Paris, who were under the delusion that she was corresponding with her daughter in Holland. It was a simple matter for the beautiful hospital-nurse to gain the confidence of the French officers, and especially of the flying-officers, from whom, no doubt, in moments of amorous delight, she obtained valuable military information. She was able to give the German Army command most useful details as to the disposition of French spies on the German front, and betrayed the preparations that were being made for a French counter-offensive in 1916.

The British secret service was the first to warn the French authorities against her, and at last they too had their suspicions aroused. When she became aware that she was being observed she quitted the front and returned to Paris. But even here she did not feel safe. What was she to do? She did what most spies are wont to do in such circumstances: she offered her services to the other side. She went to the second bureau of the French General Staff and made a statement

purporting to give the points on the Moroccan coast where German submarines were sheltering: the statement was, of course, an invention. At the same time she proposed that she should be sent to the occupied zone in Belgium, to convey instructions to the French agents posted there. The French secret service pretended to accept the offer, and handed her a list of all the names of their people employed at the time in Belgium. But this list was really a trap; for, of the names included in the list, only one was genuine; and this exception was that of an agent who, they had good reason to believe, was a double spy. Three weeks later this man was shot by the Germans in Brussels. Only Mata Hari could have given him away, by communicating that list, somehow or other, to the enemy.

She had not yet left Paris; but as she belonged to the neutrals and there was no absolutely clear proof that suspicion was well founded, they did not care to proceed at once to arrest her. She was allowed to leave France.

Here the account of her movements is somewhat obscure. It is certain that she managed to find her way to Germany, for a personal friend of the Crown Prince ran across her in the street in Cologne, and had a long talk with her. She gave him to understand that she intended to go

back, sooner or later, to France and would not be dissuaded, alleging that she had professional engagements to keep. On leaving him she used these curious and tell-tale words, "Remember me as a woman who has done and suffered much for Germany."

It is also certain that the British authorities were aware of her movements. They managed to secure her person, probably arresting her on board ship, and conveyed her to London, where she was subjected to a very thorough cross-examination by Sir Basil Thomson, the chief of Scotland Yard. With consummate skill she strove to avoid all the traps he laid for her, and the interview ended most unexpectedly on her admission that she was indeed a spy, but for France, not for Germany. She was sent off to Spain; with what commission is not stated.

Her arrival there was, of course, known to both sides, and from the moment she set foot on shore in the port of Gijon, a French secret agent attached himself to her, following her wherever she went and taking care never to let her out of his sight. He was, from the start, so successful in his job that, on the very day of her landing, he had a photograph taken and sent to his employers, which showed himself and the all unsuspecting dancer on the one plate. In Madrid

she took up her abode in a well-appointed suite of rooms in a fashionable hotel, and was soon on very intimate terms with a particularly fascinating German attaché there. Her relations with him developed quickly into a regular liaison. There was no opportunity of bringing her charms to bear directly upon the King, who would certainly have known much of what mattered most at the moment concerning Entente policy, so they endeavoured to bring about an association between her and the French military attaché, who lived in the same hotel. But of him she could make nothing. Having been warned beforehand, he successfully repelled all the advances she made to him, on every conceivable pretext.

The German attaché gave the lady one or two dainty trinkets, but Mata Hari needed money, always money. So, as they could make no further use of her as an agent in Spain, it was decided to send her back to Paris, where in any case, as she had told her friend in Cologne, she wished to go. And it was then that the thing was done which sealed her fate.

The attaché sent an urgent wireless message to the chief of the intelligence service in Amsterdam requesting him to have 15,000 pesetas paid to H. 21, by the intermediary of the Dutch

embassy, on her return to Paris. This wireless message was intercepted by the Eiffel Tower; and as the French were by this time informed of Mata Hari's letter and number, it was resolved to arrest her. She was allowed to return to Paris, in order to receive payment due at the Dutch Embassy, and almost immediately after she had paid this call the police conveyed her to the St Lazare prison.

The proceedings before the court-martial were not without dramatic episodes. Mata Hari made ingenious efforts to defend herself. She admitted quite frankly the various remittances from Amsterdam and her correspondence with the chief spy in Holland, whose mistress she said she was. But, she protested, it was not a question of espionage at all, but simply of a love-affair. She had certainly been a courtesan, but never a spy. Her advocate, an old gentleman of seventy-five, who appeared to be in love with her, and chivalrously lavished flowers and sweetmeats upon her, cited as a witness for the defence a French diplomatist who occupied a very exalted post in the Foreign Office. He had been her first lover after her divorce, and with him she had spent three evenings on her return from Madrid. He testified that the subject of their conversations had been Indian art. A very intimate docu-

ment from a French Minister of War was read aloud and provoked in the court a significant smile. Apparently Mata Hari had used these connexions to give herself the necessary importance in the eyes of her employers.

She was unanimously condemned to death, and heard the sentence with a convulsive sort of smile and a shrug of the shoulders. On the day before her execution she was dancing in her cell and took a bath. She had asked to be allowed to bathe in milk, but had to be satisfied with water. The execution took place at six o'clock on the morning of the 15th of October, 1917. The Dutch Government had vainly tried to intervene at the last moment; and, as vainly, her counsel had tried to obtain a reprieve by appealing to a certain article of the criminal code, affirming that she was pregnant by his agency. Mata Hari would not have anything to do with this line of strategy, and refused to undergo the medical examination. She wrote a few letters of farewell, and then entered the motor-car that conveyed her, accompanied by a military escort, to Vincennes. As proud as a princess she walked past the file of soldiers, who were standing at the present. She bade farewell to her advocate, who embraced her, and to the sister-of-mercy who had watched over her and tended her in her cell,

and then received the last words of consolation from the priest. A *gendarme* led her to the stake to pinion her, but she objected. She likewise refused to be blindfolded. The officer in charge of the firing-party raised his sword. The drums rolled. The clergyman stepped aside. Mata Hari smiled and threw kisses to the lawyer and the priest. Then, short and sharp, came the order, "Fire!" A sergeant-major gave her the *coup de grâce* by firing his revolver into her ear. The doctor certified her death. The body of the beautiful dancer and spy, once so ardently loved and admired, was thrown into a plain white-wood coffin. *Finita la commedia!*

